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Executive Summary 
A .  Fkndings 
Rela t ions  i ,n sc ience  and technology f i g u r e d  prominently 
i ,n  t h e  process  of U.S.-China normal iza t ion ,  and came t o  sym- 
b o l i z e  improving Skno-Americm r e l a t i o ' n s  i .n  t h e  post-normalizatio,n 
per iod.  Governme,nt t o  government r e l a t i o n s  i ,n  sc ience  and tech-  
,nology have expa,nded r a p i d l y  s ince  January,  19'79, and now a r e  
being conducted under t h e  terms of 14 b i l a t e r a l  agreeme.nts (ex- 
c luding  the  agreement f o r  exchanges of s tuden t s  and s c h o l a r s ) .  
I n  many a r e a s ,  subs tan t ive  s c i e n t i f i c  co l l abora t ion  has a l r eady  
occurred. In o t h e r s ,  c a r e f u l  p lans  f o r  cooperat ion have been 
made, and t h e  s t a g e  i s  ,now s e t  f o r  subs tan t ive  work. Due t o  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  commitments t o  it from both  governments and t h e  
growth of genui,ne rappor t  between s c i e ' n t i s t s  i n  t h e  two com- 
t r i e s ,  i n  most r e s p e c t s  t h e  program of S & T cooperat ion has 
been remarkably successfu l  t o  da te .  
For t h e  Chi.nese s i d e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i n  S & T i s  seen as 
an important p a r t  of t h e  d e v e l o p h g  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a s  
we l l  as am opportuni ty t o  upgrade i t s  scie,nce and technology. 
Chknese s c i e , n t i f i c  developmeant was i n t e r r u p t e d  by t h e  C u l t u r a l  
Revolution j u s t  as major new advances i n  r e sea rch  were occurr ing 
i n  t h e  West, advances due ?n p a r t  t o  t h e  r evo lu t ion  i n  r e sea rch  
ins t rumenta t ion .  Access t o  t h e  U .  S. , t h e r e f o r e ,  provides  not  
j u s t  access  t o  i n d u s t r i a l  technology, but  a l s o  t o  t h e  tech-  
nology of r e sea rch  i t s e l f ,  o r  how one "does sc ience"  i n  t h e  
advanced i n d u s t r i a l  world. 
There have been a number of changes i n  China s ince  t h e  
agreement w a s  s igned,  y e t  s c i e n t i f i c  and technologica l  devel- 
opment i s  s t i l l  a  high p r i o r i t y  i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  development 
e f f o r t .  I n  s p i t e  of severe n a t i o n a l  budgetary cutbacks and a 
renewed emphasis on app l i ed  resea rch ,  t h e  Chinese s i d e  i s  com- 
mi t t ed  t o  maintaining i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  wi th  t h e  U . S .  i n  most 
f i e l d s .  Except f o r  high energy phys ics  and some a r e a s  of 
space technology, t h e  Chinese regard  the  content  of t h e  pro- 
gram as appropr ia te  f o r  t h e i r  needs,  and appear t o  be p r o t e c t -  
i n g  budgets f o r  cooperat ion wi th  t h e  U . S .  accordingly.  
Although t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  l e v e l s  of t h e  two coun t r i e s  a r e  
i n  most f i e l d s  uneven, many of t h e  Americans who have p a r t i -  
c ipa ted  i n  t h e  program have found i t  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  exc i t ing .  
The program a f f o r d s  access  t o  unique n a t u r a l  and s o c i a l  phenom- 
ena,  and American p a r t i c i p a n t s  have a l s o  found t h a t  t h e i r  Chin- 
ese  coun te rpa r t s  a r e  both cooperat ive and thought fu l  co l labor-  
a t o r s ,  and consc ient ious  and hardworking i n  t h e i r  ded ica t ion  
t o  improve t h e i r  work. One experienced s c i e n t i s t  who spent  
s i x  weeks of f i e l d  work i n  China as p a r t  of one o f  t h e  agree- 
ments, repor ted  t h a t  t h e  program w a s  t h e  b e s t  cooperat ive pro- 
gram he had ever p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n .  Another, who p a r t i c i p a t e d  
i n  the  most ambitious of t h e  p r o j e c t s  t o  d a t e ,  r epor ted  t h a t  
on t h e  b a s i s  of h i s  f i e l d  experience i n  China, he expected 
t o  r e d i r e c t  t h e  next  10 yea r s  of h i s  ca ree r  t o  co l l abora t ive  
work w i t h  Chinese col leagues.  
The a c t i v i s t  approach t o  S & T cooperat ion pursued by both 
s i d e s  during t h e  las t  two years  has c rea ted  some problems ( d i s -  
cussed below),  but it has a l s o  produced a number of s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  
worthwhile p r o j e c t s  t h a t  a r e  a l ready "o f f  t h e  ground." While 
t h i s  ac t iv ism has not  escaped c r i t i c i s m  from some q u a r t e r s ,  it 
i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  a more caut ious  approach probably would have meant 
l e s s  subs tan t ive  achievements t o  d a t e .  The approach followed 
has  a l s o  l e d  t o  t h e  des i red  goal  of c r e a t i n g  a web of r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p s  between t h e  two coun t r i e s ,  and t h e  two governments i n  par-  
t i c u l a r .  O f f i c i a l s  on both s i d e s  a r e  now obl iga ted  t o  consider  
t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  o the r  i n  developing domestic p lans  and pro- 
grams, and t h e  record  of both s i d e s  i n  d ischarging  t h i s  obl iga-  
t i o n ,  i n  genera l ,  has ind ica ted  t h a t  r e a l  progress  has been 
made i n  overcoming 30 years  of mutual i s o l a t i o n ,  h o s t i l i t y  and 
misunderstanding, 
I n  s p i t e  of considerable  success  during t h e  f i r s t  two yea r s  
of t h e  program, c e r t a i n  problems a r e  now evident .  Four i n  par-  
t i c u l a r  a r e  no tab le .  F i r s t ,  t he  U . S .  s i d e  has n o t  organized 
i t s e l f  adequately t o  take  f u l l  advantage of t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  
The l a c k  of imaginat ively devised l i a i s o n  between t h e  govern- 
ment and t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  t o  advance t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of both  
i s  one man i fes ta t ion  of t h i s  problem. The l o s s  of a consider-  
a b l e  amount of p o l i c y  use fu l  information generated by t h e  pro- 
gram about China i s  another .  
Second, f r u s t r a t i o n s  on t h e  U.S. s i d e  over Chinese t r e a t -  
ment of proposals  by American s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s  f o r  r e sea rch  i n  
China under t h e  s tugen t  and scho la r  program i s  c r e a t i n g  some 
resentment among Americans who have a c t i v e l y  supported c l o s e r  
U.S.-China r e l a t i o n s .  There i s  a danger t h a t  t h i s  resentment 
could poison the  c l imate  f o r  the  conduct of t h e  S & T b i l a t e r a l s  
a s  wel l .  
Third, the financial foundation for the program was never 
satisfactorily laid and complaints about finances are common 
to both sides. The Chinese note that in comparison with co- 
operative programs which they conduct with other OECD countries, 
the U.S. approach has been particularly stringent. In the face 
of the current severe budgetary austerity in both China and 
the U.S., the shaky financial foundation of the program is the 
biggest immediate threat to its continuation and development. 
Finally, after the activist pursuit of improved U.S.-China 
relations during the Carter administration, the U.S. now seems 
to be a bit unclear about just how relations with China serve 
its interests and about how S & T fits into the larger relation- 
ship. In contrast, the Chinese side seems to have a better sense 
of where it hopes the U.X.-China relationship will go and of the 
important role S & T cooperation can have in building the over- 
all relationship over the long run. While the S & T relationship 
cannot substitute for political understandings, it plays an im- 
portant part in developing the political relationships on the 
basis of those understandings, in the Chinese view. 
B. Recommendations 
The credibility of any recommendations pertaining to S & T 
cooperation with China is contingent upon their being in phase 
with current assumptions about China policy more generally. The 
latter are somewhat unclear as of this writing. Furthermore, the 
austerity budgets both sides are adopting seemingly limit the 
possibilities for major new initiatives. These recommendations 
proceed from a recognition of budgetary austerity, but also 
from the assumptions that regaining momentum for the improve- 
ment of U.S,-China relations is in the national interests of 
both sides, and that there is more potential for contributing 
to that goal in the S & T relationship than has yet been realized. 
The recommendations resulting from the study, therefore, are 
as follows: 
1. The U.S., at a high level, should indicate its commit- 
ment to the continuation of the program at least at current 
levels, and should insure that adequate resources, especially 
travel funds, are available. 
2. The U.S. Government cannot possibly anticipate all the 
resources in the U.S. that might be available to support U.S.- 
PRC S & T cooperation. It is therefore desirable to make greater 
efforts to involve non-governmental parties in the bilaterals 
in order to facilitate the matching of opportunities with re- 
sources. 
3. The U.S. should explore ways of taking fuller advantage 
of the opportunities for benefits afforded by the program. This 
is particularly true in the areas of commercial opportunities 
and opportunities for expanding our knowledge of China, its S & T 
and economy. Again, this will involve greater involvement of 
non-governmental parties. More detailed suggestions are found 
in Section V I .  
4. The U.S. must clarify its export controls policy as it 
affects China, and insure that the workings of the export con- 
trols machinery are consistent with policy. 
5. The U.S. should explore wi th  t h e  Chinese imaginative 
new ways of funding program a c t i v i t i e s .  ~ s s u m i n ~  t h a t  t h e  U .  S .  
decides t h a t  i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with China i s  of value t o  i t ,  
modest concessionary f inancing  should be explored. Another 
a l t e r n a t i v e  deserving cons idera t ion  i s  t h e  establ ishment  of 
an endowment fund f o r  S & T cooperation with con t r ibu t ions  
from both  s i d e s  ( inc lud ing  perhaps,  the  U.S. p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ) .  
6. The p u r s u i t  of recommenda-kion 5 lander p resen t  condi t ions  
w i l l  be p o l i t i c a l l y  d i f f i c u l t .  It i s  t h e r e f o r e  d e s i r a b l e  t o  
broadeq pub l i c  awareness of t h e  program, i t s  achievements and 
promise f o r  f u t u r e  mutual b e n e f i t .  It i s  a l s o  important f o r  
t h e  Chinese s i d e  t o  deepen i t s  understanding of t h e  importance 
of t h e r e  being non-governmental cons t i tuenc ies  i n  t h e  U . S .  
support ing expanded S & T t i e s .  
7 .  China's e f f o r t s  t o  reform i t s  R & D system provide 
an opportuni ty f o r  new co l l abora t ive  i n i t i a t i v e s .  The Chinese 
a r e  c u r r e n t l y  s t r e s s i ' n g  t h e  development of a p p l i c a t i o n s  or iented  
con t rac t  r e sea rch ,  an  approach t o  research  management no t  un- 
f a m i l i a r  t o  t h e  U.S. Mechanisms should be sought t h a t  would 
make t h e  extens ive  experience of t h e  U.S. wi th  t h i s  type  of 
r e sea rch  a v a i l a b l e  t o  the  Chinese i n  a manner t h a t  would be 
mutual ly  b e n e f i c i a l .  
The S & T r e l a t i o n s h i p  wi th  China has a l r eady  produced s c i -  
e , n t i f i c  and f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  b e n e f i t s  t o  both s i d e s .  By stayi,ng 
t h e  course,  those b e n e f i t s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  mul t ip ly .  This  i s  par-  
t i c u l a r l y  so as Chinese S & T overcomes t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h e  Cul- 
t u r a l  Revolution. The r e l a t i o n s h i p  wi th  t h e  U.S. o f f e r s  t h e  
Chinese an  opportuni ty t o  a c c e l e r a t e  t h a t  process ,  and as they  do, 
t h e  b e n e f i t s  t o  t h e  U.S. from access  t o  demonstrated s c i e n t i f i c  
t a l e n t  as we l l  as unique na tu ra l  and s o c i a l  phenomena w i l l  i n -  
c rease .  I n  t h e  process ,  i f  t h e  programis proper ly  managed, 
f u r t h e r  progress  i n  t h e  bu i ld ing  of good w i l l  between t h e  two 
c o u n t r i e s  can be expected. Given t h e  d i f f e r e n t  s o c i a l  systems 
of t h e  two coun t r i e s ,  t h e  development of p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
r e l a t i o n s  of long term v i a b i l i t y  w i l l  t ake  t ime and w i l l  involve 
disappointments and i r r i t a t i o n s .  It i s  p r e c i s e l y  f o r  t h e s e  
reasons t h a t  a program wi th  demonstrated c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  bu i ld ing  
a  fund of good wil1,among o the r  achievements,deserves sustenance.  
While it  i s  n e i t h e r  poss ib le  nor d e s i r a b l e  t o  l i m i t  U.S.- 
PRC S & T r e l a t i o n s  t o  t h e  b i l a t e r a l s ,  t h e  l a t t e r  have served 
as an important br idge between t h e  two s c i e n t i f i c  communities 
and t h e  t e c h n i c a l  agencies  of t h e  two coun t r i e s .  It i s  import- 
a n t  t o  keep t h e  br idge i n  good r e p a i r  f o r  a few more y e a r s  a t  
l e a s t ,  while ind iv idua l s  and groups on both s i d e s  discover  new 
and perhaps more v i a b l e  modes of i n t e r a c t i o n .  
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I. Scope and Approach of Study 
On January 31, 1979, President Carter and Vice-president 
Deng Xiaoping signed an Agreement Between the Government 
of the United States of America and the Government of the 
People's Republic of China on Cooperation in Science and 
Technology (hereafter "the umbrella agreement"). The signing 
was followed by zn exchange of letters between Dr. Frank Press, 
Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and 
Vice-premier Fang Yi, Minister in Charge of the State Scien- 
tific and Technological Commission (SSTC) in which it was 
agreed that the understandings on the Exchange of Students 
and Scholars (October, 1978), on Agricultural Exchange (Novem- 
ber, 1978) and on Cooperation in Space Technology (~ecember, 
1978) would become part of the umbrella agreement. Sugsequently, 
twelve protocols to the umbrella agreement have been signed, 
making a total of 15 intergovernmental bilateral agreements 
in various areas of science and technology. Since the student 
and scholar exchange program was the subject of a separate 
study done for the International Communications Agency by Dr. 
Ralph Clough, this study has concentrated on the remaining 14 
bilaterals. However, some attention was given to the relation- 
ship between the bilaterals and the student and scholar program. 
The umbrella agreeme'nt provides for a U.S.-P.R.C. Joint 
Commission on Scientific and Technological Cooperation which 
duri,ng the Carter Administration was co-chaired by Frank Press 
and Fang Yi. The Foreign Affairs Bureau of the SSTC and 
OES/SCT of the Department of State perform the executive 

Certa in  l i m i t a t i o n s  on t h e  scope and methods of t h e  study 
should be recognized. It quickly became apparent once i n t e r -  
views wi th  American o f f i c i a l s  began, t h a t  t h e  extent  of t h e  
program w a s  g r e a t e r  than  had been a n t i c i p a t e d ,  and t h a t  mastery 
of a l l  t h e  programs' d e t a i l s  would not be poss ib le  during t h e  
time per iod  s p e c i f i e d  by t h e  con t rac t .  It was not  p o s s i b l e ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t o  do t h e  thorough examination of agency f i l e s  
t h a t  had been planned. A second l i m i t a t i o n  i s  t h a t  most of t h e  
in terv iews were conducted with U.S. government o f f i c i a l s  ( s c i -  
e n t i s t s  and admin i s t r a to r s )  and t h a t  views from universi ty-based 
s c i e n t i s t s  and commercial i n t e r e s t s  were not  as widely s o l i c i t e d .  
Nevertheless ,  e f f o r t s  were made t o  contact  some non-governmental 
i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s ,  and some grounds f o r  judgment about t h e i r  
views of t h e  program e x i s t s .  
The in terv iews with Chinese o f f i c i a l s  should a l s o  be 
seen i n  context .  The shor t  per iod  of time a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e  
v i s i t  n e c e s s a r i l y  l i m i t e d  t h e  number of con tac t s  t h a t  could 
be made. A l l  t h e  Chinese interviewed were admin i s t r a to r s .  
Some were high ranking wi th  considerable  a u t h o r i t y  over t h e i r  
programs. Others were r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  
o f f i c e s  of t h e  var ious  m i n i s t r i e s .  I n  only a few cases  were 
in terv iews conducted wi th  Chinese s c i e n t i s t s .  I n  a d d i t  i o n ,  
t h e  i d e a  of submit t ing t o  an in terv iew wi th  a f o r e i g n  i n v e s t i -  
g a t o r  w a s  r a t h e r  novel ,  and a  number of t h e  interviewees f e l t  
i t  w a s  more important t o  make a formal statement of prepared 
remarks, than  t o r e q o n d  i n  depth t o  s p e c i f i c  ques t ions .  Never- 
t h e l e s s ,  t h e  in terv iews provided an unusual opportuni ty t o  
s o l i c i t  Chinese views of t h e  program d i r e c t l y ,  and were q u i t e  
u s e f u l .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  s tudy draws almost e n t i r e l y  on u n c l a s s i f i e d  
m a t e r i a l s .  Although I d id  rece ive  s e c u r i t y  c learance  f o r  
t h e  s tudy,  i t s  approval came only a f t e r  most of t h e  work i n  
Washington w a s  completed. With t h e  poss ib le  exception of t h e  
export  c o n t r o l s  a r e a ,  it i s  un l ike ly  t h a t  g r e a t e r  a t t e n t i o n  
t o  c l a s s i f i e d  m a t e r i a l s  would have a l t e r e d  my f ind ings .  
11. The Context of t h e  Program 
A s  noted,  t h e  program of intergovernmental  S  & T coopera- 
t i o n  developed very r a p i d l y  during t h e  las t  two yea r s  of t h e  
Car te r  Administrat iont  Since t h e  program w a s  i n i t i a t e d ,  how- 
e v e r ,  t h e r e  have been many changes i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  and eco- 
nomic c l imates  of t h e  two coun t r i e s .  On t h e  Chinese s i d e ,  
t h e r e  have been a major reassessment of Chinese modernization 
p o l i c i e s ,  and some r e s h u f f l i n g  of Chinese p o l i t i c a l  l eader s .  
On t h e  U . S .  s i d e ,  of course,  a p r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  has pro- 
duced a new admin i s t r a t ion  which has brought proposa ls  f o r  
major changes i n  economic p o l i c y  and budgetary s t r ingency.  
Some o f f i c i a l s  who were a c t i v e  i n  promoting t h e  program of 
S  & T cooperat ion wi th  t h e  PRC a r e  no longer  i n  o f f i c e .  
The r a p i d i t y  of t h e  program's development can be explained 
i n  l a r g e  p a r t  by two f a c t o r s .  The f i r s t  w a s  t h e  percept ion  by 
both  s i d e s  t h a t  t h e i r  r e spec t ive  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  were con- 
verg ing  i n  important a r e a s  of s e c u r i t y  and economic a f f a i r s .  
Both s i d e s  have expressed t h e  view t h a t  cooperation i n  S & T 
i s  both  i n h e r e n t l y  worthwhile, and an important component 
i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  A number of Chinese o f f i c i a l s  
interviewed s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  program i s  not  a s h o r t  term 
expedient but  r a t h e r  a p a r t  of a  process  f o r  bu i ld ing  a long 
term r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Prel iminary evidence t h a t  t h e  Chinese 
s i d e  has p ro tec ted  i t s  budget f o r  cooperat ion with t h e  U.S. 
i n  t h e  f ace  of severe n a t i o n a l  cutbacks i s  one measure of 
Chinese i n t e r e s t s  i n  a long term r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  and of t h e  
importance a t t ached  t o  t h e  program i n  bu i ld ing  t h a t  r e l a -  
t ionsh ip .  
While converging p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  and agreement 
on t h e  importance of S  & T i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  (a t  
l e a s t  during t h e  Car ter  Administration) were favorable  
necessary condi t ions  f o r  t h e  program, they  were not  s u f f i -  
c i e n t .  Subs tan t ive ly ,  t h e  program could not  have progressed 
a s  f a r  as i t  has  had t h e r e  not been pre-normalizat ion S & T 
con tac t s  i n  many of t h e  f i e l d s  of cooperation. Many of 
t h e s e  con tac t s  were f a c i l i t a t e d  by t h e  agreement t o  exchange 
s c i e n t i s t s  reached a t  t h e  time of t h e  s ign ing  of t h e  Shang- 
h a i  Communique. Since 1972, t h i s  agreement has been admin- 
i s t e r e d  by t h e  CSCPRC and the  Chinese Associat ion f o r  Science 
and Technology ( C A S T ) .  Other con tac t s  were e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  organiza t ions  ( e . g . ,  W H O ,  WMO) and a t  i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  s c i e n t i f i c  meetings. I n  some cases ,  personal  con- 
t a c t s  cont r ibuted  t o  mutual f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n .  
These va r ious  pre-normalizat ion t i e s  a l s o  cont r ibuted  
t o  t h e  f lowering of a wide range of non-governmental S & T 
t i e s .  These include t i e s  between s c i e n t i f i c  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  
formal i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangements between u n i v e r s i t i e s  and a 
v a r i e t y  of commercial r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a s  wel l  (such as t h e  
"cooperator" programs i n  t h e  f i e l d  of a g r i c u l t u r e ) .  I n  ad- 
d i t i o n ,  va r ious  kinds of personal  r e l a t i o n s  have r e s u l t e d  
i n  exchanges of t e c h n i c a l  personnel ( i n  t h i s  connection, it 
should be noted t h a t  t h e  number of Chinese s tuden t s  and schol- 
ars s tudying i n  t h e  U .  S, without o f f i c i a l  government sponsor- 
s h i p  apparent ly  now exceeds t h e  number o f  government sponsored 
i n d i v i d u a l s ) .  
The ex i s t ence  of t h e s e  numerous u n o f f i c i a l  S & T t i e s  
r a i s e s  important ques t ions  about t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between 
them and t h e  government sponsored b i l a t e r a l s .  While some 
have been f a c i l i t a t e d  by t h e  exis tence  of t h e  S & T umbrella 
agreement, o t h e r s  could undoubtedly s tand on t h e i r  own. I n  
a  few cases ,  t h e  u n o f f i c i a l  and t h e  o f f i c i a l  may be i n  compe- 
t i t i o n .  
When viewed i n  t h e  context of Car te r  Administrat ion 
China p o l i c y  ob jec t ives ,  t h e  o f f i c i a l  and u n o f f i c i a l  t i e s  on 
balance a r e  mutually support ive and complementary i n  promoting 
t h e  p o l i c y  goal  of c r e a t i n g  a web of r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between 
t h e  two count r ies .  From t h e  Chinese pe r spec t ive ,  t h e  two 
types  of t i e s  a r e  seen as a ve r s ion  of "walking on two l e g s , "  
and a r e  t h e r e f o r e  seen as complementary. More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  
some Chinese o f f i c i a l s  be l i eve  t h a t  t h e  funct ions  of t h e  two 
types  of t i e s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t .  While the  o f f i c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  
a r e  a t  t imes  seen  as r e l a t i v e l y  i n f l e x i b l e  and cumbersome, 
they  a r e  necessary f o r  c e r t a i n  types  of p r o j e c t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
l a r g e  ones where government's r o l e  i s  preeminent (e .g .  mete- 
oro logy) .  The exis tence  of t h e  non-of f i c i a l  t i e s ,  on t h e  
o the r  hand, g ives  g r e a t e r  f l e x i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  o v e r a l l  r e l a -  
t i o n s h i p .  Although not  mentioned e x p l i c i t l y  by t h e  Chinese 
s i d e ,  it i s  a l s o  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  exis tence  of t h e  n o n - o f f i c i a l  
t i e s  i n  some cases  opens up a d d i t i o n a l  channels of communica- 
t i o n s  of relevance t o  t h e  o f f i c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  
A s  noted,  both governments have accorded S & T r e l a t i o n s  
an important p lace  i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  This  w a s  
s t a t e d  on a number of occasions by Chinese o f f i c i a l s ,  and as 
observed above, t h e  apparent p r o t e c t i o n  of budget i tems dedi- 
ca ted  t o  cooperat ion wi th  t h e  U.S. g ives  substance t o  t h e s e  
claims. On t h e  U . S .  s i d e ,  t h e  importance of S & T t i e s  w a s  
demonstrated by t h e  a c t i v e  promptings of t h e  t e c h n i c a l  agencies  
by t h e  Car te r  White House t o  e s t a b l i s h  r e l a t i o n s  wi th  PRC 
counterpar ts .  I n  one sense,  t h e  S & T r e l a t i o n s h i p  with China 
w a s  t h e  forerunner  of o the r  innovat ive approaches t o  t h e  use 
of S & T as instruments  of f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  as seen i n  t h e  Car- 
t e r  Adminis t ra t ion ' s  subsequent i n i t i a t i v e s  toward A f r i c a ,  
L a t i n  America and Japan. But while these  i n i t i a t i v e s  were in -  
novat ive ,  t h e  o v e r a l l  conception of t h e  requirements of S & T 
i n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  w a s  incomplete. 
I n  t h e  China program, f o r  ins t ance ,  while most of t h e  
t e c h n i c a l  agencies  were e f f e c t i v e l y  mobilized t o  make con- 
t a c t s  and s i g n  p ro toco l s  with PRC counterpar ts ,  t h e r e  were 
a t  l e a s t  t h r e e  s u b j e c t s  t h a t  pe r t a ined  t o  program e f f e c t i v e -  
ness  where unanswered ques t ions  remained. These were t h e  
budgetary foundation of t h e  program, export  c o n t r o l  p o l i c y ,  
and coordinated a c t i o n  wi th  commercial i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e  
i n t e r e s t  of export  promotion a c t i v i t y .  This  i s  n o t  t o  say 
t h a t  t h e  Car ter  admin i s t r a t ion  d id  not  have p o s i t i o n s  on on 
these  mat ters .  It i s  r a t h e r  t o  say t h a t  i n  launching what 
w a s  an innovat ive approach t o  t h e  use of S & T as instruments  
of China p o l i c y ,  a l l  of t h e  impl ica t ions  of doing so were not  
f u l l y  apprec ia ted .  While urging agency p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  China 
programs, t h e  White House a l s o  adopted a s t r i n g e n t  " b e n e f i t i n g  
s i d e  pays" approach t o  program f inancing ,  which i n  some cases  
has  l i m i t e d  agency a c t i v i t i e s  somewhat. Although some of 
t h e  export  c o n t r o l  i s s u e s  were recognized e a r l y  on i n  t h e  pro- 
gram, and al though i n i t i a t i v e s  were taken i n  1980 t o  l i b e r a l -  
i z e  export  con t ro l s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  PRC, t h e  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  change 
of those  c l o s e s t  t o  t h e  export  con t ro l  machinery w a s  underes t i -  
mated. Although export  promotion w a s  considered t o  be an i m -  
p o r t a n t  p a r t  of t h e  program, t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  evidence of sys-  
t emat i c  e f f o r t  t o  involve those  concerned with export  promo- 
t i o n  i n  t h e  design and execut ion of t h e  program. These ques- 
t i o n s  w i l l  be discussed f u r t h e r  below. 
A. Science and Technology in Chinese Modernization 
One of the expectations of the U.S. Government in letting 
this contract was that an assessment would be made of the im- 
pact of the bilaterals on Chinese modernization efforts. The 
Request for Proposals issued by the State Department specified 
that among the topics to be addressed in the study would be 
Chinese perceptions of the S & T relationship, how the rela- 
tionship influenced Chinese S & T development efforts and 
whether the relationship contributed to the formation of a web 
of U.S.-PRC ties in S & T that would ensure the continued pro- 
gress towards a close U.S.-PRC overall relationship. More 
specifically, the RFP was concerned about the appropriateness 
of S & T content of the agreements for Chinese needs and of 
the modes of cooperation being pursued, and whether the rela- 
tionship would contribute to an unintended Chinese dependency 
(whether unwanted or desired) on the U.S. 
These are unquestionably issues of considerable importance. 
An adequate approach to them, however, requires that they be 
seen in light of earlier Chinese modernization efforts and of 
what is known, and not known, about Chinese policy making pro- 
cedures. The former is important for assessing the prospects 
for Chinese modernization, and logically precedes both the ques- 
tions of the role of S & T in that modernization, and of the 
contributions the U.S. might make toward Chinese S & T development. 
Attention to policy making is especially important for 
dealing with the appropriateness question. While it is clearly 
desirable and analytically possible to approach this question 
without reference to the authoritative determination of what 
is appropriate, behaviorally, the appropriateness of various 
forms of science and technology and S & T cooperation is poli- 
tically determined. That is, something is appropriate because 
a powerful actor says it is. 
For the student of modern Chinese history, it is difficult 
to escape a sense of deja in witnessing post-Mao modernization 
policies and changes in policies. For over 100 years, China has 
been seeking to modernize and to find the right formula for com- 
bining foreign assistance, domestic institutional change and 
ideological and cultural adjustment to reach the goal of mod- 
ernization. Along the way, the particulars of the original 
objective of creating a strong "modern" China have at times been 
lost in the clash of competing interests, each seeking to promote 
its own vision of the means to be used. Significantly, however, 
the development of modern science and technology has been com- 
mon to all statements of the modernization objective. This 
history has been characterized by efforts both to "go it alone" 
to the fullest extent possible during some periods, while in 
others there has been a willingness to rely on foreign assist- 
ance from the West, and during the 1950s, from the Soviet union. 
Various approaches to institutional change were tried both be- 
fore and after 1949, and of course the most profound institu- 
tional change, the Chinese Revolution itself, was justified 
in part in the name of modernization. 
While it clearly would be an overstatement to observe that 
the more things have changed, the more they have stayed the 
same, it nevertheless seems to be the case that there inheres 
in Chinese society qualities which make it difficult for any 
leadership group to maintain a sustained commitment to modern- 
izing policies, 
The reasons for this are largely unknown. To the extent 
that they are known, they are exceedingly complex. Without 
attempting to analyze these reasons in detail, I will attempt 
instead briefly to characterize the difficulty and suggest how 
it affects U.S.-PRC relations, 
It has been suggested recently by a Japanese wag that where- 
as Japan is an economic animal, China is a political animal. 
While such aphorisms are no substitute for analysis, there is 
something suggestive about the remark. It suggests an image 
of a resource-poor, island-nation Japan having as its national 
purpose the commitment of energies to the creation of wealth 
through domestic and international commerce in which its Ynvest- 
ment decisions (both narrowly economic and social) are based 
on the criterion of market competitiveness. On the other hand, 
the remark suggests the image of a huge, continental, inward- 
looking China which must expend its material and symbolic re- 
sources on maintaining political integration. In addition, 
in keeping with a sense of historic grandeur but with a recogni- 
tion of national humiliations during the last hundred years, 
resources must also be diverted to the task of laying a fomda- 
tion for a capability to project power abroad. Consistent with 
these primary political purposes is the maintenance, in both 
historical and contemporary China, of political bureaucracies 
as the means for effecting these purposes. In keeping with 
the principle of "goal displacement," however, bureaucracies 
come to develop interests of their own. One important result 
is that resources must be allocated to satisfy those interests, 
and the maintenance of bureaucratic loyalty becomes confused 
with the maintenance of political integration. A second con- 
sequence is that the political bureaucracies suppress initia- 
tives for establishing alternative means for maintaining poli- 
tical integration. Thus, the protection of bureaucratic interests 
has precluded the legitimation of relatively autonomous groups 
in society (especially economic and professional groups), and 
of the widespread use of "market" exchanges. While discussions 
of markets in China normally focus on commodity markets, of 
greater importance perhaps has been the retarded development 
of factor markets and markets in ideas. The currently dis- 
cussed economic reforms in China are of considerable signifi- 
cance in this regard. 
Some historians of China see bureaucratic dominance as 
having frustrated the chances for a scientific revolution in 
China. According to this view, the former impeded the develop- 
ment of a powerful entrepreneurial class, and the failure of 
the latter to emerge is seen as one of the key reasons why 
a scientific revolution did not occur. TYithout attempting to 
evaluate such a thesis for pre-modern China, it is clear that 
in contemporary China, modern science is developing in the ab- 
sence of an entrepreneurial class. Indeed, in some areas, Chin- 
ese scientific achievements have been most notable. However, 
if the analysis above is sound, the continued development of 
science and technology will be paced by state interests rather 
than by scientific or market criteria, and will occur in a 
highly bureaucratic environment. One should expect, therefore, 
that the character of Chinese scientific development will be 
significantly different from that of the U.S. or of other na- 
tions where markets have both economic and metaphorical sig- 
nificance. This is not to deny the universality of scientific 
knowledge. It is rather to call attention to differences in 
the behavior of the Chinese scientific community, in science 
policy, and i'n the relations of science to the society in gen- 
eral and to the economy and the military in particular. 
Thus, with reference to science policy, unless there is 
dramatic progress in implementing current economic reforms, 
Chinese science policy should be seen as being driven by the 
requirements to meet the twin purposes of maintaining politi- 
cal integration and preparing for the projection of power abroad, 
rather than by calculations of maximum scientific and economic 
returns on investments. Given the high degree of integration 
between economy and polity and the low degree of autonomy for 
professional communities, it could not be otherwise. At present, 
in spite of the fact that economic modernization is seen as the 
preeminent task of Chinese society, the ever present challenge 
of political integration precludes the sustained pursuit of 
what would appear to be economically "rational" measures to 
promote modernization. Thus, a liberalized labor market for 
scientists and engineers would almost certainly produce a more 
efficient allocation of this valuable but scarce "good." Pro- 
posals for sucha change founder, however, on the rock of 
bureaucratic resistance and the fear that a reform of this 
sort would be system threatening. 
B. Perspectives on the Chinese policy process 
Within this bureaucratic system, however, our knowledge 
of who determines what are appropriate S & T objectives and 
how, is unfortunately limited. Regrettably, it is consider- 
ably less than it should be for devising sound policies for 
interacting with China. At best, we can propose certain hypo- 
thetical models of Chinese political behavior and policy mak- 
ing processes. 
It is interesting to note that some U.S. officials inter- 
viewed for this pro ject reported that Chinese inter-ministerial 
conflict, or the lack of inter-ministerial cooperation, seemed 
to affect the smooth implementation of some of the agreements. 
Such observations would seem to be consistent with a "bureau- 
cratic politics" interpretation of policy making. In this 
view, policy is the outcome of the pulling and hauling of, 
and turf battles and coalitions between and among different 
agencies. The interests of scientists and technologists are 
expressed in the process through the bureaucratic systems to 
which they belong. 
There are reasons to believe, however, that a bureaucratic 
politics model is not fully representative of the Chinese 
policy process. One reason is that the bureaucratic politics 
model presumes a certain commonality of interests among organiz- 
ational members and that organizational leaders are closely 
linked to the activities of subordinates whose interests they 
represent. It is thought, by some students of contemporary 
China, however, that Chinese organizational leaders are remark- 
ably ignorant of, and/or unconcerned about, the problems of 
implementation faced by subordinates, and that anticipated 
strong chains of command are in fact relatively weak. 
A second reason for doubting the validity of the bureau- 
cratic politics model is that the model seems to require an 
assumption that the procedures and norms of formal organiza- 
tion are fairly well institutionalized, i.e., that they are 
accepted by organizational members and are a guide to the ac- 
tions of the latter. There seems to be general agreement, how- 
ever, that the Cultural Revolution years had a devastating ef- 
fect on formal organizations and that as a result, organiza- 
tional members came to rely on various forms of informal organ- 
ization. 
The breakdown of formal organization and the increased 
importance of informal organization has tended to reinforce 
historic tendencies towards personalism and factionalism in 
Chinese politics and policy making. A number of students of 
contemporary Chinese politics, therefore, have come to interpret 
Chinese politics in terms of factionalism models. According 
to this perspective, personal relations among policy actors 
are assumed to be of greater importance in determining behavior, 
-16- 
especially coalition formation, than organizational affiliation 
or position. Thus, policy positions are regarded less as 
rational responses to societal or bureaucratic needs than as 
tactical stances for purposes of alliance formation in inter- 
factional conflict. 
It is important that this factional perspective be borne 
in mind in attempting to assess the appropriateness of the 
areas of U.S.-PRC S & T cooperation for Chinese needs. Where- 
as Americans may approach this question on the basis of assess- 
ments of Chinese objective conditions, it would be a mistake 
to assume that the Chinese do as well, if the factionalism 
model is correct. 
There is a danger in overstating the importance of fac- 
tionalism in Chinese decision making, however. On the basis 
of comparative political analysis, one would expect that the 
importance of factions would vary with the type of policy at 
stake. That is, the type of political behavior in policy 
making is somewhat contingent upon the type of policy being 
considered. Ir'ithout attempting to develop this point in de- 
tail here, one would expect that if the factionalism model 
has merit, factionalism might be relatively more important for 
explaining domestic science policy making and relatively less 
significant in accounting for Chinese approaches to foreign 
S & T relations. 
There is also a danger that both the factionalism, and 
bureaucratic politics models underestimate rational, compre- 
hensive or''synoptic" approaches to policy making. In spite of 
the fact that formal organization and bureaucratic procedures 
were weakened as a result of the Cultural Revolution years, the 
Chinese policy maki,ng process is nevertheless formally struc- 
tured to achieve centralized overviews of policy and to make 
centralized decisions based upon inputs from subordinate units. 
For example, the area of manpower development gives evidence of 
a synoptic approach. General policy in this area is set by the 
SSTC and conveyed to the Science and Technology Cadres Bureau 
which then reportedly devises an overall national plan. Planning 
figures are then related to the Ministry of Education which 
then attempts to reconcile those figures with Chinese domestic 
educational capabilities and training opportunities abroad. 
Thus it may be a mistake to underestimate the importance 
of formal structure. While factional struggles and competing 
bureaucratic interests (as well as serious information problems), 
unquestionably compromise comprehensive decision-making based 
upon rational consideration of problems and alternative solu- 
tions, there may be cases where Chinese decision making proceeds 
more in accordance with "unitary actor" models than the pro- 
ponents of either the factionalism or bureaucratic politics 
models are prepared to admit. Although our knowledge of how 
the Chinese came to determine "appropriateness" leaves much to 
be desired, by bearing in mind the possibility for alternative 
interpretations of the policy process, we should at least be 
able to avoid simplistic assumptions about Chinese plans and 
intentions. 
While we are quite ignorant of the policy process, we 
do know a bit more about the contents of policies. We also 
know that there have been serious problems with the implemen- 
tation of policy, with the result that Chinese policy has often 
been lacking in stability. This, of course, has been true of 
the post-Mao modernization policies on which much of the pro- 
gram of S & T cooperation has been based. 
C. Post-Mao science policies and U.S. initiatives 
It should be recalled that although many in post-Mao China 
clearly have had an interest in gaining access to U.S. science 
and technology, a great deal of the initiative for S & T co- 
operation came from the U.S. side. Two key events in the de- 
velopment of the relationship were the Brzezhinski mission 
in May, 1978, during which overtures to the PRC on S & T co- 
operation were made, and the Press mission in July, which was 
a response to the Chinese expressions of interest made in May. 
Specific agreements for intergovernmental S & T cooperation 
then followed later in the same year. 
The U.S. side, prior to the Brzezhinski visit, had de- 
termined that an economically progressive China, able to meet 
its own basic needs--particularly in energy and food, was in 
the U. S. interest. Officials in the Carter administration 
believed that it could assist China in achieving this status 
through cooperation in S & T. The U.S. was responding in 
part to new Chinese statements of domestic policy. In the 
overly ambitious, Chinese modernization program of early 1978, 
the "modernization of science and technology" figured promin- 
ently and was often referred to as the key to the other three 
modernizations. 
As we have seen, the U.S. also had the objective of estab- 
lishing a web of relationships between various sectors in the 
two countries, and S & T ties could provide some of the strands. 
There were also expectations of substantial commercial tech- 
nology transfer opportunities for American firms that could 
be facilitated by S & T relations. Finally, there were assmp- 
tions that a degree of stability in Chinese policy had finally 
been achieved after the many disruptions of the Cultural Revo- 
lution decade. A new generation of leaders would soon be emerg- 
ing to carry on the modernization policies. This new genera- 
tion was expected to have strong technocratic orientations, 
and could perhaps be expected to develop interests in close 
S & T relations with the U.S. if mutual understandings between 
the two sides were reached. 
In the S & T policy area, the Chinese at the National 
Science Conference in March, 1978, established what seemed to 
be a well-considered andlong term program for scientific devel- 
opment. Included in this program was the identification of 
eight priority areas of research, It was to these areas of 
priority--agriculture, energy, materials, space, lasers, com- 
puters, high energy physics and genetic engineering--which the 
Chinese themselves had chosen, that the U.S. attempted to re- 
spond. The U.S. was clearly the preeminent nation in these 
fields. Even though the centers of U.S. preeminence were not 
necessarily within the government, nevertheless the U.S. had 
substantial expertise in all of them within U.S. government 
agencies. Initially, and at first glance, it appeared that 
Chinese objectives and U . S .  capabilities were appropriately 
matched. 
Following the signing of the S & T umbrella agreement, 
U.S. technical agencies were encouraged by the White House to 
seek to develop cooperative S & T relations. The agencies, 
however, were also cautioned to approach the funding of acti- 
vities with China on the basis of mutual sharing of costs, 
or where that formula was inapplicable, on the basis of "bene- 
fiting side pays" (a concept the Chinese have never accepted). 
Since, with only a few exceptions, the technical agencies did 
not have access to special funding for international programs, 
costs were to be borne out of existing budgets. This meant 
that the agencies had to satisfy themselves that cooperative 
activities with the PRC would be consistent with their legisla- 
tively determined missions. The process of making such a de- 
termination involves the exercise of considerable discretion 
by agency leaders and program officers, and the agencies clearly 
wished to be responsive to White House encouragement of the 
China relationship. Nevertheless, the funding policy laid 
down meant that U.S. agencies did not have as a first priority 
the objective of responding to Chinese needs. Instead, in most 
cases, the U.S. and Chinese sides sought to identify areas of 
work that would be of mutual interest and benefit. 
During t h e  two yea r s  when most of t h e  b i l a t e r a l s  were be- 
i n g  s igned (1979 and 1980),  t h e r e  were important changes i n  
Chinese domestic p o l i c i e s  and p o l i t i c s  which were not  f u l l y  
a n t i c i p a t e d  when t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w a s  i n i t i a t e d .  While t h e s e  
do not  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n v a l i d a t e  t h e  assumptions underlying U . S . -  
PRC S & T r e l a t i o n s ,  it i s  c e r t a i n l y  t h e  case t h a t  t h e  p o l i -  
c i e s  of e a r l y  1978, t h e  assumptions about which cont r ibuted  t o  
t h e  na ture  of U . S .  i n i t i a t i v e s ,  no longer  obta in .  I n s t e a d ,  
China has undergone, and indeed cont inues t o  undergo, a  thor -  
ough reassessment not only of i t s  economic p o l i c i e s ,  but  a l s o  
of i t s  economic s t r u c t u r e .  Th i s  process  of reassessment has 
not  been without i t s  p o l i t i c a l  impl ica t ions .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
t h e r e  have been i n d i c a t i o n s  of s e r i o u s  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  imple- 
mentation of c e r t a i n  of t h e  S & T p o l i c i e s  of 1978, p o l i c i e s  
which formal ly  have not  been changed. 
The essence of t h e  changes i n  economic p o l i c y  has been 
t o  s h i f t  investment p r i o r i t i e s  from l a r g e - s c a l e ,  c a p i t a l  i n -  
t e n s i v e ,  heavy indus t ry  p r o j e c t s  t o  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  l i g h t  i n d u s t r y  
and economic i n f r a s t r u c t u r e .  C a p i t a l  cons t ruc t ion  f o r  most 
a r e a s  of i n d u s t r y  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  has  been cut  back d r a s t i c a l l y .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  China has c l e a r l y  been re th ink ing  both i t s  economic 
s t r u c t u r e  and t h e  c r i t e r i a  used f o r  making economic po l i cy .  
O f  considerable  i n t e r e s t  has been i n c r e a s i n g  a t t e n t i o . n  given 
t o  t h e  r o l e  of markets i n  commodity exchange, and market- l ike 
c r i t e r i a  i n  f a c t o r  a l l o c a t i o n s .  A s  of t h i s  w r i t i n g ,  however, 
t h e  f u t u r e  of reforms i n  economic s t r u c t u r e  remains unclear .  
The implications of economic readjustment for S & T poli- 
cies in China, and for S & T relations with the U.S, began 
to become evident during 1980. By early 1981, Chinese science 
policy was again reflecting a concern for applied research and 
for quick payoffs from investments in research. Science educa- 
tion was clearly receiving higher priority. The importance 
of some basic research was acknowledged, but the proper level 
of effort remained unclear. 
When the research priorities of 1978 are compared with 
those of 1981, the big changes are in the downgrading of high 
energy physics, space and genetic engineering. Instead, the 
status of applied research relating to light industry, communi- 
cations and transport, resources (especially energy and energy 
conservation) and environmental protection has increased. High 
technology fields such as computers, integrated circuits, and 
lasers continue to be stressed. 
In addition to these adjustments in priorities, serious 
efforts are being made to reform the organization and financing 
of research. Thekey innovation is to be a widespread use of 
contract research. A system comprising three different types 
of research institutes in envisioned. One type (mainly large 
scale) will continue to be funded directly out of the state 
budget, although individuals may undertake some contract research 
as time allows. The second type is composed of institutes (also 
relatively large) which will have more freedom to select their 
own research projects according to anticipated market demand. 
They w i l l  have access  t o  seed money from a "Science and Tech- 
nology Research Fund" t o  be adminis tered by t h e  SSTC, and w i l l  
be a b l e  t o  s e l l  t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e i r  r e sea rch  and r e t a i n  t h e  
p r o f i t s  a f t e r  repaying t h e  SSTC. 
The t h i r d  type  of i n s t i t a e  inc ludes  those  r e f e r r e d  t o  as 
" c o l l e c t i v e "  i n s t i t u t e s .  These w i l l  no t  have access  t o  s t a t e  
funds andthusmust  survive on t h e i r  own a b i l i t i e s  t o  r a i s e  r e -  
sources  by s e l l i n g  t h e i r  s e r v i c e s .  A f i n a l  s t r u c t u r a l  reform 
w i l l  be t o  inc lude  more re sea rch  i n s t i t u t e s  t h a t  had formerly 
been under d i r e c t  m i n i s t e r i a l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  under t h e  j u r i s d i c -  
t i o n s  of t h e  new i n d u s t r i a l  corpora t ions .  
The two b igges t  c a s u a l t i e s  of these  changes i n  p o l i c y  f o r  
U.S.-PRC r e l a t i o n s  have been i n  t h e  space and high energy phy- 
s i c s  a r e a s .  I n  e a r l y  1981, t h e  Chinese formal ly  informed t h e  
U . S .  of what had been evident  f o r  some t ime,  namely, t h a t  they  
were dropping p lans  t o  purchase a U.S. communications s a t e l l i t e .  
During 1980, t h e  Chinese a l s o  expressed t h e i r  chagrin a t  t h e  
p r i c e  t a g  of a Landsat D ground s t a t i o n  they  had hoped t o  pro- 
cure i n  t h e  U.S. Although they  have not  formally announced 
t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n  t o  cancel p lans  f o r  t h e  s t a t i o n ,  they  have l e t  
it be known t h a t  they  have i n v e s t i g a t e d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of pur- 
chasing one (wi th  l e s s e r  c a p a b i l i t i e s  i n  NASA's view) elsewhere. 
I n  t h e  high energy physics  a r e a ,  what had i n i t i a l l y  appeared 
t o  be only s l ippages  i n  t h e  schedule f o r  t h e  cons t ruc t ion  of 
t h e  B e i j i n g  Proton Synchrotrom (BPS) had by e a r l y  1981 turned  
i n t o  what was i n  e f f e c t  a c a n c e l l a t i o n  of t h e  p r o j e c t .  
A number of t h e  o the r  b i l a t e r a l s ,  however, do not  seem 
t o  be s u b s t a n t i a l l y  out of phase with cu r ren t  Chinese economic 
and resea rch  p r i o r i t i e s .  This  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  i n  t h e  
f i e l d s  of a g r i c u l t u r e ,  meteorology, e a r t h  sc iences  and ea r th -  
quake p r e d i c t i o n ,  h e a l t h  and environmental p r o t e c t i o n  work. 
The s t a t u s  and p r i o r i t y  t o  be accorded metrology and oceanogra- 
phy a r e  more uncer t a in ,  although t h e  Chinese a r e  prepared t o  
go forward wi th  t h e  cooperat ive program i n  marine sc iences .  
The f u t u r e  of t h e  Dalian management t r a i n i n g  program would 
seem t o  be very much i n  phase wi th  current  Chinese i n t e r e s t  i n  
upgrading t h e  q u a l i t y  of managers and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ,  and t h e  
Chinese s i d e  has  committed sca rce  c a p i t a l  cons t ruc t ion  funds 
t o  t h e  expansion of f a c i l i t i e s  a t  Dalian.  The hydropower agree- 
ment would seem t o  be cons i s t en t  wi th  cu r ren t  Chinese emphasis 
on energy development, and i n  s p i t e  of t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  imposed 
on t h e  c a p i t a l  cons t ruc t ion  budget,  t h e r e  a r e  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  
both  s m a l l  and medium, and some l a r g e  s c a l e  hydro p r o j e c t s ,  
w i l l  go forward. Concessionary f inanc ing  i s  a l s o  being sought 
f o r  t h e  l a r g e r  p r o j e c t s .  
The cha rac te r  and v i a b i l i t y  of t h e  U.S.-PRC S & T r e l a -  
t i o n s h i p s  may be subjec t  t o  a  more i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t  from cur ren t  
Chinese p o l i c y  readjustments .  A s  noted,  t h e r e  a r e  c l e a r  s i g n s  
t h a t  once again ,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  l eader sh ip  is  i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  
t h e  t e c h n i c a l  community be more a t t e n t i v e  t o  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  of s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge. Unlike t h e  p a s t ,  how- 
eve r ,  when i n s i s t e n c e  on p r a c t i c a l i t y  w a s  prompted by ideo log ica l  
as we l l  as economic reasons ,  and t h e  means chosen were h ighly  
d i s r u p t i v e  of p ro fess iona l  l i f e ,  t h e  cu r ren t  concern seems t o  
be motivated p r i m a r i l y  by economic cons idera t ions .  Indeed, 
cu r ren t  d iscuss ions  of S & T p o l i c i e s  r e f l e c t  t h e  cos t -benef i t  
men ta l i ty  of t h e  accountant.  A s  we have seen,  t h e  mechanism 
of choice f o r  l i n k i n g  resea rch  and product ion seems t o  be t h a t  
of t h e  r e sea rch  con t rac t  between indus t ry  and research  i n s t i -  
t u t e s ,  r a t h e r  than  t h e  C u l t u r a l  Revolution mechanisms of second- 
ing  p ro fess iona l  personnel t o  f a c t o r i e s  and farms and i n s i s t i n g  
t h a t  r e sea rch  i n s t i t u t e s  run t h e i r  own f a c t o r i e s .  
But while t h e r e  a r e  s i g n s  t h a t  approaches t o  t h e  prac- 
t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n s  problem a r e  more d i sc r imina t ing  t h a n  i n  t h e  
p a s t ,  t h e  s h i f t  of p o l i c y  t o  emphasize p r a c t i c a l i t y  does r a i s e  
an i s s u e  t h a t  could have an impact on U.S.-PRC S & T r e l a t i o n s .  
T h i s  can be seen by looking a t  ques t ions  of funding. Although 
t h e r e  does not seem t o  be any marked dec l ine  i n  t h e  sc ience  
budget,  n e i t h e r  has i t  expanded a s  many i n  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  commu- 
n i t y  have been advocating. One motivat ion f o r  t h e  emphasis on 
p r a c t i c a l i t y  i n  research  may be t o  enable t h e  s t a t e  t o  avoid 
making a d d i t i o n a l  investments i n  S & T from t h e  n a t i o n a l  bud- 
g e t .  I n s t e a d ,  r e sea rch  i n s t i t u t e s  would be expected t o  pay a s  
much of t h e i r  own way as poss ib le  through t h e  s a l e  of t h e i r  
own s e r v i c e s .  
There i s  a  danger t h a t  t h i s  approach t o  funding may r e s u l t  
i n  t h e  neglec t  of b a s i c  research ,  and what might be termed 
"balanced s c i e n t i f i c  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . "  These, of course ,  were t h e  
a s p e c t s  of t h e  n a t i o n a l  sc ience  program which were most damaged 
by t h e  Cu l tu ra l  Revolution, and which var ious  sc ience  reform 
e f f o r t s  of t h e  1970s ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  those of 1977 and 1978) were 
intended t o  r e c t i f y .  While t h e  '77-'78 reforms c l e a r l y  r a n  
t h e  r i s k  of unleashing (and perhaps d id  unleash)  too  much b a s i c  
r e sea rch ,  excessive a t t e n t i o n  t o  a p p l i c a t i o n s  now could be a  
r e c i p e  f o r  continued s c i e n t i f i c  underdevelopment, r e g a r d l e s s  
of shor t  term economic b e n e f i t s .  
China has long had a problem of deciding what propor t ion  
of i t s  s c i e n t i f i c  e f f o r t  should go t o  b a s i c  research .  Seemingly, 
throughout t h e  h i s t o r y  of the  P R C ,  i f  app l i ed  work was not con- 
s i s t e n t l y  emphasized a s  a  mat ter  of p o l i c y ,  many i n  t h e  sc ien-  
t i f i c  community would d r i f t  i n t o  p r o j e c t s  of personal  i n t e r e s t ,  
but of no apparent a p p l i c a b i l i t y .  I n  t h e  p a s t ,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  have tended t o  overreac t  t o  t h e  p r o c l i v i t i e s  of 
t h e  s c i e n t i s t s  t o  t h e  poin t  where r e sea rch  r o u t i n e s  were d i s -  
rupted  i n  t h e  name of " se rv ice  t o  product ion."  I t  has been 
r a r e  t h a t  t h e  p ropos i t ion  t h a t  " a  community r i c h  i n  b a s i c  s c i -  
e n t i s t s  i s  needed as a  b a s i s  f o r  success  i n  appl ied  science" 
has  been s e r i o u s l y  en te r t a ined  by the  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s .  
A degree of shor ts ightedness  i n  t h e  p a s t  has a l s o  been 
evident  i n  p o l i c i e s  a f f e c t i n g  s c i e n t i f i c  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  devel-  
opment. By s c i e n t i f i c  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ,  I r e f e r  t o  t h e  s e r v i c e s  
and f a c i l i t i e s  t h a t  provide inputs-- instruments ,  information 
s e r v i c e s ,  reagents  and supp l i e s ,  and most impor tant ly ,  proper ly  
t r a i n e d  people-- into t h e  r e sea rch  process .  It i s  notable  t h a t  
i n  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  of exper t  assessments on Chinese sc ience  found 
i n  Leo A .  Orleans ( e d . ) ,  Science i n  Contemporary China ( s t a n f o r d  
University Press, 1 9 8 0 ) ,  infrastructure-related problems are 
frequently mentioned as the most serious obstacle to progress. 
These include such problems as overly specialized scientific 
training oriented toward specific practical problems, unreli- 
able supplies of reagents and instruments, underdeveloped com- 
puter applications and data analysis techniques, no tradition 
of recasting practical problems into the terms of basic sci- 
entific questions from which innovative advances could be made, 
and a weak tradition of interdisciplinary work. These diffi- 
culties, which are traceable to problems in the educational 
system, the scientific instruments industry and in organiza- 
tional and administrative arrangements for research strongly 
influence the strategies and techniques of research. Many of 
the problems are caused by a failure to recognize that "the 
modernization of science" requires investments, the returns 
from which will take time. It is still too early to tell whe- 
ther the current return to practicality in research will exacer- 
bate these difficulties. 
These issues of domestic Chinese science policy pertain 
directly to relationswith the U.S. U.S. scientists and science 
administrators interviewed for this project, while their assess- 
ments of Chinese activities in different fields vary, have in 
common the observation that the most likely contribution the 
U.S. can make to Chinese scientific development is to expose 
China to contemporary ways of doing science. This observation, 
which is consistent with the assessments contained in the Orleans 
volume, is based on the belief that the ways of doing science in 
the West have changed dramatically in the last 15 years. This 
of course ,  w a s  t h e  per iod  during which Chinese sc ience  w a s  most 
d i s rup ted  a t  home and most cu t  o f f  from i n t e r n a t i o n a l  sc ience .  
One of t h e  main con t r ibu t ing  f a c t o r s  t o  t h e  changes i n  the  
West has been t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  i n  ins t rumenta t ion .  However, 
t h e  r evo lu t ion  i n  i 'ns trumentat ion cannot be brought t o  China 
simply by br inging  instruments .  The revo lu t ion  i n  instrwnenta- 
t i o n  has i n s t e a d  a l t e r e d  ways of th ink ing  about r e sea rch  and 
devis ing  resea rch  s t r a t e g i e s .  Western observat ions of Chinese 
sc ience  a t  i t s  bes t  usua l ly  cha rac te r i ze  it as t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
good, but l ack ing  i n  "hands on" experimental  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n .  
A s  a r e s u l t ,  even though t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  content  may be up 
t o  d a t e ,  t h e  way of th ink ing  about s c i e n t i f i c  problems i s  more 
reminiscent of Western p r a c t i c e  of 15-20 yea r s  ago than  t h a t  
of today. 
A number of t h e  Americans interviewed expressed t h e  be- 
l i e f  t h a t  through cooperat ive programs, t h e  Chinese could ca tch  
up i n  t h i s  realm of r e sea rch  techniques and s t r a t e g i e s  r e l a -  
t i v e l y  qu ick ly ,  and t h a t  once they  d i d ,  t h e  prospects  f o r  mu- 
t u a l i t y  of s c i e n t i f i c  b e n e f i t s  from cooperation would improve 
markedly. Thus, f o r  some agenc ies , the re  w a s  a sense t h a t  cur- 
r e n t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  b i l a t e r a l s  was a type of investment 
i n  obviously capable s c i e n t i f i c  t a l e n t  which could be expected 
t o  y i e l d  r e t u r n s  i n  t h e  not too  d i s t a n t  f u t u r e .  
There i s  c l e a r l y  a danger t h a t  a r e t u r n  t o  emphasizing 
p r a c t i c a l i t y  i n  Chinese research  could t h r e a t e n  t h e  a b i l i t y  
of t h e  Chinese s c i e n t i f i c  community t o  make t h e  necessary f i n -  
a n c i a l ,  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  and i n t e l l e c t u a l  investments needed t o  
bring research techniques and strategies up to world standards. 
In addition, the more promising opportunities to benefit from 
cooperation with the U.S. could be lost. Finally, excessive 
attention to applications probably would result in science that 
will be less interesting to Americans, and thus dampen enthus- 
iasm for U.S. - PRC collaboration. 
It is by no means certain, however, that the renewed atten- 
tion to applications will result in excessive emphasis on prac- 
ticality. And indeed, there are indications the Chinese are 
taking the problems of scientific infrastructure development 
quite seriously. The best evidence suggests that, instead, 
policy makers are grappling with what the appropriate mixes of 
basic vs. applied work and research vs, infrastructure develop- 
ment should be. Of concern to us here is that in terms of 
both science policy priorities and in terms of the persuasions 
of the policy actors currently most influential, the condi- 
tions for U.S.-PRC S & T relations have changed somewhat. 
The change need not be regarded as for the worse, however. A 
positive interpretation of it is that it has been a step toward 
greater realism on the part of the Chinese, which might be 
especially fortuitous given current U.S. budgetary stringency 
and unresolved issues of export control policy. Nevertheless, 
it may require that some of the assumptions underlying the U.S. 
approach be reexamined. 
Two areas in particular may need some rethinking. In 
light of the discussion above about the policy process and 
policy changes, and in contrast to our assumptions of the 
' 7 8 - ' 7 9  p e r i o d ,  t h e r e  is a need f o r  g r e a t e r  pa t ience  and under- 
s tanding  while t h e  Chinese attempt t o  master reforms i n  t h e i r  
economic and S & T systems. A t  t h e  same time t h e  U.S. should 
a l s o  be aware of i t s  r o l e  a s  a  " reference  case" i n  Chinese 
p o l i c y  d e l i b e r a t i o n s .  This  impl ies  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  
s tudy of t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s e t t i n g s  f o r  S  & T may become a 
more important f a c t o r  i n  t h e  b i l a t e r a l s  than  had been thought 
o r i g i n a l l y .  It a l s o  impl ies  t h a t  some i n  China w i l l  use " the  
U . S .  a s  r e fe rence  case" t o  promote change, wi th  t h e  r i s k  t h a t  
an t ipa thy  toward t h e  U .  S. r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i l l  develop among those  
r e s i s t a n t  t o  change. 
D.  Chinese S  & T r e l a t i o n s  wi th  o t h e r  coun t r i e s  
Chinese f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s  i n  S  & T wi th  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  
n a t i o n s  a r e  not  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  U.S. Programs of cooperat ion 
have been e s t a b l i s h e d  with A u s t r a l i a ,  Japan, France, West Germ- 
any, t h e  United Kingdom, Sweden and o the r s .  The program wi th  
t h e  U.S., however, d a f f e r s  i n  two important r e s p e c t s .  F i r s t ,  
it is  f a r  more extensive and i n  most f i e l d s  i t  is a l s o  more 
s p e c i f i c  and in tens ive .  Second, t h e  U . S .  t a k e s  a much harder  
l i n e  on cos t  sha r ing  than  do o ther  count r ies .  This  i s  p a r t i -  
c u l a r l y  t r u e  when "exchanges" a r e  r e a l l y  tantamount t o  t r a i n i n g  
f o r  PRC personnel .  I n  most cases  t h e  c o s t s  of such "exchanges" 
a r e  borne by t h e  PRC's p a r t n e r ,  whereas wi th  t h e  U.S., t h e s e  
c o s t s  a r e  charged t o  t h e  PRC. 
I n  some cases ,  t h e  accounting s t r ingency of t h e  U.S. has  
caused some resentment,  and most of t h e  Chinese o f f i c i a l s  went 
to great lengths to make the case for benefits flowing to the 
U.S. from the program. On the other hand, the PRC officials 
seemed to appreciate the "absorptive capacity" of U.S. scien- 
tific and educational institutions, the high quality of work 
done in the U.S., the working relationships with Americans, 
and the commitment of the U.S. side to insuring that the pro- 
gram was substantive. Although little hard data was available 
on the relative amounts spent by the PRC on the program with 
the U.S. in comparison with those of other countries, the im- 
pression received was that the U.S. program was unquestionably 
the largest item. 
Foreign collaboration is also conducted with international 
organizations such as WHO, WMO and the UN Environmental Program 
(UNEP). In meteorology, for instance, China is an important 
regional center for observations and forecasting, and has also 
provided training in agro-meteorological forecasting to indi- 
viduals from other LDC's on behalf of WMO. International organ- 
izations, especially UNDP (and in the near future, the World 
Bank), are also assisting the PRC in scientific and techno- 
logical development, and the U.S. is in some cases involved in 
these relationships. For instance, U.S. technical counsel is 
being offered in UNDP-PRC discussions on the establishment of 
a marine data center and a Tiros receiving station. 
Although the implications of the U.S.-PRC S & T relationship 
for the Western Pacific region were not an explicit subject 
investigated in this study, it is clear that a number of the 
bilaterals could have regional significance. The programs in 
earthquake prediction, agriculture, meteorology, oceanography 
and fisheries and medicine come readily to mind. The further 
maturation of the bilateral relationship is probably necessary 
before it can serve as a foundation for multilateral regional 
initiatives. However, the possibilities for opportunities 
for some regional cooperation in the future should not be over- 
looked. 
111. The Program -- Described 
As indicated above, the U.S.-PRC S & T relationship has 
developed very rapidly and is quite extensive. Some effort 
is made in the following discussion to indicate the quantita- 
tive dimensions of the relationship, although summary statis- 
tical data on the program were difficult to come by, Approxi- 
mately 765 Chinese and Americans, scientists and administrators, 
have participated in exchanges under the program during the first 
two years. (According to Chinese estimates, some 350 Chinese 
came to the U.S. and some 420 Americans traveled to China. Ac- 
cording to my calculations, Chinese coming to the U.S. outnumber 
Americans to China 415 to 350.) Many of these, of course, were 
part of exploratory delegations that led to the signing of the 
protocols. 
The dollar costs of the program to the U.S. presented in 
the following table are also imperfect estimates. 
Costs to the U.S. Side by Agency (approximations) 
Agencx FY 79 FY 80 
EPA $ 7,500 $ 55,000 
USGS ( 2 )  121,000 50,000 









It is still too early to predict what the total dollar 
costs of the program will be. While some costs will undoubt- 
edly increase as activities expand, others will decline since 
the expensive exploratory delegations should no longer be neces- 
sary. 
This section of the report represents an effort to cap- 
ture the extensiveness and diversity of the program. The dis- 
cussion is organized according to the chronology of the agree- 
ment s. 
A. Agriculture 
Contacts between the agricultural sciences communities 
of the two countries predated normalization. Notable among 
* Does ,not include $750,000 in support 
of programs administered at the NAS 
these contacts were four agriculture related exchanges conducted 
under the CSCPRC mechanism. These included delegations on 
agricultural science and research, farm machinery, citrus 
fruits and wheat and vegetables. Momentum for a government 
to government agreement was building, therefore, when Secre- 
tary Bergland visited China in November, 1978, and signed the 
Understanding. Following normalization, the Understanding on 
Agricultural Exchanges was formally included under the S & T 
umbrella agreement by an exchange of letters between Frank 
Press and Fang Yi. The USDA is specified as the lead agency 
on the American side, and although not specified in the agree- 
ment, the State Agricultural Commission has been acting as 
the lead agency on the Chinese side. However, the program 
has also involved the Ministries of Forestry, Agricultural 
Machinery, State Farms and Land Reclamation as well as the 
Ministry of Agriculture and its Academy of Agricultural Sciences. 
Under the authority of paragraph 3, of Article 10, of the 
S & T apreement, the two sides agreed at a preparatory meeting 
in Beijing in January, 1980, to establish a U.S.-PRC Working 
Group on Agricultural Cooperation in Science and Technology. 
The Working Group has now met twice (January, 1980, and December, 
1980) and the minutes of its deliberations serve as the work 
program for the following year. 
Considerable movement of personnel has occurred since 
the program began. Exchange visits have enabled both sides 
to learn about each other's capabilities and needs. Both sides 
also now look forward to longer term cooperative research 
activities. Nevertheless, both sides have expressed satisfac- 
tion with the exchange visits that have occurred. These in- 
clude : * 
19'79 - Reciprocal visits 
germplasm 
biological control of insect pests 
mimal science (one half complete) 
1980 From PRC 
tractor testing (5) animal science and health (7) 
(from 1979) 
soil and water management (6) 
forestry (8) 
economics and statistics (14) 
biological control: stem (3) 
research associate rogram (5) P borers in corn, sugar cane, (one-year stay and rice 
biological pest control (3) aquaculture (2) 
and agent introduction 
germplasm: cotton (6) 
agriculture education (14) 
plant germplasm: wheat, (4) 
forestry 18) soybeans, forage grasses 
and vegetables 
grain storage and handling (6) 
biological control: para- (1) 
soil tillage and equipment (5) sites and predators of 
testing pests on citrus, deciduous 
fruits and field crops 
agricultural education (15) 
biological control: use of (2) 
lab. equipment (8) viruses 
Total: 81 plant germplasm: vegetables (3) 
economics and statistics (14) 
erosion control and water (6) 
management 
Total : 64 
*Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants. 
Plans for 1981 
From PRC From U.S. 
Forest Tree Seed (4) 
Management and Testing 
Processing of Forest (3) 
Products 
Small Watershed Management (3) 
Agrohydrology (2) 
Management Extension of (6) 
Agricultural S & T 
Saline and Alkaline Soil (5) 
Improvement 
Medicinal Plants (3) 
Soil Tillage ( 2 )  
Tobacco Improvement (3) 
Resistance of Crops to (3) 
Insects through Crop Breeding 
Economics and ( 3 )  
Statistics - I 
Economics and (3) 
Statistics - I1 
Agricultural Economics (3-4) 
* Biological Control by (3) 
Entomogenous Micro-organisms 
* Beef Cattle Breeding (4) 
Total: 50 
Total Man-Months: 58 
Agricultural Machinery Management (6) 
Utilization 
Soil Management and Productivity (6) 
Germplasm: Medicinal Plants (2) 
Soybeans: Germplasm and Biological (6) 
Control 
Forest Genetics and Tree Improvement (6) 
Survey of Taxonomic Study of (2) 
Natural Enemies of Crop Pests 
Agricultural Economics and (3) 
Statistics 
Agricultural Economics and (3) 
Statistics - I 
Agricultural Data Processing and (3) 
Remote Sensing - 11 
Economic Specialists (3-4) 
Hater Use and Management (6) 
Integrated Pest Management - Trees (6) 
Total: 52-53 
The following are contingent on 
the availability of funds: 
Human Nutrition (6) 
Root-knot Nematodes (2) 
Biological and Integrated Weed (3) 
Management Systems 
Animal Health (5) 
Fresh Water Fish Disease Control ( 3 )  
and Eradication 
Plant ~uarant ine ( 3 ) 
Biological Control by Entomogenous (3) 
Micro-Organisms 
Total: 25 
Total Man-Mont hs : 24 
As indicated above, both sides now seem ready to move 
towards cooperative research programs of longer duration than 
study tours. The 1981 program calls for cooperative research 
efforts in three areas: tree improvement, sediment research and 
saline alkaline soil. 
A third component of the agricultural agreement pertains 
to training and the exchange of visiting scientists. Although 
some activities had been occurring in this area in 1979 and 
1980, it received more focused attention at the December, 1980, 
Working Group meeting. Four programs have been tentatively 
identified. 
(1) Chinese Agricultural Participant Program - This is to be 
a PRC funded program with USDA acting to facilitate placement 
in appropriate U.S. universities. Thirty-one individuals have 
been identified for participation, and the PRC is currently 
reviewing the availability of funds for this project. 
(2) University Fellowship Program - U.S. agricultural universi- 
ties, working through the National Association of State Univer- 
sities and Land Grant Colleges and the International Science 
and Education Council's Standing Committee on Training (ISEC/ 
SCOT) have identified 20 training opportunities for PRC agri- 
cultural scientists. These range from six months to a full 
degree program. USDA's Office of International Cooperation 
and Development will serve to facilitate this program by commu- 
nicating training opportunities to China, receiving credentials 
of Chinese candidates and assisting in placement. 
3 Foreipn Research Associate Program - This program provides 
opportunities for Chinese scientists to work in USDA Science 
and Education Administration laboratories for 12 months, on 
projects of mutual interest. USDA provides laboratory space, 
supplies, materials and instruction when necessary. The Chinese 
side pays all travel and living expenses. The PRC intends to 
send 16 scientists under this program in the following fields: 
Veterinary Diagnostics (1 ) 
Poultry Disease and Protection (1) 
Identification and Classification of Natural Enemies 
of Crop Pests (1) 
Nutrition and Physiology of Fruit Trees (1) 
Effects and Analysis of Pesticide and Insect Residue (1) 
Plant Tolerznce to Environmental Conditions (1) 
Storage, Preservation and Utilization of Germplasm (1) 
Viral Disease of Crops (1) 
Fresh Water Fishery Nutrition (1) 
Forest Resource Inventory and Management ( 4  persons) 
Forest Fire Protection ( 3 )  
(4)  Agricultural Scholar Exchange Program - This would be a 
reciprocal exchange program. It is currently only in the talk- 
ing stage. 
The evolution of these exchange programs seemingly requires 
a modification in administrative arrangements, and both sides 
have agreed to discuss the establishment of a sub-group on 
Training and Scholar Exchange Frograms under the auspices of 
the Working Group at the latter's next meeting. These train- 
ing opportunities have been facilitated by the International 
Science and Education Council, a joint body composed of repre- 
sentatives of USDA and from the National Association of State 
Universities and Land Grant Colleges. The existence of ISEC 
is one of the unique features of USDA's approach to cooperation 
with China which sets it apart from activities in other agencies. 
In addition to facilitating training opportunities, ISEC also 
provides a point of liaison between USDA and agricultural higher 
education community in developing activities with the PRC of 
interest to the American agricultural science community. 
An unusual feature of the Understanding in agriculture 
is the explicit mention of the U.S.-PRC interest in agricul- 
tural trade. In this regard, USDA with its Foreign Agricul- 
tural Service and "cooperator" program is unique among Federal 
agencies in being able to link organizationally S & T coopera- 
tion activities with trade promotion. In consequence, the 
Understanding has not only led to the cooperative activities 
described above, but has facilitated interactions between the 
Chinese and U.S. agricultural trade association "cooperators." 
During 1979, an initial cooperators team visit in March was 
followed by separate visits of teams from the National Asso- 
ciation of Animal Breeders, American Seed Trade ~ssociation and 
the Western Wheat Associates. Three Chinese delegations visited 
the U.S. under cooperator auspices. By the end of 1980, approx- 
imately seven other commodity groups also had activities with 
China including the American Soybean Association, the Hdlstein- 
Friesian Association of America, the National Association of 
Swine Records, the National Renderers Association, the Tanner's 
Council of America, the U.S.A. Dry Pea and Lentil Council, Inc., 
and the U.S. Wheat Associates. The cooperators also have con- 
tributed to the hosting of Chinese delegations coming to the 
U.S. under the bilateral. 
A final feature of the agricultural agreement which sets 
it off from other agreements is that unlike most other agencies 
having cooperative S & T agreements with China, USDA has a 
budgetary line item for international S & T cooperation. In 
FY 1980 and FY 1981 this line contained approximately $1.4 
million, of which approximately $500,000 was committed to PRC 
activities. In addition, the Foreign Agricultural Service 
allocates funds for cooperator exchanges. (Funds for cooper- 
ator programs comein part from the private sector.) 
As can be seen from the above, activities under the agri- 
cultural agreement are many-faceted, involving U.S. agricul- 
tural universities and commodity trade associations as well 
as the USDA itself. Indeed, agricultural programs with China 
reflect structurally the far-flung activities of the government- 
industry-university U.S. agricultural establishment. This 
fact created managerial difficulties within USDA, and a sense 
that the program with China was proceeding without sufficient 
attention to planning, clarifying objectives and coordination. 
An informal working group on China was set up by the De- 
partment in 1979. It is chaired by Dr. Quentin West of the 
Office of International Cooperation and Development (OICP), 
the lead office within USDA, and also includes representatives 
of the Foreign Agricultural Service, the Science and Education 
Administration, the Economics and Statistics Service, the Ani- 
mal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the Forest Service, 
the Soil Conservation Service, the International Science and 
Education Council, and the WAOSB. In spite of the existence 
of the Working Group, by December, 1980, there was still the 
feeling that the program was not being as well managed as it 
should be. As a result, in January, 1981, activities within 
OICD were reorganized and strengthened. Dr. Thomas Kelly has 
assumed the leadership of the China Program and is assisted 
by two international affairs specialists, one China area spe- 
cialist and one secretary. 
The view from Beijing on the implementation of the agri- 
cultural agreement is positive and enthusiastic. Although co- 
operative programs with other countries exist, that with the 
U.S. is viewed as most effective in part because the govern- 
mental agreement is complemented by a variety of commercial, 
educational and "people to people" ties. The PRC officials 
interviewed felt that the program with the U.S. fit nicely 
with their own domestic activities, and they have adjusted 
their planning activities to accommodate the program. 
Prior to meetings with the U.S. side, the Agricultural 
Commission consults with the S & T officers in each of the 
ministries under its jurisdiction (who maintain active ties 
with relevant research institutes), with the Ministries of 
Light Industry, Food, Cereals and Pharmaceutical Industry, 
as well as with the STC in order to prepare for the integration 
of t h e  cooperat ive program wi th  t h e  domestic program. I n  t h e  
p rocess ,  U , S .  needs and i n t e r e s t s  a r e  a l s o  considered. 
The impact of t h e  PRC economic readjustment i s  not  ex- 
pected t o  be major. Resources have a l r eady  been a l l o c a t e d  
f o r  completion of t h e  1981 cooperat ive program. Formally, a g r i -  
c u l t u r e  enjoys a higher  s t a t u s  i n  t h e  new economic p o l i c y ,  and 
educat ion and sc ience  a r e  regarded as c e n t r a l  t o  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
development. A s  an i n d i c a t i o n  of t h i s ,  t h e  expansion of f a c i l -  
i t i e s  f o r  t h e s e  two a c t i v i t i e s  i s  cont inuing.  
Thus f a r ,  t h e r e  seems t o  be a f a i r  degree of mutual bene- 
f i t  i n  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  program. With t h e  key p o s i t i o n  of a g r i -  
c u l t u r e  i n  cu r ren t  PRC modernization p o l i c i e s ,  t h e r e  a r e  a 
v a r i e t y  of b e n e f i t s  accruing t o  t h e  Chinese s i d e  as a  r e s u l t  
of access  t o  U . S .  a g r i c u l t u r a l  S & T .  The U . S .  s i d e  b e n e f i t s  
as w e l l ,  however, i n  a v a r i e t y  of ways, most notably  i n  access  
t o  f l o r a  unique t o  China ( information on 806 v a r i e t i e s  provided 
t h u s  f a r )  and t o  t h e  germplasm of Chinese p l a n t  v a r i e t i e s ,  i n  
access  t o  Chinese experience wi th  b i o l o g i c a l  pes t  c o n t r o l ,  and 
i n d i r e c t l y  through t h e  l inkage  between S & T cooperat ion and 
t r a d e  which both s i d e s  recognize.  I n  t h e  b i o l o g i c a l  con t ro l  
a r e a ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  two agents  used i n  f o r e s t r y  p e s t  management 
which t h e  U.S. has only r e c e n t l y  begun t o  s tudy have been used 
i n  China f o r  twenty years .  
Both s i d e s  a r e  eager t o  move towards more subs tan t ive  j o i n t  
research .  A s  noted,  t h e  first such p r o j e c t s  a r e  included i n  
t h e  1981 work p lan .  The prospect  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e  development 
of co l l abora t ion  is promising. A p o t e n t i a l  problem i n  t h e  
program, however, is the maintenance of enthusiasm among Ameri- 
can scientists for it. While the enthusiasm thus far appears 
to be high, few American scientists have demonstrated a desire 
for a long term commitment to cooperation with China, for in- 
stance, by wanting to spend a longer period of time (e.g., one 
year) doing research in China. The language barrier is one de- 
terrent. It is important for the main%enance of the enthusiasm 
of U.S. scientists that the Chinese make additional efforts to 
accommodate the wishes of American scientists to have access 
to the physical sites at which germplasm is collected and bio- 
logical control techniques are used. 
During the past few years, USDA has initiated a new approach 
to international S & T activities. The dedication of a budget 
line, the establishment of ISEC and efforts at closer liaison 
with FAS and the cooperators represents an integrated yet ex- 
tensive approach to science, international cooperation and 
trade promotion which is intended to serve both the govern- 
ment's interests and those of its two main constituencies. To 
date, the most extensive use of this approach has been with 
China, as the commitment of 1/3 of OICD's budget to PRC-related 
activities signifies. While it is still too early to evaluate 
it seriously, the approach deserves more attention than it has 
thus far received. 
B. Space 
Discussion with China for cooperation in space began 
during the Press mission to China in July, 1978. NASA 
Administrator Robert A. Frosch was a member of that delega- 
tio'n. A Chinese space delegation visited the United States 
in November and December of 1978 at which time the Understand- 
ing on Cooperation in Space Technology was signed by Cr. Frosch 
on behalf of the U.S. and Ren Xinmin on behalf of the PRC. The 
document recorded an "understanding in principle" that "under 
suitable conditions" the PRC would purchase from the U.S. a 
satellite broadcast and communications system. The satellite 
would be launched by NASA, and placed into geostationary orbit 
by a U.S. contractor. With the same "suitable conditions" 
caveat, the Chinese also recorded their intention to purchase 
from the U.S. a Landsat ground station that would be capable 
of receiving information from "the Landsat now under devel- 
opment" (i.e., Landsat D). As with the agricultural and high 
energy physics agreements, the space agreement was subsumed 
under the umbrella S & T agreement by an exchange of letters 
between Frank Press and Fang Yi, following normalization. As 
with agriculture, international activities at NASA are facili- 
tated by a special budget line. 
A Joint Commission was established following the signing 
of the agreement. At its January, 1980, meeting, a lvlemorandum 
of Understanding was signed between NASA and the Chinese Academy 
of Sciences (Center for Space Science and Technology) on the 
conditions for direct reception of Landsat data. The MOU con- 
tains a clause which enables NASA, in consultation with CAS, 
to terminate its activities under the MOU if construction of 
the ground station is not under way within 15 months of the 
signing. 
NASA's role in these two projects has been mainly to facil- 
itate Chinese contacts with U.S. private vendors, and in the 
case of the ground station, to manage the complex export con- 
trol issues raised by the proposed Landsat D procurement. NASA 
has performed these responsibilities to date. On the satellite 
project, it was able to put the Chinese in touch with two candi- 
date systems consultants and four hardware manufacturers. A 
complex, drawn-out process of export control policy adjustment 
has opened up the way for the ground station purchase. How- 
ever, reassessments of Chinese economic policy have resulted 
in the indefinite postponement of the communications satellite 
project and some uncektainty about the future of the Landsat 
purchase. 
In spite of difficulties with these two projects, explora- 
tions continue for further areas of cooperation. The Academy 
of Space Technology proposed 13 additional areas of cooperation 
in technology at the January, 1980, meeting. Discussions on 
cooperation in fundamental aeronautics with the Chinese Aero- 
nautical Establishment have progressed to the point where dele- 
gations were exchanged during 1980, and a draft protocol and 
annexes have been prepared. NASA has expressed an interest 
in extending the relationship to two areas of its basic science 
interest (geodynamics and meteorology). Discussions are in 
progress on geodynamics and it is believed that cooperation 
in this area could be effected by a letter agreement. 
Approximately 35 Americans have traveled to the PRC in 
connection with the agreement, and some 35-40 Chinese have 
come t o  t h e  U.S. However, t h e  problems of developing and nur- 
t u r i n g  a v i a b l e  program of cooperat ion i n  space have been nwn- 
erous.  An enormous amount of time has been given t o  t h e  export  
c o n t r o l  problems assoc ia ted  wi th  t h e  ground s t a t i o n  procurement, 
and those  on t h e  U.S. s i d e ,  inc luding  p r i v a t e  vendors,  have 
been keenly disappointed by t h e  c a n c e l l a t i o n  of t h e  communi- 
c a t i o n s  s a t e l l i t e .  
NASA i s  now i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of dea l ing  with a t  l e a s t  t h r e e  
d i f f e r e n t  Chinese organiza t ions  ( t h e  Academy of Space Technol- 
ogy, t h e  Academy of Sc iences ,  and t h e  Chinese Aeronautical  Estab- 
l i shment ) .  It w a s  not poss ib le  t o  meet i n  Be i j ing  wi th  repre-  
s e n t a t i v e s  from a l l  t h e s e  organiza t ions .  Ins tead ,  con tac t s  
were l i m i t e d  t o  d iscuss ions  of t h e  LANDSAT p r o j e c t .  The Chin- 
ese  gave evidence of cont inuing i n t e r e s t  i n  t h i s  procurement, 
but  they  a r e  c l e a r l y  wary of t h e  p r i c e  of U.S. equipment and 
t h e  e f f e c t s  of i n f l a t i o n  on t h a t  p r i c e .  They be l i eve  t h a t  they  
can produce comparable equipment ou t s ide  t h e  U.S. (which i s  
denied by NASA), although they  p r e f e r  t o  buy from t h e  U.S. 
They have s t a t e d  t h a t  funds have been p ro tec ted  f o r  t h e  pur- 
chase,  but t h a t  they  have l i t t l e  f l e x i b i l i t y  (al though they  
have some) t o  go beyond what has a l r eady  been budgeted. They 
would, i n  s h o r t ,  be prepared t o  make t h e  purchase i f  t h e  p r i c e  
were r i g h t .  
P repara t ion  f o r  t h e  p r o j e c t  i s  under way. A network of 
remote sens ing  u s e r s  i s  p a r t i a l l y  i n  p lace  and i s  being f u r t h e r  
developed. It involves var ious  government m i n i s t r i e s ,  univer- 
s i t i e s  and a s p e c i a l  i n s t i t u t e  f o r  remote sens ing  i n  CAS. I n  
addition, efforts have been made to identify a suitable loca- 
tion--free from radio interference--and a site 100 km. from 
Beijing has been tentatively selected. The site, however, is 
inconvenient for the users, and as a result, a second site for 
the data processing center within the city is being proposed. 
N A S A  objects to this plan since it would greatly complicate 
the export control process, and recommends that the two sta- 
tions be combined. NASA recommends that the Chinese consult 
the Italians about the radio interference problem. The Chinese 
report that they have done this, but that they remain uncon- 
vinced. NASA has proposed sending a team to the PRC to assist 
with this question. 
The Chinese also expressed concern about the 15 month 
clause in the MOU, since in principle the MOU could become a 
dead letter after April. The Chinese strongly urged that in 
light of the disagreement over the purchase price, as well as 
the longer than expected clarification of the export control 
situation, the 15 month deadline be relaxed. 
C. High Energy Physics 
Perhaps more than in any other agreement, contacts between 
U . S .  and Chinese high energy physicists were already developing 
positively prior to normalization. High energy physics (HEP) 
is an exceptionally international discipline, and the Chinese 
HEP community had perhaps the greatest number of opportunities 
for foreign contacts during the 1970s of any group of Chinese 
scientists. Western HEP delegations had been to the PRC during 
the 1970s, and Chinese delegations visited major facilities 
abroad. In addition, there was a network of personal ties be- 
tween the U.S. and PRC HEP communities, many of which involved 
Americans of Chinese ancestry. Once normalization was decided 
upon, the two HEP communities and their bureaucratic patrons 
were prepared to quickly conclude an agreement and move to- 
wards its implementation. 
The instruments of the cooperative agreement in HEP are 
slightly different from those in other fields. Instead of one 
general protocol and one or more implementing annexes, the HEP 
agreement is founded on an "Implementing Accord" signed on 
January 31, 1979, between the Department of Energy and the Science 
and Technology Commission. The accord contains provisions for 
the U.S. to assist the PRC in the design of a 5 0  GeV proton 
synchroton (the Beijing Proton Synchroton) on a best effort, 
full cost recovery basis. It also provides for training for 
high energy experimental physicists, assistance in formulating 
a research program for HEP, and the sharing of administrative 
experience in establishing a major research center. The accord 
provides for the establishment of a Joint Committee (JCHEP), and 
Dr. James E. Leiss, Associate Director of the Office of High 
Energy and Nuclear Physics of the DOE and Dr. Zhang Wenyu, 
Director of the Institute for High Energy Physics (IHEP) of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) were named as co-chairmen. 
Annual cooperative work programs decided upon at the annual 
meeting of the JCHEP provide the details of collaboration. 
The only formal "annex" to the agreement, the "patent annex, " 
spells out mutual understandings on matters relating to intel- 
lectual property rights. 
The agreement provides for participation of the five major 
DOE contractor laboratories--the Stanford Linear Accelerator 
Center (sLAC), the Lawrence-Berkeley Laboratories (LBL), Fermi- 
lab, Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and the Brookhaven Nati- 
onal Laboratory (BNL). The Directors of these laboratories sit 
on the JCHEP. 
Because of pre-normalization contacts, implementation of 
the accord began almost immediately after its signing. In an- 
ticipation of the signing, a delegation of Chinese physicists 
visited the national labs in mid-January, 1979, and then con- 
vened in Washington with the contractor lab directors and DOE 
officials from January 29-31. At this meeting each of the labs 
spelled out in considerable detail what they were prepared to 
contribute to the agreement individually and jointly, and pre- 
liminary administrative arrangements were settled. The min- 
utes of this January meeting served as the basic reference docu- 
ment for the first meeting of the JCHEP in June, 1979, at which 
the work program for 7/79-6/80 was agreed upon. Of the 28 
items agreed to in the 1979-80 work program, 11 had been com- 
pleted and 9 were in progress as of November, 1980. Of the 
remaining 8, 7 are being carried out as part of the 1980-81 
program along with 4 new items. One of the original items 
was canceled by mutual agreement. As the program has evolved, 
the main division of responsibilities among the 5 U.S. labs 
for design assistance and review is as follows: 
ANL - magnetic field measurements, polarized ion source 
BNL - RF Linac,  RF f o r  main r i n g ,  beam t r a n s p o r t ,  beam 
e x t r a c t i o n ,  po la r i zed  beam 
Fermilab - i on  sources ,  high vol tage  column, beam i n j e c -  
t i o n ,  r i 'ng  magnets, low l e v e l  RF, boos ter  synchroton, super- 
conductor, magnets 
LBL - a c c e l e r a t o r  c o n t r o l ,  r i n g  magnet power s u p p l i e s ,  
h e a l t h  phys ics  
S U C  - magnet assembly and t e s t i n g ,  t e c h n i c a l  d a t a  labor-  
a t o r y ,  h e a l t h  physics .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a l l  f i v e  l a b s  a r e  providing advice on f a c i l i -  
t i e s  cons t ruc t ion ,  admin i s t r a t ion  and experimental  appara tus  
and resea rch  experience.  
A s  of t h e  begirmi'ng of 1981, more than  120 Chinese sc ien-  
t i s t s ,  engineers  and admin i s t r a to r s  had come t o  t h e  U.S. as p a r t  
of t h e  program, wi th  about 55 Chinese, a s  of t h a t  t ime,  working 
i n  t h e  U.S. on t h e  PBS p r o j e c t .  To coordinate  Chinese a c t i -  
v i t i e s  i n  t h i s  country,  a  Chinese HEP l i a i s o n  o f f i c e  has been 
e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  Fermilab wi th  a d i r e c t o r  who had a t  h i s  d i s -  
posa l  $1 m i l l i o n  i n  f o r e i g n  currency t h e  f i r s t  yea r ,  and s l i g h t l y  
more during t h e  second. 
I n  s p i t e  of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  both s i d e s  have expressed sat- 
i s f a c t i o n  with t h e  development of t h e  program it has not been 
without d i f f i c u l t i e s  and, a s  of t h i s  w r i t i n g ,  i t s  f u t u r e  is  very 
much i n  doubt. One of t h e  major problems on t h e  U.S. s i d e  has  
been wi th  export  con t ro l  p o l i c y  and procedures.  This  sub jec t  
i s  discussed f u r t h e r  i n  a separa te  s e c t i o n ,  but i t  should be 
noted here t h a t  i n  s p i t e  of high l e v e l  p o l i c y  changes druing 
the Carter administration designed to liberalize controls on 
exports of sensitive technologies to China, the policies have 
not been implemented at the working level. As a result, ex- 
port license applications have not been approved to the irri- 
tation of both the Chinese and DOE and its contractors. 
There has also been some minor misunderstanding concerning 
DOE prohibitions against use of DOE funds to support Chinese 
scientists who have been determined to be contributing members 
to research teams led by DOE contractors. The prohibition 
resulted from DOE efforts to enforce a strict interpretation 
of the "full cost recovery principle." However, this was a 
source of irritation to the Chinese--the rule does not apply 
to nationals of other countries--and DOC has accordingly changed 
its policy. According to guidelines issued by DOE on January 12, 
1981, Chinese scientists in DOE labs are to be treated in the 
same manner as scientists from other communist countries. In 
addition, however, DOE has also instituted a new regulation 
requiring "IA-473" forms for visitors to DOE facilities. The 
IA-473 procedures are not directed specifically at PRC scien- 
tists, but will affect them. It is important that both the new 
1/12/81 guidelines and the IA-473 requirements be explained to 
the Chinese authorities in Beijing, since their knowledge of 
these at present is unofficial (largely from PRC scientists 
in the U.S.) and incomplete. 
On the Chinese side, the BPS project required a degree of 
inter-agency coordination that seems to be somewhat out of 
character for the Chinese government. This led to an approach 
t o  p r o j e c t  management which t h e  American s i d e  be l ieved d i d  not  
t ake  f u l l  advantage of t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  provided. The b igges t  
problem, however, which now seems insurmountable i n  t h e  shor t  
run, i s  Chinese funding f o r  t h e  p r o j e c t .  
To t h e  s u r p r i s e  of many fo re ign  observers ,  t h e  BPS pro- 
j ec t  2nd high energy physics  genera l ly  was given a  prominent 
p lace  a s  one of China's  e i g h t  p r i o r i t y  f i e l d s  of r e sea rch  when 
t h e  n a t i o n a l  sc ience  p lan  was unveiled i n  Marcy, 1978. I t s  
i n c l u s i o n  a s  a  p r i o r i t y  f i e l d  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  high degree of 
i n t e r e s t  i n  and commitment t o  HEP shown by va r ious  Chinese 
p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s ,  r epor ted ly  inc luding  Mao Zedong and Zhou 
En la i  before  t h e i r  dea ths ,  and Deng Xiaoping and Fang Y i  i n  
t h e  post-Mao e r a .  
I n  s p i t e  of t h i s  high l e v e l  suppor t ,  t h e r e  were indica-  
t i o n s  of d i s s e n t  wi th in  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  community over t h e  HEP 
p r i o r i t y  s t a t u s .  By t h e  time t h e  implementing accord w a s  s igned,  
t h e  P R C  had begun t h e  process  of recons ider ing  i t s  ambitious 
economic p lans  of e a r l y  1978, a process  which has become an  
extens ive ,  soul-searching and p o l i t i c a l l y  u n s e t t l i n g  re th ink ing  
of t h e  economy as a  whole, and which cont inues t o  t h e  p resen t .  
A t  t h e  time of t h e  s ign ing  of t h e  accord,  it d id  not  appear 
t h a t  genera l  economic retrenchment would i n t e r f e r e  with U .S . -  
PRC s c i e n t i f i c  and technologica l  cooperation. However, by t h e  
f i r s t  meeting of t h e  JCHEP, Zhang Wenyu repor ted  t h a t  economic 
readjustment was f o r c i n g  t h e  cons t ruc t ion  schedule t o  s l i p  
and t h a t  components which t h e  Chinese had expected t o  procure 
abroad would be made i n  China i n s t e a d  (The U.S. s i d e  had been 
encouraging this latter course and applauded this decision). 
Zhang stated, however, that the project still enjoyed strong 
support. A t  the second meeting of the JCHEP, the Chinese indi- 
cated that they hoped to complete the BPS by 1987 with construc- 
tion stretched out--with segments completed sequentially rather 
than in parallel as originally planned--in order not to over- 
burden the economy. 
Unfortunately, by early 1981, word was reaching the U.S. 
informally that the BPS project has been canceled. It is clear 
that in the last two years, the project has come under increas- 
ing scrutiny by an increasingly budget-conscious government. 
Reportedly it survived cancellation efforts on prior occasions 
during this period, but has not survived the most recent effort. 
As an alternative to the BPS, the Chinese are considering 
the construction of a smaller machine on the grounds of the 
IEHP. In March, 1981, two Deputy Directors of IHEP came to 
the U.S. to consult with U.S. counterparts. The futures of 
both PRC high energy physics and collaboration with the U.S. 
in this field thus are unclear as of this writing. 
D. Metrology and Standards 
The Protocol on Cooperation in the Fields of Metrology 
and Standards between the DOC and the State Bureau of Metrology 
was signed on May 8, 1979, and an accompanying annex came into 
effect on the same day. Responsibility for implementing the 
agreement on the U.S. side rests with the National Bureau of 
Standards. Responsibility on the Chinese side is divided 
between the SBM and the State Bureau of Standardization. 
The annex provides for an exchange of visits of the Direct- 
ors of NBS and SBM, for PRC scientists to work in NBS labs, 
and for lectures in China by NBS scientists on the following 
topics: the establishment, management and technical operation 
of a standard reference materials program, the metrology of 
microwave and electronic sciences and engineering, the metrol- 
ogy of microwave and electronic sciences and engineering, the 
metrology of cryongenic sciences and engineering, the develop- 
ment and application of guidelines, protocols and standards 
for computer software and networking, the establishment, man- 
agement and technical operations of an analytical chemistry 
program, the determination of absolute physical quantities, 
and the utilization of applied mathematics in metrology. 
A number of these activities have been carried out. NBS 
Director Ambler visited China in May, 1980, and plans have been 
made for a return visit by SBM Director Li Leshan in the spring 
of 1981. During 1980, four Chinese were placed in NBS labs 
(analytical chemistry ( 2 ) ,  thermodynamics and molecular sci- 
ence, and radiation research), and one has already returned 
home. Three NBS scientists have traveled to China for two week 
lecture tours. In addition, NBS sent a laboratory visitation 
team to China in October and November, 1980, in order to gain 
greater familiarity with PRC activities in metrology and phys- 
ical science research. The team represented expertise in the 
fields of optical physics, nuclear radiation, time and fre- 
quency, radiometry, microwave measurements, surface physics 
and mechanical engineering. Approximately $20,000 was expended 
on these activities during 1980. 
Negotiations have been completed for activities during 
1981 and a second annex is to be signed during Li Leshan's 
visit in late April. Included in the 1981 program are some 
lecture visits to China by NBS personnel, and extended stays 
in NBS labs for up to four PRC scientists. 
While the Chinese side is generally satisfied with the 
progress of the program to date, there have been some irrita- 
tions. Furthermore, since further cooperation will probably 
involve training of PRC scientists at NBS, financial diffi- 
culties may become serious. Both SBM and SBS have programs 
with other countries, and they find the financial arrangements 
with these more to their liking. Chinese scientists are mak- 
ing long term stays in both France and West Germany, for in- 
stance, and on a receiving side pays basis, are receiving monthly 
allowances of 2,000 francs and 1,200 marks respectively. An 
agreement with the United Kingdom calls for a simple 100/~erson/ 
day mutual exchange. In light of this experience, U.S. insis- 
tence on "benefiting side pays" is viewed as burdensome, and 
in the context of current economic readjustments, a real ob- 
stacle to cooperation. In addition, the Chinese believe that 
their people have made contributions during their stays at NBS, 
and thus should be compensated. 
Thus while the preeminence of NBS is recognized, the Chin- 
ese may increasingly go the Europeans for training, However, 
cooperation with the Europeans in problematic since the Chin- 
ese scientists are usually less proficient in German or French 
than English. Of six PRC scientists now in Germany, four were 
o r i g i n a l l y  s l a t e d  t o  go t o  t h e  U.S. The NBS has made f o u r  
guest  worker p o s i t i o n s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  Chinese s i d e  during 
1981, but because of funding l i m i t a t i o n s ,  only two people can 
be s e n t ,  and these  w i l l  be pa id  f o r  by t h e  Minis t ry  of Educa- 
t i o n .  
The Chinese s i d e  a l s o  noted an unevenness i n  t h e  exchange 
of de legat ions .  According t o  t h e i r  c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  by t h e  end 
of 1980, they  have received and pa id  f o r  24 U.S. v i s i t o r s  while 
t h e  U.S. has  only received and paid f o r  e i g h t .  
A second a r e a  of complaint i s  t h e  den ia l  of access  t o  
t h e  NBS microwave l abora to ry  i n  Boulder, Colorado. The Chin- 
e se  be l i eve  t h a t  they  had explained t o  NBS Direc tor  Ambler 
t h a t  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  was pure ly  c i v i l i a n ,  and t h a t  D r .  Ambler 
knew t h e  backgrounds of t h e  two Chinese involved. The NBS 
has  looked i n t o  t h i s  problem; it w a s  r a i s e d  by t h e  Chinese wi th  
D r .  P r e s s ,  but t h e  DOD has p e r s i s t e n t l y  opposed t h e  presence 
of any f o r e i g n  s c i e n t i s t s  a t  t h e  Boulder f a c i l i t y .  
A f i n a l  a r e a  of i r r i t a t i o n  p e r t a i n s  t o  cooperat ion i n  
t h e  metrology of e l e c t r o n i c  devices .  Apart from t h e  microwave 
i s s u e  involving t h e  Boulder f a c i l i t y ,  t h e  Chinese s i d e  b e l i e v e s  
t h a t  t h e  U.S. has r e s i s t e d  t h e  f u l l  implementation of t h e  e l ec -  
t r o n i c s  s e c t i o n  of t h e  agreement by ignor ing  Chinese i n t e r e s t  
i n  t h e  metrology of l a r g e  s c a l e  i n t e g r a t e d  c i r c u i t s .  I n  p a r t i -  
c u l a r ,  they  a r e  anxious t o  have D r .  J u l i a n  French v i s i t  China. 
A t  t h e  time of t h e  s igning  of t h e  agreement, they  wished t o  
inc lude  LSICs i n  t h e  agreement. According t o  t h e i r  account ,  
they  were dissuaded by t h e  American s i d e  from doing so ,  but  t h e r e  
was an unwri t ten understanding t h a t  ' ' e l ec t ron ics"  would inc lude  
LSICs. Although t h e r e  a r e  no p lans  f o r  D r .  French t o  go t o  
China, h i s  a s s o c i a t e ,  Murray B u l l i s ,  i s  t o  go during 1981. 
NBS i s  w i l l i n g  t o  d iscuss  i t s  work i n  LSIC metrology wi th  t h e  
Chinese, but has decided t h a t  fo re ign  s c i e n t i s t s  w i l l  not  be 
permi t ted  access  t o  NBS f a c i l i t i e s  concerned with LSIC work. 
Two o t h e r  cons idera t ions  a f f e c t  t h e  prospects  f o r  co l lab-  
o r a t i v e  r e sea rch  of mutual i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  near f u t u r e .  F i r s t ,  
t h e  Engl ish  competence of t h e  f i r s t  group of PRC "guest worker 
s c i e n t i s t s  w a s  a problem, and t h e  NBS i s  q u i t e  concerned t h a t  
t h i s  be solved. Second, as wi th  o ther  agreements, t h e  Chinese 
work of g r e a t e s t  i n t e r e s t  t o  t h e  U.S. s i d e  may be i n  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
( e . g . ,  CAS) o the r  than  t h e  one with whom t h e  agreement was 
signed. 
E.  Management of Science and Technology 
The Protocol  on Cooperation i n  t h e  F i e l d s  of Management 
of Science and Technology and S c i e n t i f i c  and Technical I n f o r -  
mation between t h e  Department of Commerce and t h e  Science and 
Technology Commission w a s  signed on May 8 ,  1979. An annex 
s p e l l i n g  out i n i t i a l  a c t i v i t i e s  became e f f e c t i v e  wi th  t h e  s ign-  
ing  of t h e  p ro toco l .  The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  implementing t h e  
agreement on t h e  U.S. s i d e  r e s i d e s  with t h e  D O C ' S  Off ice  of 
P r o d u c t i v i t y ,  Technology and Innovat ion (OPTI )  and t h e  Nat ional  
Technical Information Service.(NTIS).  
A c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  S  & T information a r e a  c a l l  f o r  t h e  
establ ishment  of a r e l a t i o n s h i p  between NTIS and t h e  I n s t i t u t e  
of S & T Information of China ( I S T I C ) .  This  has been accom- 
p l i shed .  NTIS has so ld  ISTIC p u b l i c a t i o n s  and subsc r ip t ions  
t o  t h e  Governmen-t Reports Announcements and Index. These m a -  
t e r i a l s  a r e  being made a v a i l a b l e  t o  China a t  t h e  U.S. domestic 
p r i c e ,  a 50% reduct ion  of t h e  normal p r i c e  f o r  overseas  buy- 
e r s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  ISTIC sent  a  team of four  t o  NTIS f o r  n ine  
weeks of t r a i n i n g  during 1980. ISTIC i s  f a c i l i t a t i n g  NTIS 
a c q u i s i t i o n  of Chinese m a t e r i a l s .  F i n a l l y ,  NTIS has es tab-  
l i s h e d  a  working agreement with t h e  China National  Publ ica-  
t i o n  Import Cooperation, t h e  organiza t ion  i n  China with t h e  
main r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  acqu i r ing  f o r e i g n  books, p e r i o d i c a l s  
and government documents. 
A c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  management of S  & T a r e a  have r e s u l t e d  
i n  one of t h e  most i n t e r e s t i n g  j o i n t  p r o j e c t s  of a l l  t h e  U.S.- 
PRC S  & T agreements. One of t h e  i n t e r e s t i n g  f e a t u r e s  of t h e s e  
a c t i v i t i e s  i s  t h a t  they  a r e  occurr ing outs ide  a  formal s p e c i f i c  
agreement. The annex s p e c i f i e s  t h a t  D r .  Jordan Baruch, t h e n  
DOC A s s i s t a n t  Secre tary  f o r  Science and Technology and t h e  
head of OPTI, would l e a d  a  de legat ion  of management exper t s  
t o  China. This  t r i p  occurred i n  November, 1979, and involved 
extensive d iscuss ions  with Fang Y i  ( r ep resen t ing  t h e  STC) and 
Vice Premier Kang Shi 'en ,  Chairman of t h e  S t a t e  Economic Com- 
mi t t ee .  Out of t h e s e  d iscuss ions  came a proposal  f o r  t h e  es tab-  
l ishment of a t r a i n i n g  i n s t i t u t e  f o r  Chinese managers, o f f i -  
c i a l s  and u n i v e r s i t y  p ro fessor s .  The proposal  w a s  then  r e f i n e d  
by DOC and w a s  presented t o  t h e  STC a t  t h e  f i r s t  meeting of 
Urns.-PRC J o i n t  Commission on Science and Technology i n  January,  
1980. The Chinese s i d e  w a s  e n t h u s i a s t i c  about t h e  i d e a ,  and it  
w a s  decided t o  e s t a b l i s h  a Nat ional  Center f o r  I n d u s t r i a l  Sc i -  
ence and Technology Management Development ( o r  Dalian Manage- 
ment Tra in ing  Center: DMTC) on t h e  grounds of t h e  Dalian I n s t i -  
t u t e  of Technology. 
Af te r  an  i n i t i a l  v i s i t  of an American team t o  China i n  
June,  1980, c l a s s e s  a t  Center began on August 18 ,  1980. The 
p r o j e c t  has involved the  U . S .  s i d e  providing a f a c u l t y  of nine 
drawn from U.S. bus iness  schools  t o  o f f e r  courses  i n  accounting 
and f i n a n c i a l  management; management of product ion,  opera t ions  
and technology; organiza t ion  and personnel management; mana- 
g e r i a l  economics, s t a t i s t i c s ,  and decision-making t o o l s ;  d a t a  
management and information systems; s t r a t e g i c  planning,  p o l i c y  
a n a l y s i s  and formulat ion;  and markets and e n t e r p r i s e  develop- 
ment. There were 120 o f f i c i a l  s tuden t s  and 60 u n o f f i c i a l  "aud- 
i t o r s "  i n  t h e  f irst  sess ion .  The s tudent  body w a s  drawn approx- 
imate ly  equal ly  from among e n t e r p r i s e  managers, government o f f i -  
c i a l s  and S & T managers, and u n i v e r s i t y  p ro fessor s .  
The program a l s o  involved t h e  U.S. providing f i v e  "case 
w r i t e r s "  who were t o  develop wi th  Chinese counterpar ts  case 
m a t e r i a l s  from Chinese managerial experience t o  be used f o r  
i n s t r u c t i o n a l  purposes (along wi th  U .  S .  case m a t e r i a l s ) .  Con- 
t r o l  Data Corporation provided a computer and t w o  of i t s  em- 
ployees t o  assist i n  computer t r a i n i n g  and u t i l i z a t i o n .  Xerox, 
Texas Ins t ruments ,  RCA and Wang a l s o  cont r ibuted  equipment t o  
t h e  program. Overal l  d i r e c t i o n  of a c t i v i t i e s  on t h e  U.S. 
s i d e  w a s  i n  t h e  hands of OPTI's Direc tor  of Far E a s t  Programs 
who w a s  r e s i d e n t  i n  Dalian. 
During t h e  f i r s t  year ,  two t h i r d s  of t h e  c o s t s  of U.S. par-  
t i c i p a t i o n  were covered by t h e  IPRC,which repor ted ly  has assigned 
t h e  p r o j e c t  high p r i o r i t y ,  (The c o s t s  t o  t h e  U.S. during t h e  
f i r s t  year  were between $40,000 and $50,000).  The S t a t e  Eco- 
nomic Commission has been designated t h e  l ead  agency on t h e  
Chinese s i d e ,  but t h e  STC and t h e  Minis t ry  of Education a r e  
a l s o  a c t i v e l y  involved. 
Reportedly t h e  f i rs t  s e s s i o n  a t  t h e  Center was q u i t e  suc- 
c e s s f u l .  Both Japan and West Germany have watched t h e  program 
c a r e f u l l y ,  and wish t o  emulate t h e  Dalian concept elsewhere 
i n  China. They a r e  repor ted  t o  be prepared t o  con t r ibu te  r e -  
sources  t o  meet t h e  bulk of t h e  c o s t s  f o r  t h e i r  p r o j e c t s .  The 
PRC accordingly requested t h a t  the U .  S. increase  i t s  contr ibu-  
t i o n  t o  t h e  1981 e f f o r t  from 1/3 t o  1/2 of t h e  c o s t s .  
I n  March, 1981, a  U.S. team composed of t w o  DOC o f f i c i a l s  
and t h r e e  of t h e  1980 " facu l ty"  t r a v e l e d  t o  Be i j ing  and formu- 
l a t e d  p l a n s  with PRC counterpar ts  f o r  1981. The second "term" 
i s  t o  begin May 4 and l a s t  f o r  28 weeks. During t h e  f i r s t  6 
weeks, t h e  Chinese f a c u l t y  w i l l  t each  b a s i c  s u b j e c t s ,  t o  be 
followed by 20 weeks of i n s t r u c t i o n  by t h e  American f a c u l t y .  
A f i n a l  2  weeks of t h e  term w i l l  involve s p e c i a l  p r o j e c t s  d i -  
r e c t e d  by t h e  Chinese f a c u l t y .  The U . S .  has agreed t o  f inance  
one ha l f  of t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a v e l  and one h a l f  of t h e  sal- 
a r i e s  of t h e  American p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  es t imated t o  be approxi- 
mately $ l j0 ,000 .  
The Chinese s i d e  c l e a r l y  has considerable  i n t e r e s t  i n  
t h i s  p r o j e c t .  One measure of t h e i r  commitment t o  i t  i s  t h e i r  
dec i s ion  t o  proceed with t h e  cons t ruc t ion  of 9,000 square meters 
of l i v i n g  and teaching  space a t  t h e  s i t e  i n  s p i t e  of t h e  n a t i o n a l  
p o l i c y  of c u t t i n g  back c a p i t a l  cons t ruc t ion .  However, any a t -  
tempt t o  a s s e s s  t h e  impact on t h e  Chinese s i d e  would be pre-  
mature. I w a s  t o l d  t h a t  both t h e  contents  of t h e  1980 courses  
and t h e  teaching  methods used had a  d e f i n i t e  impact on t h e  
th ink ing  of t h e  Chinese p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  but  t h a t  it w a s  t oo  soon 
t o  know how success fu l  t h e  Chinese p a r t i c i p a n t s  have been i n  
adapt ing what  t hey  have learned  t o  Chinese condi t ions .  The 
expansion of management educat ion i n  Chinese i n s t i t u t i o n s  of 
higher  educat ion i s  now being considered. 
U .  S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  Dalian Center is  an innovat ive 
and p o t e n t i a l l y  very  s i g n i f i c a n t  con t r ibu t ion  t o  Chinese modern- 
i z a t i o n  e f f o r t s  and t o  U.S.-PRC r e l a t i o n s .  It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
eva lua te  t h e  program s e r i o u s l y ,  however, s ince  t o  da te  t h e  
DOC has suppl ied very l i t t l e  documentation of i t s  a c t i v i t i e s .  
A s  noted above, t h e  establ ishment  of t h e  Center and t h e  U . S .  
r o l e  i n  it i s  not s p e c i f i c a l l y  mentioned i n  e i t h e r  t h e  pro- 
t o c o l  o r  t h e  annex. A s  a r e s u l t ,  it i s  not p o s s i b l e  t o  know 
what t h e  commitments and i m p l i c i t  understanding of t h e  two 
s i d e s  a r e .  The case m a t e r i a l s ,  which were intended t o  be a  
key p a r t  of t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n  program, have not  been made a v a i l -  
a b l e ,  and t h e r e  has been no w r i t t e n  d e t a i l e d  r e p o r t  on t h e  
a c t i v i t i e s  t o  da te .  
Thus, t h e r e  a r e  p o t e n t i a l  problems with t h e  program. DOC 
has r epor ted  t o  DOS t h a t  U . S .  t eaching  f a c u l t y  w i l l  be r equ i red  
a t  DMTC f o r  the  next 3 t o  5 years .  It i s  by no means c l e a r  
who w i l l  pay f o r  these  s e r v i c e s .  I f  t h e  U.S. s i d e  i s  expected 
t o  pay, t h e  b e n e f i t s  t o  t h e  U . S .  s i d e  need t o  be s p e l l e d  out 
i n  considerably more d e t a i l  than  has been done t o  da te .  Ref- 
erence t o  Japanese and German i n t e r e s t s  i n  having t h e i r  own 
c e n t e r s  i s  not i n  i t s e l f  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  U.S. p a r t i c i p a -  
t i o n .  The Chinese s i d e  be l i eves  t h a t  t h e  U.S. has benef i t ed  
from l e a r n i n g  about PRC management p r a c t i c e s  i n  g r e a t e r  de- 
t a i l  as a  r e s u l t  of t h e  access  a f forded t o  t h e  case w r i t e r s  
and f i r s t  y e a r ' s  f a c u l t y .  This  access ,  i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  i s  r e -  
garded a s  ex t rao rd ina ry  by t h e  Chinese, and repor ted ly  requ i red  
ex t raord ina ry  e f f o r t s  t o  arrange.  
One of t h e  problems wi th  t h e  program i s  t h a t  those  who 
had t h i s  access  n e i t h e r  had any p r i o r  knowledge of Chinese man- 
agement nor any s p e c i a l  p ro fess iona l  commitment t o  t h e  s tudy 
of Chinese management or the  PRC economy ( t h e r e  a r e  Americans 
who both have some knowledge of these  ma t t e r s  and who have 
made l i f e  long commitments t o  inc rease  t h a t  knowledge). I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  when I asked i n  Be i j ing  whether f u r t h e r  case s t u d i e s  
would be done, I was t o l d  t h a t  the  American f a c u l t y  w i l l  prob- 
a b l y  be t o o  busy f o r  t h a t  purpose,  a l though t h e r e  may be some 
opportuni ty f o r  such work i n  Dalian. It would appear t h a t  
f u t u r e  access  t o  Chinese f a c t o r i e s  w i l l  no t  be expanded and 
may i n  f a c t  be reduced. Thus one of t h e  b e n e f i t s  t o  the  U.S. 
w a s  not  p ro tec ted  while a t  t h e  same time U.S. con t r ibu t ions  
t o  t h e  program have increased .  
While t h e  DMTC program thus  f a r  has been success fu l ,  i t s  
v i a b i l i t y  over t h e  longer  run r e q u i r e s  a t t e n t i o n .  Three a r e a s  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r  need f u r t h e r  cons idera t ion .  The f i r s t  is  t h e  
funding and management of t h e  program on t h e  U .  S. s i d e .  The 
p o s s i b i l i t y  of moving t h e  program out of DOC ( ~ e r h a p s  t o  a  
consortium of bus iness  schools)  should be explored as should 
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of t o t a l  or  p a r t i a l  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  funding. 
Second, t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of inc luding  U.S. i n d u s t r i a l  and 
R & D managers (o r  r e t i r e d  managers) as members of t h e  f a c u l t y  
should be explored. 
F i n a l l y ,  e f f o r t s  should be made t o  inc lude  Americans who 
have s p e c i a l i z e d  p ro fess iona l  competence i n  and demonstrated 
p ro fess iona l  commitment t o  t h e  study of Chinese management, 
admin i s t r a t ion  and economic development. 
F .  Marine and Fishery  Scie,nce and Technology 
The Protocol  on Cooperation i n  t h e  F i e l d  of Marine and 
F i she ry  Science and Technology w a s  signed May 8 ,  1979, between 
NOAA and t h e  PRC National Bureau of Oceanography. Annex 1 t o  
t h e  p r o t o c o l ,  which makes mention of d iscuss ions  with t h e  PRC 
Natio'nal Bureau of Aquatic Products and CAS as we l l  a s  NBO 
was s igned on t h e  same day. A s  wi th o the r  f i e l d s ,  t h e r e  had 
been some p r i o r  contac t  betwee,n t h e  two s i d e s  a s  a r e s u l t  of 
CSCPRC sponsored a c t i v i t i e s  and through i n t e r n a t i o n a l  organiza- 
t i o n s .  
The p ro toco l  provides f o r  t h e  establ ishment  of a j o i n t  
Working Group, and t h e  Annex o u t l i n e s  a n  i n i t i a l  program of 
work c o n s i s t i n g  of t h r e e  ca tegor ies  of p r o j e c t s :  Category I 
included a c t i v i t i e s  f o r  which s p e c i f i c  commitment could be made 
a t  t h e  t ime of t h e  s igning.  Category I1 inc ludes  a c t i v i t i e s  
which have been agreed upon " i n  p r i n c i p l e . "  Category I11 pro- 
j e c t s  a r e  those  which both s i d e s  w i s h  t o  explore f u r t h e r  before 
agreements a r e  reached. Category I des ignat ions  from t h e  t ime 
of t h e  s ign ing  t o  t h e  present  include (1) marine d a t a  exchange; 
( 2 )  marine sedimentation processes ;  (3)  aquacul ture ;  (4)  tuna 
f i s h e r i e s  a c t i v i t i e s ;  and (5) marine environmental s e r v i c e s .  
A c t i v i t i e s  t o  da te  have been mainly i n  t h e  f i rs t  t h r e e  a r e a s .  
Deta i led  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  of work a r e  s p e l l e d  out i n  t h e  minutes 
of t h e  Working Group. 
I n  t h e  da ta  exchange a r e a ,  t h e r e  has  been an exchange of 
de lega t ions  ( U . S .  t o  PRC i n  November, 1979; PRC t o  U.S. i n  Oct- 
ober ,  1980) which has been focused on t h e  i n i t i a l  ob jec t ives  
of l e a r n i n g  about each o t h e r ' s  systems and helping t h e  PRC es-  
t a b l i s h  a National  Oceanographic Data Center ( N O D C ) .  A pro- 
posa l  f o r  f u r t h e r  cooperation i s  now i n  d r a f t  which c a l l s  f o r  
(1) U.S. advice and t r a i n i n g  i n  support  of t h e  establ ishment  
of t h e  NODC; ( 2 )  an exchange of d a t a ;  (3 )  an  exchange of s c i -  
e n t i f i c  l i t e r a t u r e .  The implementation of i tems 2 and 3 should 
not  be problematic ,  but  progress  on i tem one w i l l  probably 
be slow s ince  an  e f f e c t i v e  cen te r  r e q u i r e s  considerable  i n t e r -  
agency coordinat ion i n  China, and w i l l  a l s o  r equ i re  funding 
(poss ib ly  from UNDP f o r  f a c i l i t i e s  and hardware a c q u i s i t i o n ) .  
I n  t h e  aquacul ture  a r e a ,  t h e r e  w a s  an  exchange of dele-  
g a t i o n s  i n  1980. There have been d iscuss ions  of fo l low on a c t i -  
v i t i e s  and o f  Bs tabl i sh ing  a  j o i n t  s tudy panel  on aquacul ture .  
The f u t u r e  of these  d iscuss ions  i s  uncer t a in  a t  t h i s  t ime. 

i n  t h e  annex a r e  un l ike ly  t o  y i e l d  a c t i v i t i e s  u n t i l  l a t e  1981 
o r  1982. These include marine environmental s e r v i c e s  (Cate- 
gory I ) ,  marine ins t rumenta t ion  and buoys ( I I ) ,  marine environ- 
mental monitoring and p r e d i c t i o n  (11), numerical computer model- 
i n g  (11), s e a - a i r  i n t e r a c t i o n  (11), and marine metrology and 
s tandards  (moved from 111 t o  11). Exchanges a r e  t o  begin i n  
1981 on biology of f i s h  resources  spec ies  ( I I ) ,  which i s  t o  
be coordinated w i t h  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  aquacul ture .  
The proposal  f o r  t h e  marine sedimentation s tudy w a s  very 
much of an  American i n i t i a t i v e .  While t h e  Chinese c l e a r l y  
have a  long term i n t e r e s t  i n  sedimentation problems i n  t h e  
Changjiang es tua ry  and while they  have c o l l e c t e d  much d a t a  
on t h e  phenomenon (which i s  being made a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  U.S. 
s i d e ) ,  it i s  not c l e a r  t h a t  they  were planning any major sed i -  
mentation dynamics study p r i o r  t o  t h e  U.S. i n i t i a t i v e .  Evi- 
den t ly  they  f e l t  t h a t  a  p o s i t i v e  response t o  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  
would give them an opportuni ty t o  l e a r n  first hand about Ameri- 
can oceanographic r e sea rch  s t r a t e g i e s  and t o  have access  t o  
American technology. They t h e r e f o r e  agreed t o  t h e  p r o j e c t .  
Although t h e r e  was i n i t i a l  disagreement between t h e  two s i d e s  
about t h e  choice of s t a t i o n s  f o r  observat ions ,  t h e  p r o j e c t  
could not  have g o t t e n  as far and as fast as it has ,  had it  
not  been f o r  t h e  a c t i v e  support  of t h e  NBO. 
The program t o  da te  may have cos t  t h e  Chinese s i d e  more 
than  had been a n t i c i p a t e d .  I n  s p i t e  of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  it now 
occupies a spanking new bu i ld ing  i n  Be i j ing ,  t h e  NBO i s  f i n d i n g  
it d i f f i c u l t  t o  r a i s e  t h e  necessary funds t o  support  t h e  t w o  
c r u i s e s  planned f o r  1981. They est imate t h a t  these  w i l l  cos t  ap- 
proximately $1 m i l l i o n  f o r  opera t ing  expenses, and they  now have 
a s h o r t f a l l  of some $400,000. (Some on t h e  U.S. s i d e  be l i eve  
t h a t  a t  most t h e  c r u i s e s  should cos t  no more than  $500,000). 
It w a s  suggested by t h e  Chinese t h a t  even t h e  $ ~ O O O , O O O  t h a t  
has  been a l l o c a t e d  has not been easy t o  r a i s e  and has had t o  
come out of o ther  NBO programs. ( I  a l s o  received t h e  impression 
t h a t  progress  i n  t h e  f i s h e r i e s  a r e a  may be slowed by a l a c k  of 
funds a s  w e l l . )  
The NBO has  approached NOAA w i t h  a proposal  t h a t  t h e  U.S. 
help def ray  t h e  c o s t s  of 1981 c r u i s e s .  The b a s i s  f o r  t h i s  pro- 
posa l  i s  t h e  wording found i n  t h e  minutes of t h e  June,  1980, 
Working Group meeting which reads  i n  p a r t ,  " . . . i f  only one s i d e  
provides s h i p s ,  t h e  expenses should reasonably be shared by 
both s i d e s . "  NOAA has thus  f a r  re fused  on t h e  grounds t h a t  it 
i s  cont rary  t o  NOAA p r a c t i c e  t o  pay opera t ing  expenses f o r  t h e  
sh ips  of o the r  coun t r i e s ,  and t h a t  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  w a s  made c l e a r  
t o  t h e  PRC s i d e  a t  t h e  June meeting. A s  a r e s u l t ,  t h e r e  i s  
some ques t ion  about whether t h e  c r u i s e s  can i n  f a c t  be con- 
ducted. There is room f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n ,  however, s ince  t h e  Chin- 
ese  s i d e  i s  not  i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  NOAA make up f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  
s h o r t f a l l ,  nor  t h a t  N O A A ' s  con t r ibu t ion  need be i n  t h e  form of 
money. A s  of t h i s  w r i t i n g ,  a  compromise i s  being explored i n  
which NOAA would provide forms of t r a i n i n g  a s s i s t a n c e  as p a r t  
of its con t r ibu t ion  t o  t h e  p r o j e c t .  
There have been and continue t o  be i r r i t a t i o n s  on both 
s i d e s  i n  implementing t h e  p r o t o c o l ,  but these  have been manage- 
a b l e  so far .  A s  noted,  t h e r e  w a s  some confusion about t h e  a r e a  
chosen f o r  t h e  f i r s t  c r u i s e  ( t h e  Chinese s i d e  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  they  
accommodated U.S. wishes ) ;  t h e  Chinese be l i eve  t h a t  they  have 
not  rece ived  a formal p r e s e n t a t i o n  of U.S. da ta  and a n a l y s i s  
from t h e  f i r s t  c r u i s e  (not  a l l  of t h e  d a t a  held by t h e  U.S. i s  
i n  a  form t o  be t r a n s m i t t e d ) ,  and i n  t h e  f i s h e r i e s  a r e a  t h e  
Chinese f e e l  t h a t  s ince  they  have received s i x  Americans i n  
China and sen t  only four  of t h e i r  own people t o  t h e  U.S.,  t hey  
would l i k e  t o  r i g h t  t h i s  imbalance. I n  s p i t e  of these  minor 
problems, t h e  rappor t  between t h e  two s i d e s  i n  sedimentat ion 
p r o j e c t  has improved dramat ica l ly  i n  t h e  months s i n c e  t h e  c r u i s e  
(except f o r  t h e  funding ques t ion) .  The rappor t  between t h e  
s c i e n t i s t s  of t h e  two s i d e s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i s  e x c e l l e n t .  There 
i s  genera l  s a t i s f a c t i o n  with t h e  program. 
Although t h e  marine sedimentation p r o j e c t  was f i r s t  pro- 
posed by t h e  U.S. s i d e ,  and may have given t h e  Chinese some 
problems i n  i n t e g r a t i n g  it  with t h e i r  own a c t i v i t i e s ,  i t  i s  now 
viewed as a p r o j e c t  t h a t  has benef i t ed  t h e  Chinese s i d e  (ac-  
cess  t o  ins t rumenta t ion  and U . S .  ways of doing oceanographic 
r e sea rch ;  t h e  f r ank  c r i t i c i s m s  and suggest ions provided by t h e  
U.S. oceanographers) and i s  a t t r a c t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a t t e n t i o n .  
The U .  S. s i d e  b e l i e v e s  it i s  a f i r s t  r a t e  s c i e n t i f i c  opportu- 
n i t y  t h a t  i s  producing very e x c i t i n g  r e s u l t s .  
I n  t h e  marine d a t a  a r e a ,  t h e  PRC s i d e  hopes t h a t  coopera- 
t i o n  with t h e  U . S .  w i l l  f a c i l i t a t e  support  from UNDP f o r  t h e  
establ ishment  of a marine d a t a  c e n t e r ,  and hopes t h a t  t h e  U.S. 
w i l l  t r y  t o  convince UNDP of t h e  importance of t h i s  p r o j e c t .  
The NBO i s  beginning t o  develop r e l a t i o n s  wi th  o the r  
coun t r i e s  as wel l .  Both France (under a formal S  & T agreement) 
and t h e  Netherlands have expressed i n t e r e s t  i n  cooperat ive ocean- 
ographic s t u d i e s .  Japan i s  eager t o  develop cooperat ion and was 
t o  send a resea rch  v e s s e l  t o  China i n  l a t e  March, 1981. The 
program wi th  t h e  U. S. i s  t h e  most extensive t h u s  f a r .  The 
f a c t  t h a t  it i s  more s t r u c t u r e d  and focused accords 
wi th  Chinese preferences .  
Although it i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  provide s p e c i f i c s ,  one senses 
a f t e r  conducting in terv iews wi th  both s i d e s  t h a t  t h e  program 
i n  t h e  marine sc iences  a r e a  i s  one t h a t  would b e n e f i t  from 
g r e a t e r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  q u a l i t y  of communications between 
t h e  two s i d e s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  an e f f o r t  should be made t o  
genera te  more information concerning t h e  longer  term i n t e r e s t s  
of the  two s i d e s  i n  cooperat ion,  and t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  on present  
and f u t u r e  cooperat ion f e l t  by both. 
G .  Atmospheric Science and Technology 
P r i o r  t o  t h e  s igning  of Pro tocol  on Cooperation i n  t h e  
F i e l d  of Atmospheric Science and Technology on May 8 ,  1979, 
con tac t s  between t h e  two meteorological  communities had been 
e s t a b l i s h e d  v i a  t h e  WMO, where both t h e  U.S. and t h e  PRC s i t  
on t h e  executive committee, and through a v i s i t  t o  China by 
a  de lega t ion  from t h e  American Meteorological Soc ie ty  i n  1974. 
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  va r ious  types  of personal  con tac t s  e x i s t e d  be- 
tween t h e  two s i d e s .  Since t h e  s igning ,  37 Americans have gone 
t o  t h e  PRC and 25 Chinese have come t o  t h e  U.S. under t h e  pro- 
v i s i o n s  of t h e  agreement. 
The p ro toco l  between NOAA and t h e  Chinese Cent ra l  Meteor- 
o l o g i c a l  Bureau (CMB) s p e l l s  out genera l  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  cooperation 
and provides f o r  t h e  establishment of a  j o i n t  working group. 
On t h e  same day t h a t  t h e  p ro toco l  was s igned,  two annexes were 
a l s o  s igned.  Annex 1, l i k e  i t s  marine sc iences  coun te rpa r t ,  
e s t a b l i s h e s  t h r e e  ca tegor ies  of p r o j e c t s  ranging from those  on 
which f i rm agreement e x i s t s  t o  begin implementation, t o  those  
s t i l l  i n  t h e  t a l k i n g  o r  explora tory  s t age .  The Category I 
a r e a s  included i n  Annex 1 were numerical weather p r e d i c t i o n ,  
meteorological  s a t e l l i t e  (metsa t )  d a t a ,  mesoscale observat ions  
and resea rch ,  and meteorological  d a t a  and information.  Annex 
1, category I a c t i v i t i e s  have been implemented. During 1979 
and 1980, de legat ions  were exchanged i n  a l l  a r e a s .  
Annex 2 of t h e  pro tocol  committed t h e  two s i d e s  t o  a  co- 
opera t ive  program t o  e s t a b l i s h  a j o i n t  upper a i r  sounding f a -  
c i l i t y  i n  China, i n  which t h e  U . S .  s i d e  would provide equipment 
and some t r a i n i n g  i n  China, and t h e  Chinese s i d e  would provide 
f o r  t h e  s i t e ,  continued opera t ion  of t h e  s t a t i o n  and c o s t s  of 
NOAA personnel .  The implementation of t h i s  annex has gone 
smoothly and t h e  f a c i l i t y  has been i n  opera t ion  i n  China s ince  
June ,  1979. 
The second meeting of t h e  Working Group w a s  held i n  Bei- 
j ing  i n  September, 1980. A t  t h e  conclusion of t h i s  meeting, 
two a d d i t i o n a l  annexes were signed. Annex 111 records  under- 
s tandings  concerning t h e  implementation of Annex I.  It pro- 
v i d e s  f o r  t h e  r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  fol lowing a r e a s  a s  ca te-  
gory I f o r  implementation during 1981: cl imate monitoring, 
c l imate modeling and numerical p r e d i c t i o n ,  ground-based remote 
sens ing ,  and t r o p i c a l  cyclones.  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  p r o j e c t s  were 
added t o  ca tegor ies  I1 and 111. 
Annex IV is intended to lay the foundation for training 
and participation in operational and research activities for 
Chinese meteorologists at NOAA facilities. Seven Chinese are 
to be involved for approximately one year in environmental sat- 
ellite applications to weather forecasting ( & ) ,  and in the fields 
of UHF Doppler Radar and boundary layer atmospheric sounding 
applying ground-based remote sensing technology. It is to be 
funded jointly with the Chinese covering the costs of the first 
six months, while the second six months will be funded by the 
U.S. side. 
Meteorology is by nature an international activity and 
for this reason alone, NOAA officials are enthusiastic about 
expanded collaboration with Chinese counterparts. In addition, 
the American side is impressed with both the staff and operation 
of the CMB. In addition to the relationship provided for by 
the protocol, NOAA is participating in a WINO sponsored, UNDP 
founded project to help China upgrade its meteorological capa- 
bilities. 
From the Chinese perspective, cooperation with the U.S. 
is part of a multifaceted involvement in international meteor- 
ological activities, but one which has special appeal. The 
appeal comes in part from the access to U.S. technology, train- 
ing opportunities and forecasting experience afforded by the 
agreement. But in addition, China feels that the many geogra- 
phical and climatic similarities between the two countries 
provides a special basis for cooperation. While the Chinese 
are quite satisfied with the progress of the program, certain 
of their perceptions warrant attention. 
The CMB b e l i e v e s  t h a t  both s i d e s ,  but p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  
U.S., should not  become excess ive ly  concerned wi th  s h o r t  term 
balance of b e n e f i t s ,  but should i n s t e a d  keep t h e  long term i m -  
p l i c a t i o n s  i n  mind. Because of t h e  na ture  of t h e  f i e l d ,  with 
i t s  impl ica t ions  f o r  a v a r i e t y  of a c t i v i t i e s  i n  which t h e  two 
c o u n t r i e s  have i n t e r e s t s ,  cooperat ion i n  meteorology t ends  t o  
con t r ibu te  t o  t h e  o v e r a l l  U.S.-PRC r e l a t i o n s h i p .  B i l a t e r a l  
cooperat ion a l s o  b e n e f i t s  m u l t i l a t e r a l  e f f o r t s  t o  improve, 
understand and p r e d i c t  meteorological  phenomena. Thus China 
i s  a reg iona l  cen te r  f o r  weather da ta  c o l l e c t i o n  and dissemina- 
t i o n .  Daily d a t a  t ransmiss ions  a r e  made t o  Japan and West Germ- 
any, f o r  ins t ance .  China has a l s o  provided agro-meteorological 
t r a i n i n g  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  from other  LDCs under WMO auspices .  
The b i l a t e r a l - m u l t i l a t e r a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  a l s o  evident  i n  PRC 
i n t e r e s t  t o  procure a T i r o s  ground s t a t i o n  through p a r t i a l  UNDP 
funding. During t h e  first phase,  Chinese personnel  a r e  t o  r e -  
ce ive  t r a i n i n g  i n  t h e  U.S.,  t h e  c o s t s  of which a r e  t o  be borne 
by t h e  PRC. Some 300,000 yuan i s  t o  go f o r  f i r s t  phase a c t i -  
v i t i e s .  The a c t u a l  procurement is expected t o  involve $1.5 
m i l l i o n  (most of which w i l l  come from UNDP).  China would l i k e  
t o  buy t h e  equipment from t h e  U . S . ,  but cau t ions  t h a t  t h e  deci-  
s i o n  w i l l  depend on t h e  competit iveness of t h e  b i d s  from U.S. 
f i rms .  
It i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  a c t i v e  CMB p l a c e s  
s p e c i a l  value on i t s  r e l a t i o n s  with t h e  U.S. I t s  r e l a t i o n s  
wi th  D r .  George Benton, former NOAA Associate  Administrator ,  
were h ighly  apprec ia ted  and it  i s  eager t h a t  h i s  replacement 
be named. While t h e  U . S .  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  valued,  t h e  Chinese 
, - a n  < 2 -  - - 1 
also note that U.S. funding of the program is especially strin- 
gent. In its relations with Japan, for instance, 10 Chinese 
are being trained in Japan in numerical weather prediction on 
a receiving side pays basis. Training in Europe will also be 
covered by the Europeans. The funding arrangements with the 
U.S. for the participation of the seven trainees/researchers 
in NOAA activities during 1981 are acceptable. However, the 
precise formula should be reviewed once the U.S. has a better 
understanding of the contributions that can be expected from 
the Chinese participants. 
CMB has not been unaffected by budget cuts. I'hile its 
ability to conduct international activities out of its yuan 
budget will probably improve somewhat, activities requiring 
the expenditure of foreign exchange will be more constrained. 
It is unlikely that this will affect activities with the U.S. 
during 1981, however. 
The impact of budget cuts at NOAA as of this writing are 
a bit uncertain. Ceilings have been placed on travel expendi- 
tures, and in the competition for travel funds, travel essen- 
tial for NOAA operations will have highest priority. Funding 
for PRC trainees under Annex 4 may not be as firm as it was 
expected to be. 
H. Medicine and Public Health 
Cooperation in the fields of medicine and public health 
is being conducted under the terms of the Protocol for Cooper- 
ation in the Science and Technology of Medicine and Public 
Health signed on June 22, 1979, between the PRC Ministry of 
Publ ic  Health and t h e  Department of Health and Human Services  ( t h e n  
HEW).  A S  w i th  o ther  agreements, t h e r e  had been pre-normalizat ion 
con tac t s  between t h e  t w o  s i d e s .  I n  t h i s  case those  con tac t s  in -  
cluded a r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  had developed a t  WHO. 
The p ro toco l  spec i f i ed  seven a r e a s  f o r  i n i t i a l  cooperat ion 
( i n f e c t i o u s  and p a r a s i t i c  d i s e a s e s ,  cancer ,  card iovascular  d i seases ,  
p u b l i c  h e a l t h  and hea l th  s e r v i c e s  r e sea rch ,  medical information 
sc ience ,  immunology, and medical g e n e t i c s )  and e i g h t  a d d i t i o n a l  
a r e a s  f o r  subsequent cooperation ( reproduct ive  physiology and 
family planning techniques ,  pharmacology, i n d u s t r i a l  hygiene and 
environmental h e a l t h ,  organ t r a n s p l a n t a t i o n ,  burns,  microsurgery,  
biomedical engineering and mental h e a l t h ) .  During Minis te r  Qian  
Xinzhong's v i s i t  t o  t h e  U . S .  i n  June,  1980, mental h e a l t h ,  food 
and drugs ( inc lud ing  pharmacology) and family planning were added 
t o  t h e  l i s t  of i n i t i a l  a r e a s .  
The p ro toco l  a l s o  provides f o r  t h e  establ ishment  of a J o i n t  
Committee, t h e  f i r s t  meeting of which occurred immediately f o l -  
lowing t h e  s ign ing  of t h e  pro tocol .  The d e l i b e r a t i o n s  of t h e  
J o i n t  Committee a r e  recorded as annexes t o  t h e  p ro toco l  which a l s o  
serve  as t h e  programs of work f o r  t h e  two s i d e s .  Annex 1 s p e l l s  
out s p e c i f i c  t o p i c s  f o r  cooperat ion i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  seven a r e a s ;  
it names Chinese and U . S .  coordina tors  f o r  those  a r e a s ,  and desig- 
n a t e s  t h e  Bureau of Foreign A f f a i r s  of t h e  MPH and t h e  Off ice  of 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Health of HHS a s  t h e  admin i s t r a t ive  agen t s  f o r  t h e  
agreement. 
Annex 2 ,  which was agreed t o  a t  t h e  second meeting of t h e  
J o i n t  Committee on November 20, 1980, s p e l l s  out i n  some d e t a i l  
t h e  program of work f o r  1981, and planned exchanges of personnel.  
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Since epidemiology underlies many of the areas above, and 
because it has been particularly characteristic of Chinese medi- 
cal and public health studies, there is interest in making a spe- 
cial initiative to develop a "core" epidemiological training 
program in China. 
A considerable amount of contact under the agreement has 
now taken place, and both sides have expressed considerable satis- 
faction with progress to date. The stage is now set for longer- 
term, more substantive relations. Two problems loom, however. 
First, although the agreement is with MPH, there is considerable 
biomedical research going on in the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
some of which may be of interest to the American side. It re- 
mains to be seen whether there will be effective coordination 
between MPH and CAS, although representatives from MPH interviewed 
in Beijing stated that coordination is good. The second more 
serious problem is funding. 
Although the status of medical research and education is 
improved somewhat under current PRC policies, and although the 
completion of projects with the U.S. that have already been 
agreed to will not be a problem, PRC budget constraints may make 
the continued expansion of the program uncertain. The Chinese 
side is generally quite satisfied with the program to date. 
They believe that it meshes harmoniously with their own domestic 
program (although the current increased emphasis on applied 
medical research may hamper the development of those areas of 
the program in which U.S. interest is in basic research), and 
that access to Chinese research, health experience and unique 
health problems offer many benefits to the U.S. The Chinese 
side is, however, irritated by the stringent approach taken by 
the U.S. on funding. They noted in particular that the per diem 
provided to the two individuals assigned to the National Library 
of Medicine was quite inadequate. Again, the divergence of 
U.S. practice from that of other countries (~apan, France, West 
Germany) with whom the PRC cooperates was noted. 
Severe budget cuts in HHS also introduce uncertainty into 
the future of the program. Although cooperative activities 
with the PRC may continue to be a high priority in HHS's inter- 
,national programs, the scale of the latter will be trimmed. Re- 
portedly the Office of International Health will be cutting its 
staff from 57 positions to 10 by the end of October, 1981, and 
the longer term future of the office is uncertain. It is not 
clear how informed the PRC side is about these developments in 
HHS, and it may be desirable to alert them of possible reduc- 
tions of American commitment to the program. 
I. Hydroelectric Power and Related Water Resource Management 
Although high-level communication between China and the 
U.S. on cooperation in hydropower development predates the estab- 
lishment of diplomatic relations, it was not until Vice President 
Mondale's trip to the PRC in August, 1979, that an agreement to 
cooperate was signed (8/28/79). The protocol identifies the 
U.S. Department of Energy, the Bureau of Reclamation (later re- 
named the Water and Power Resources Service), the Corps of En- 
gineers and the Tennessee Valley Authority as the participating 
agencies on the U . S .  side. As the program has developed it has 
also involved the Chinese Ministry of Communications and the 
Trade and Development Program of the U.S. International Devel- 
opment Cooperation Agency. Because of the multi-agency nature 
of participation, both sides agreed to name national coordinators. 
This function has been lodged in the Department of Energy on 
the U.S. side, and in the Ministry of Electric Power on the 
Chinese side. 
Uncertainties over funding arrangements (to be discussed 
below), delayed the implementation of the protocol, and it was 
not until March, 1980, that the implementing annex was signed 
during the visit to China of the American hydropower delega- 
tion led by David Freeman. The Annex provides for cooperation, 
technical assistance and exchanges of personnel with the potential 
for deep American involvement in China's ambitious hydro- 
development plans. The activities provided for in the Annex 
can be summarized as follows: 
Article 1. Cooperation in planning for multi-purpose use of 
the Hongshui (Red) River. Responsibility on the U . S .  side rests 
with WPRS (although this is not stated in the Annex). 
Article 2. Cooperation in the Zongtan hydroelectric power pro- 
ject on Hongshui River, between the Corps of Engineers and the 
Ministry of Electric Power. 
Article 3. Cooperation on multi-purpose development technology 
related to the Sanxia (~hree Gorges) project on the Changjiang 
(Yangtze). Again, clear agency responsibility is not spelled 
out in the Annex, but the lead role for this article resides 
with WFRS. 
Article 4. Cooperation on power grid technology. The ministry 
of Electric Power and the Bonneville Power Administration are 
named as the participating agencies for this article. 
Article 5. Cooperation on the Ertan hydroelectric power project 
on the Yalong Jiang. The participating parties are the WPRS and 
the MEP. 
Article 6. Cooperation on the regulation of the Changjiang estu- 
ary involving the Corps of Engineers and the Ministry of Commu- 
nications. 
Subsections under each article spell out responsibilities in 
greater detail. 
Activities to date under the Annex have included the visit 
of a COE team to study the economic feasibility and engineering 
design of the project under Article 2.1; a visit to the U.S. of 
a Chinese team to study the multi-purpose use of the Tennessee 
and Colorado rivers under Article 3.2; a visit of Chinese under 
Article 1.2 to study multipurpose planning of the Columbia River; 
a COE team to the PRC to study problems of regulating the Chang- 
jiang estuary under Article 6.1; and a Chinese team to the U.S. 
to review design alternatives for Ertan under Article 5.2. A 
WPRS group is to go to China during the first half of 1981 under 
Article 3. A planned visit to BPA under Article 4 has been sus- 
pended because of a disagreement over funding arrangements. 
The objectives of the hydro protocol are ambitious; the 
bureaucratic processes entailed in the organizational arrange- 
ments are complex, and the implications for U,S.-PRC relations 
are far-reaching. Unfortunately, a foundation for adequate 
funding of the project was not laid at the outset, and uncer- 
tainties and disagreements over financial arrangements have 
plagued the implementation of the Protocol. Under U.S. policy 
guidelines, none of the participating U . S .  agencies are able 
to fund their participation out of their own budgets, except 
for the activities spelled out in Article 6 of the Annex where 
the COE has determined that its participation will be beneficial 
to its overall ability to carry out its legally mandated missions. 
As a means to advance the objectives of the agreement, a 
high level decision was reached in the Carter Administration 
to use funds from the Trade and Development Program to enable 
implementation of parts of the Annex to proceed. Approximately 
$417,000 has been set aside for this purpose by TDP for 1980 
and 1981 of which only a small percentage has been spent. 
The TDP is intended to provide seed money for projects that 
are expected to produce commercial gains for the American private 
sector 50-100 times the original investment. It was necessary 
therefore for the Carter Administration to secure from the PRC 
a statement of intent to the effect that the U.S. private sec- 
tor would enjoy commercial opportunities in follow on design, 
engineering and construction work. 
The private sector, however, has serious misgivings about 
the entire hydro agreement. The reasoning of representatives of 
the private sector is that China has the construction experience 
and know how to do much of the construction work itself. The 
comparative advantage of the U . S .  is in the design engineering 
and construction management areas, i.e., those areas where U.S. 
expertise is being offered by government agencies via the protocol. 
The i s s u e  of Chinese and U.S. government i n t e r e s t s ,  and U.S. p r i -  
v a t e  s e c t o r  i n t e r e s t s  i s  discussed f u r t h e r  below. 
The Chinese s i d e  has expressed considerable  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
with t h e  program t o  da te .  Hydropower development is  being ac- 
corded high p r i o r i t y  i n  current  PRC economic p o l i c y  d e s p i t e  c u t s  
i n  c a p i t a l  cons t ruc t ion  i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  budget. The PRC appre- 
c i a t e s  U.S. e x p e r t i s e  i n  hydro development and f e e l s  t h a t  t h e  
two coun t r i e s  have many s i m i l a r i t i e s  i n  t h e i r  water  resources .  
The Chinese now wish t o  move toward more s p e c i f i c  subs tan t ive  
programs (e .g .  rock mechanics, s o i l  mechanics, f i s h  l a d d e r s )  
and a r e  anxious t o  begin d iscuss ions  on a c t i v i t i e s  f o r  1982 
and beyond ( s i n c e  t h e  current  agreement only provides f o r  a c t i -  
v i t i e s  i n  1980 and 1981).  
On t h e  o the r  hand, t h e  U.S. approach t o  funding s t ands  as 
an obs tac le  t o  f u r t h e r  cooperation and t o  t h e  completion of t h e  
i tems i n  Annex 1. The f a i l u r e  t o  spec i fy  f i n a n c i a l  responsi-  
b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  agreement, and Chinese r e j e c t i o n  of t h e  "bene- 
f i t i n g  s i d e  pays1' formulat ion has a l r eady  l e d  t o  t h e  postpone- 
ment of t h e  implementation of A r t i c l e  4 ( t h e  BPA v i s i t ) .  A r -  
t i c l e  2 .2 c a l l s  f o r  6-10 Chinese t o  v i s i t  t h e  U.S. f o r  6-12 
months. A r t i c l e  9  a l s o  s p e c i f i e s  t h a t  50 Chinese w i l l  come f o r  
6-12 months. The Chinese now claim t h a t  these  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  
seasoned engineers  who can be expected t o  con t r ibu te  t o  U.S. 
a c t i v i t i e s  and t h a t  t h e r e f o r e  t h e i r  expenses i n  t h e  U.S. should 
be borne by t h e  U .  S. s ide .  A s  i n  o the r  programs, t h e  Chinese 
s i d e  p o i n t s  t o  experiences w i t h  o the r  coun t r i e s  where in-country 
expenses have been covered by t h e  host  country,  i n  s p i t e  of t h e  
fact that the U.S. is the only country with whom the PRC has 
a formal agreement. Twenty-nine Chinese trainees, for instance, 
were hosted by Hydro-Quebec. Reportedly, Chinese who have been 
received for training by U.S. private firms have been paid sal- 
aries after an initial settling in period. 
Unresolved problems of funding training activities, prob- 
lems with the financial foundation for the program more gen- 
erally, and the need to begin to plan activities beyond 1981 
suggests the need to rethink the hydro agreement. In particu- 
lar, the relationship between the U.S. government and the pri- 
vate sector needs attention. There has been no evident coopera- 
tion between the two; instead the relationship is characterized 
more by antipathy and mistrust. While the program was conceived 
originally on the U.S. side as one that would facilitate com- 
mercial opportunities, to date this seemingly has not been the 
case. In particular, the possibilities of the private sector 
sharing some of the short-term costs for the completion of an- 
nex one should be explored. In return, the voice of the private 
sector in future programmatic initiatives should be guaranteed. 
J. Earthquake Studies 
The Earthquake - Studies protocol was signed in Beijing in 
January, 1981. While the signators are the USGS and the Chinese 
State Seismological Bureau, the agreement also provides for 
participation by the NSF on the U.S. side and by the State Capi- 
tal Construction Commission on the Chinese side. Seven annexes 
have also been signed dealing with premonitory phenomena, intra- 
plate active faults, earthquake engineering and hazards 
mitigation, deep crustal structure, rock mechanics, very long 
period seismographic studies and exchanges of data and films of 
seismographs (this latter annex involves the active participa- 
tion of NOAA). 
In both the U.S. and China, earthquake prediction work has 
been accorded special status in public policy. The SSB has 
been designated the lead agency of the Chinese program while 
the USGS is the lead agency of the U.S. Earthquake Hazard Re- 
duction Program. Both sides enjoy special budgetary alloca- 
tions for their work. USGSts main responsibility is in the 
prediction area, while NSF has responsibilities in the area 
of fundamental research in support of prediction and in earth- 
quake engineering. The latter parallels the responsibilities 
of the Chinese SCCC. In short, there is a convenient organiza- 
tional congruence to the earthquake studies program. 
The organizational congruence is matched by a high degree 
of congruence of interests as well. China is in effect parti- 
cipating in an ongoing U.S. program by offering data and ac- 
cess to geological structures that would not otherwise be avail- 
able. The U.S. is in effect participating in an ongoing Chin- 
ese program by offering China advanced instrumentation to im- 
prove data collection and enhance data analysis capabilities. 
Work on the program which involves the participation of U.S. uni- 
versity scientists is now under way, and seems to be 
going smoothly. According to one senior U.S. university 
scientist who recently returned from six weeks of field work 
in Yunnan province, the program with China is the best 
cooperative program he has ever 
seen. The science is very exciting and the Chinese counter- 
parts have been extraordinarily cooperative and are making a 
serious commitment to the program, as evidenced by their con- 
struction of special residences for foreign visitors. 
The PRC budgetary cutbacks should not affect the SSB's 
program significantly, and its financial base for cooperation 
with the U.S. may actually have been strengthened. Indeed, the 
SSB seemed to be anxious to push forward with the program and 
seemed to have the resources to do so. However, they would 
like to have a better idea of USGS interests and intentions, 
and in this connection they expressed the desire to know who 
the new U.S. "representative" (i.e. USGS ~irector) will be. 
In keeping with the spirit of Article 5 of the protocol, they 
believe that more high level "representative to representative" 
communication should occur, and that these representatives should 
meet once each year. 
K. Earth Sciences 
The Earth Sciences protocol which provides for cooperation 
between the USGS and the Chinese Academy of Geological Sciences 
of the Ministry of Geology was signed in Beijing in January, 
1980. As of this writing, no annexes to the protocol have been 
signed, although there is rough agreement between the two sides 
on some 17 items (20 projects) of cooperation, 11 of which USGS 
was prepared to initiate for 1981. These include application 
of remote sensing techniques to mineral exploration and sedi- 
mentary basins; basin analysis techniques to petroleum 
exploration; relation of volcanism to tectonism and metallogen- 
esis; uranium deposit exploration and analysis; coal basin ex- 
ploration and analysis; petroleum geology of carbonate rocks; 
ground water hydrogeology in arid regions; geothermal gradient 
effects on oil and gas formation; genesis, classification and 
distribution of karst; debris-flow and landslide processes and 
classification; geological and hydrological conditions of hydro- 
thermal systems. 
Since no annexes have been signed, the only real progress 
made in implementing the protocol has been the establishment and 
meeting of the Joint Working Group (as stipulated in Article 5 
of the protocol). The organizational participation in the earth 
sciences agreement is complex, and therein lies the delay in 
reaching final agreement on the annexes. On the U.S. side, five 
offices of USGX are involved (~nergy Resources, Earth Resources 
Observation Satellite Program, Geochemistry and Geophysics, 
Water Resources and Environmental Geology). On the Chinese 
side, the agreement involves the Ministries of the Coal Industry, 
Education, Geology, the Petroleum Industry and the Second Min- 
istry of Machine Building as well as units from the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences. 
USGS had a large number of pre-normalization contacts with 
China, and thus, its personnel were prepared to move quickly 
towards cooperative relations with the PRC once the opportunity 
presented itself. After the Press mission, and just prior to 
normalization, the USGS proposed a geoscience community to geo- 
science community, non-governmental agreement. The Chinese 
response t o  t h i s  i n i t i a t i v e  w a s  p o s i t i v e ,  but involved a g r e a t  
dea l  of in te r -bureaucra t i c  nego t i a t ions  among Chinese agencies .  
As a r e s u l t  t h e y  were r a t h e r  chagrined when a f t e r  normalizat ion 
t h e  U.S. proposed inter-agency agreements wi th  separa te  Chinese 
m i n i s t r i e s .  Since by t h i s  time t h e  Chinese were a l r eady  we l l  
i n t o  t h e i r  own i n t e r n a l  coordina t ion ,  they  have s i n c e  taken 
t h e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  be only one main agreement providing 
f o r  a s e r i e s  of p r o j e c t s  ( t o  be agreed upon i n  annexes) i n  which 
t h e  var ious  i n t e r e s t e d  Chinese u n i t s  could p a r t i c i p a t e .  The 
U.S. accep t s  t h i s  formulat ion,  but d i sagrees  w i t h  what has been 
t h e  Chinese view t h a t  t h e  annex should include p r e c i s e  work 
schedules  f o r  a l l  17 i tems. 
Administrat ive coordinat ion on t h e  U .  S. s i d e  has been a 
major f a c t o r  i n  delaying t h e  s igning  of annexes. Since much 
time has elapsed s ince  t h e  o r i g i n a l  USGS i n i t i a t i v e ,  and t h e  
cont ingencies  f a c i n g  USGS o f f i c e  c h i e f s  have changed, it has 
been necessary t o  r e c l a r i f y  t h e  extent  of t h e i r  commitments t o  
t h e  program. 
The Chinese s i d e  be l i eves  they  enjcy good r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  
USGS, but  t h e y  a r e  concerned about t h e  l a c k  of progress  on t h e  
annex. They be l i eve  t h a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  17 i tem program repre-  
sented  a good balance of b e n e f i t s  (as wel l  as a balance of bur- 
e a u c r a t i c  i n t e r e s t s )  and t h e r e f o r e  would l i k e  t o  see  a s ign ing  
soon. The Chinese seemed t o  be sympathetic t o  t h e  idea  of 
s ign ing  an annex wi th  a l l  17 i tems inc luded,  but  wi th  t h e  t ime 
t a b l e s  and personnel  commitments f o r  some i tems l e f t  vague. 
That i s ,  while t h e y  a r e  eager t o  s i g n ,  they  a r e  prepared t o  
s t r e t c h  out t h e  implementation of t h e  annex. 
The Ministry of Geology is the lead agency for coordinating 
earth science work within China. In the field of international 
cooperation, however, the lead role is played by the SSTC. I 
sensed that the SSTC was therefore as anxious to move forward 
with the signing as was the Ministry of Geology. I was told 
that the PRC has been cooperating with a number of other countries 
including West Germany, France, the U.K. and Australia. In the 
Chinese view, the implementation of these has gone quite smoothly 
in comparison with relations with the U.S. 
It should be noted that there have also been some contacts 
between USGS and the PRC in earth sciences outside the protocol. 
These include a remote sensing specialist who attended a UN/ 
Academy of Sciences seminar on marshland use in September, 1980, 
a three-week visit in October, 1980, of a USGS glaciologist, an 
exchange of delegat ions of coal specialists and the attendance 
of six PRC scientists at a USGS course on carbonate rock. 
The delay in signing the annex is unfortunate, since its 
implementation seemingly holds significant benefits for both 
sides. Since the delay is related in part to a lack of action 
on the part of some U.S. officials, it may be desirable to give 
this program higher level attention in the U.S. than it has re- 
ceived so far. 
I,. Environmental Protection 
After an exploratory visit to China by EFA officials in 
1979, the Protocol for Scientific and Technical Cooperation in 
the Field of Environmental Protection was signed on February 5, 
1980, in Beijing. Three annexes were signed on May 14, 1980, 
during a  v i s i t  t o  t h e  U . S .  of a Chinese de lega t ion  l e d  by L i  
Chaobo, head of t h e  Off ice of Environmental P r o t e c t i o n  Leading 
Group (oEPLG). During t h i s  same v i s i t ,  t w o  o the r  annexes ( r e -  
l a t i n g  t o  p rese rva t ion  of na ture  and environmental impact s t a t e -  
ments) were d iscussed ,  but they  remain unsigned as of t h i s  
w r i t i n g .  
The a r e a s  f o r  cooperation s p e l l e d  out i n  t h e  annexes a r e  
a s  fol lows.  Annex 1 i s  concerned wi th  environmental h e a l t h  r e -  
search  and i d e n t i f i e s  cooperat ive a c t i v i t i e s  i n  the  a r e a s  of 
a i r  p o l l u t i o n  caused by coa l  combustion, dr inking  water contam- 
i n a t i o n  and b i o l o g i c a l  accumulation of p o l l u t a n t s .  Annex 2 
provides  f o r  cooperat ion  i n  p o l l u t i o n  con t ro l  and i d e n t i f i e s  
r e sea rch  p r o j e c t s  r e l a t e d  t o  f i n e  p a r t i c l e s  from coa l  combus- 
t i o n ,  f l u i d i z e d  bed combustion, and p o l l u t i o n  from sulphur con- 
t a i n i n g  mate r i a l s .  Environmental Processes and E f f e c t s  i s  t h e  
genera l  a r e a  covered by Annex 3. The annex provides f o r  ex- 
changes of information and personnel on t o p i c s  t h a t  inc lude  
a q u a t i c  e f f e c t s ,  s o i l  and ground water ,  and t h e  modeling of 
a i r  and water p o l l u t i o n  processes .  Each annex s p e c i f i e s  t h e  
names and a f f i l i a t i o n s  of p r o j e c t  l e a d e r s  f o r  t h e  va r ious  t o p i c s .  
Although t h e  pro tocol  i s  between t h e  EPA and t h e  OEPLG, 
it  a l s o  s p e c i f i e s  t h a t  each s i d e  " s h a l l  encourage and f a c i l i -  
t a t e  t h e  development of con tac t s  and cooperat ion between govern- 
ment agencies ,  r e sea rch  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  i n d u s t r i a l  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  
u n i v e r s i t i e s  and o the r  e n t i t i e s .  ..." Given problems of i n t e r -  
agency coordina t ion  i n  China, it i s  no t  c l e a r  how e f f e c t i v e l y  
t h i s  p rov i s ion  w i l l  be c a r r i e d  out .  Formally, progress  i n  
coordination to date has been impressive. The majority of Chin- 
ese project leaders identified in the annexes are not OEPLS per- 
sonnel. Indeed a large number of them are from the Ministry of 
Public Health. This fact seemingly would make the full imple- 
mentation of interagency coordination all the more important for 
the success of the relationship. This question will be discussed 
further below. 
To date, one Chinese scientist has come to work at the EPA 
Health Effects Research Laboratory in Cincinnati on water qual- 
ity analysis. However, most of the progress under the protocol 
has involved the exchanges of planning groups, with the actual 
implementation of substantive activities to begin in 1981. Dur- 
ing 1980, approximately 16 EPA officials traveled to China and 
8 Chinese came to the U.S. The costs to EPA are estimated to 
be $55,000. 
Environmental protection work is relatively new and under- 
developed in China (although some work on pollution and health 
effects predates the establishment of the OEPLG when such work 
was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Health). 
As in some other protocols, certain unique phenomena in China 
compensate for the relative underdevelopment of environmental 
science, and thus grounds for mutual benefit exist. 
Problems in the development of the program are mainly fin- 
ancial. The PRC side is unhappy with the financial arrangements 
made for its scientist in Cincinnati, and also believes that 
Annex 4 (impact ~ssessment) should be conducted on a receiving 
s i d e  pays b a s i s  as i n  t h e  first t h r e e  annexes. The PRC s i d e  
a l s o  complained about t h e  unwil l ingness  of EPA t o  pay f o r  an 
e x t r a  day ' s  s t a y  by a member of one of i t s  de lega t ions ,  s i n c e  
they  be l i eve  t h a t  they  accommodated American wishes f o r  an  ex- 
t e n s i o n  i n  China. 
The readjustment i n  Chinese economic po l i cy  has a c t u a l l y  
l e d  t o  a formal upgrading of t h e  s t a t u s  of environmental pro- 
t e c t i o n  work, although it i s  not y e t  c l e a r  whether t h i s  extends 
t o  environmental sc ience .  The economic reform package c a l l s  
f o r  t h e  consol ida t ion  of e n t e r p r i s e s  and t h e  upgrading of e x i s t -  
i n g  technology, and t h e  Chinese hope t o  use t h e  reforms a s  an  
opportuni ty t o  curb p o l l u t i o n .  This  approach seemingly c r e a t e s  
oppor tun i t i e s  f o r  new a r e a s  of U.S.-PRC cooperat ion (e .g .  i n  
t h e  mul t i face ted  a r e a  of p o l l u t i o n  con t ro l  technology) includ-  
i n g  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of g r e a t e r  involvement of t h e  p r i v a t e  sec- 
t o r  and U.S. u n i v e r s i t i e s .  
The Chinese were asked whether they  be l ieved progress  had 
been made i n  moving forward on Annex 5 (-Preservation of ~ a t u r e ) ,  
and responded t h a t  some progress  had been made. I n  t h e  i n t e r -  
view wi th  o f f i c i a l s  concerned wi th  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p ro toco l ,  
t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  Minis t ry  of Fores t ry  w a s  asked whe- 
t h e r  he thought Annex 5 cooperat ion involving b lack  neck crane 
eggs would be poss ib le  and he r e p l i e d  t h a t  he thought t h a t  t h e  
problems had been solved.  
F inanc ia l  problems on the  U . S .  s i d e  a l s o  t h r e a t e n  t h e  f u t u r e  
of t h e  program. EPA t r a v e l  budgets have been cut  by more than  
50$ ,  and funds f o r  a c t i v i t i e s  conducted w i t h i n  t h e  U.S. a r e  
becoming scarce. Activities scheduled for 1981 probably can be 
funded but follow on activities may be a problem. A special dif- 
ficulty is the reduction of health effects research activities at 
EPA. This bears directly on Annex 1, a project which holds con- 
siderable scientific interest for the U.S. side. Should EPA 
health effects research be transferred to HHS, it may be desir- 
able for HHS to continue the implementation of the activities 
under Annex 1 as a participant in the environmental agreement. 
It is unfortunate that the granting of higher priority to 
environmental protection work in the PRC comes at a time when 
the EPA's ability to cooperate may be diminishing. In this situ- 
ation it may be desirable to explore new forms of government- 
private sector relationships by which cooperation with China 
could be furthered. The views of environmental law firms, en- 
vironmental consulting firms and universities could be more ac- 
tively solicited. In addition, it would be desirable to explore 
how opportunities made available by multilateral organizations 
(e.g. UNDP, UNEP, W W F )  could be more fully exploited. 
M. Basic Sciences 
On December 10, 1980, NSF concluded year long negotiations 
with the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the Chinese Acad- 
emy of Social Sciences (CASS)  by the signing of the ~rotocol on 
Cooperation in Basic Sciences with the two academies. An ex- 
change of side letters clarifies interpretations of articles 4 
and 6 of the protocol. The protocol is intended to include 
cooperation in basic engineering and the social sciences as well 
as basic research in the natural sciences. 
On March 19, 1981, the Joint Working Group in Basic Sci- 
ences signed an annex for the initial phase of cooperation. The 
subjects agreed to are archaeology, linguistics, natural prod- 
ucts chemistry, astronomy, material sciences (ceramics, metal- 
lurgy and polymers), and systems analysis for management. The 
types of activities for the first year are 10-20 joint research 
projects and 2-4 jointly organized topical conferences. Pro- 
gram development seminars are planned for subsequent years. 
Prior to the signing of the protocol, there had been agree- 
ment between the two sides to hold seminars in the fields of 
natural products chemistry and submicron electronics. The former 
was successfully completed in Shanghai in October, 1980. The 
latter was held at Cornell University in April, 1981, after leng- 
thy coordination with DOC and DOD to insure consistency with 
export control policies. It too was a successful meeting. 
In addition to its activities under the protocol, NSF is 
committing of its $1 .j million China budget to support the ex- 
change activities to be conducted under the National Academy of 
Sciences-CAS agreement and the Program of Advanced Study and Re- 
search in China or "National Program" under the student/scholar 
exchange agreement. As discussed under the Earthquake Prediction 
protocol, NSF has participated with USGS in implementing Annexes 3, 
4, 5 and 6 of that agreement. 
The China program at NSF is a new effort and is somewhat 
novel in conception. The program has a separate line in the 
NSF budget and thus is somewhat different from other NSF inter- 
national programs. Projects under the program will be researcher 
initiated with program funding dedicated to support projects that 
by nature require Chinese collaborators. However, the addition 
of the NSF program now renders U.S.-PRC cooperation in basic 
research somewhat more complicated. 
The signing of the basic sciences protocol and its initial 
annex raises two important questions. The first concerns the 
impact of the new agreement on the CSCPRC-administered National 
Program, and to a lesser extent, on the NAS-CAS agreement. In 
principle, the requirement that work supported under the basic 
sciences protocol be truly collaborative sets the latter agree- 
ment apart from the others. However, under tight budgetary 
conditions, it may be difficult for NSF to continue its sup- 
port for the programs based at NAS (including the National Pro- 
gram). Should such support be discontinued, the effect would 
be to focus all natural and social science activities into NSF's 
realm, leaving only programs in the humanities (not funded by 
NSF) for the CSCPRC. 
The consequences of such a scenario are potentially un- 
desirable for three reasons. First there have been outstanding 
research projects sponsored by CSCPRC that were not formally col- 
laborative at their inception, and thus might not have been fund- 
able under NSF guidelines. The second reason follows from the 
first. There is a danger of losing flexibility in dealing with 
the Chinese side if all U.S. basic research proposals had to 
meet the "collaboration" g-uideline. It is quite conceivable that 
there will be projects of benefit to the U.S., which the Chinese 
could be persuaded to accept, for which there may not be a ready 
Chinese collaborator. The requirement that there be one, there- 
fore, could both limit the number of U.S. initiated projects on 
the basis of self-imposed restrictions (and thus reduce the bar- 
gaining power of the U.S.), and at the same time give the Chinese 
side additional leverage in refusing projects on the grounds 
that no suitable collaborator exists. 
Finally, the possibility that all basic research activi- 
ties could wind up in the NSF realm would represent the reduc- 
tion of desirable redundancy in our S & T relations with China. 
The CSCPRC has a distinguished record of serving U.S.-PRC rela- 
tions at times when the political relationship was weaker than 
it is today, precisely because as a non-governmental body, it 
has been somewhat less constrained by political trends. Hav- 
ing such a body, particularly one with accumulated expertise 
and extensive contacts with various sectors of U.S. society 
involved in S & T relations would still seem to be desirable 
as an "extra channel" that could prove quite useful in the face 
of some unforeseen development in the future. 
A second important question raised by the basic science 
protocol is whether it will facilitate greater access to China 
by U.S. social scientists interested in field work and survey 
research. 
U.S. experience (mainly CSCPRC experience) with the place- 
ment of U.X. social scientists for field research has been char- 
acterized by time-consuming and often frustrating negotiations 
with the Chinese-side. Nevertheless, until now, these efforts 
have met with some success. 
The Chinese have resisted this access for reasons that 
are understandable in the short run. Social science research 
in China, in most fields has long been neglected; Chinese col- 
laborators of distinction are therefore not readily available, 
and there are genuine bureaucratic problems in trying to facil- 
itate field research for American social scientists. These 
reasons are now being used to resist further U.S. initiatives 
in this area. Unfortunately, the least promising "window" for 
gaining access is the CASS. A more promising approach would be 
to work through Chinese universities. 
It had been hoped by some that the NSF program would offer 
the U.S. side greater leverage on the field research question, 
and it remai'ns to be seen whether it will. However, Chinese un- 
willingness to include work in anthropology in the first annex, 
as proposed by NSF, is a disappointment in this regard (although 
it should be noted that NSF refused certain CASS proposals as 
well). The social science issue may again demonstrate the im- 
portance of redundant channels for exchanges in the basic sci- 
ences area. 
In spite of the fact that the interests of American social 
scientists may be out of phase with Chinese scholarly development, 
and that attempts to accommodate those interests create many 
bureaucratic problems for Chinese officials, it is important 
for the Chinese side to realize that a lack of progress in this 
area will result in the alienation from the program of a group 
from the U.S. academic community that is the program's natural 
constituency and should be its most vocal supporters. 
N* Other programs and Future Possibilities 
In addition to the U.S. agencies participating in the above 
formal agreements, a number of other agencies have been in con- 
tact with their PRC counterparts and have explored to varying 
degrees areas of possible collaboration. These include the De- 
partment of Labor (where a modest program of exchanges of per- 
sonnel and information has been in progress since March, 1980), 
the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (where draft protocols have been exchanged), 
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (which has drafted an agree- 
ment on cooperation in nuclear safety). The Smithsonian Insti- 
tution has also exchanged personnel with the PRC and has drafted 
an agreement for cooperation. As noted above, the NAS has form- 
alized its relationship with CAS by the signing of a Memorandum 
of Understanding on January 24, 1980. The two Academies have 
agreed to sponsor in 1981 two symposia (on algology and nitro- 
gen fixation), exchange scientists for laboratory visits in the 
fields of nitrogen fixation, marine biology, insect control and 
paleontology. These activities on the U.S. side are to be funded 
by NSF. 
Three areas of energy related activities are under con- 
sideration at the Department of Energy. In the fossil energy 
area, there have been discussions with the Chinese which go 
back to Secretary Schlesinger's visit to China in October, 1978. 
The DOE feels it is being randomly queried for information from 
China, and would like to bring some order to the relationship. 
It i s  now considering t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of suggest ing t o  t h e  Chinese 
t h a t  they  send a de lega t ion  t o  t h e  U.S. t o  explore t h e  p o s s i b i l i -  
t i e s  f o r  cooperation i n  long-term, high r i s k  p r o j e c t s ,  and it 
has s o l i c i t e d  t h e  views of t h e  U.S. Embassy on t h i s  ma t t e r .  The 
DOE a l s o  has an i n t e r e s t  i n  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  a DOC-TDP p r o j e c t  
on a coal  s e c t o r  s tudy i n  China. The Chinese, however, have not 
ind ica ted  an i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  DOC-TDP proposal .  
While unquestionably t h e r e  a r e  grounds f o r  U.S.-PRC cooper- 
a t i o n  i n  t h e  f o s s i l  energy a r e a ,  t h e  U.S. government should be 
wary of e n t e r i n g  i n t o  agreements without p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  involve- 
ment. The f o s s i l  energy a r e a  i s  a good opportuni ty t o  explore 
new modes of government-industry cooperation. 
DOE has a l s o  had prel iminary d iscuss ions  with China on nu- 
c l e a r  energy R & D. I n  response t o  a PRC i n i t i a t i v e ,  t h e  DOE 
has proposed a  meeting of t h e  two s i d e s  t o  c l a r i f y  o b j e c t i v e s  
and work toward a program of cooperat ion.  No o f f i c i a l  response 
from t h e  Chinese s i d e  has yet  been rece ived .  
Again, t h i s  i s  an  a r e a  with p o t e n t i a l  f o r  both cooperat ion 
and p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  involvement. The establishment of nuclear  
power p l a n t s  i n  China cont inues t o  be a  l i v e  opt ion  i n  PRC energy 
p o l i c y  th ink ing .  There appears  t o  be some disagreement wi th in  
China, however, as t o  whether t o  procure a p l a n t  from abroad 
( r e p o r t e d l y  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of t h e  Minis try of E l e c t r i c  Power) o r  
t o  develop one indigenously ( t h e  p o s i t i o n  of the  nuclear  commu- 
n i t y ) .  Cooperation i n  t h i s  f i e l d  w i l l  a l s o  r e q u i r e  t h e  recon- 
c i l i a t i o n  of U,S. non-pro l i f e ra t ion  p o l i c i e s  with t h e  f a c t  of 
t h e  PRC's being a nuclear  weapons s t a t e .  
1,n the areas of fusion and nuclear physics research, a draft 
agreement has been discussed. Some problems exist relating to 
the organization of the program and intellectual property con- 
siderations, but discussions continue. It is likely that changes 
in PRC S & T priorities will slow cooperation in these fields. 
There have also been discussions of the possibility of co- 
operation in nuclear physics research. Activities in this field, 
however, would require further clarification of policies relating 
to access to DOE laboratories. 
Finally, a protocol in the area of water resources should 
be signed during the first half of 1981. It would provide for 
cooperation between the Water Resources Division of USGS and 
the Bureau of Hydrology of the Ministry of Water Conservancy. 
IV. Implementation 
Because of the relatively short period of time that the 
bilaterals have been in effect, it is difficult to develop per- 
spective on problems of policy and program implementation. That 
there are implementation difficulties will be evident in the dis- 
cussion below, but it is not clear how many of these are normal 
features of any new cooperative program, how many are due to 
weaknesses in the organizational arrangements for the program 
and how many of these are due to defects in the design of the 
program and in the assumptions of the underlying policy. In an 
attempt to bring some clarity to the incipient problems of im- 
plementation, issues affecting implementation will be classified 
into three categories: operational, policy management, and de- 
sign. 
A. Operational problems 
Operational problems are those faced mainly by the indivi- 
dual technical agencies in the course of carrying out the pro- 
visions of the agreements. These include the following: 
1. funding - This is a problem facing almost all of the 
agencies. Although it affects day to day operations, it is in 
fact more a matter of policy design, and therefore will be dis- 
cussed under that category below. 
2. communications - Problems of communication are of two 
kinds. The first involve communications between the individual 
agencies and the Department of State and OSTP. The second in- 
volves communications with Chinese counterpart agencies. 
Agency perceptions of communications problems were by no 
means uniform. During the course of interviews, a few agencies 
complained vigorously about delays in getting "central" (i.e., 
DOS/OSTP) clearance for communications to China. Other agen- 
cies did not raise the issue at all, or if asked, stated that 
it was not a major problem. Most agencies regarded central 
clearance as a minor but probably necessary annoyance. Delays 
were usually found in the early stages of a relationship, such 
as in the preparation of annexes, and usually disappeared once 
agreements were signed and policy questions were settled. 
No clear pattern of difficulties in communications with 
Chinese counterparts was evident either. In a few cases there 
were complaints about delays in Chinese responses, but in most 
cases, communications seemed to be remarkably good. In one 
case, however, where the implementation of the protocol required - 
a greater amount of logistic coordination than most, and where 
prompt communication would have made implementation easier for 
the U.S. side, Chinese delays were quite frustrating. 
This case is instructive for two reasons. First, the pro- 
ject was more substantive than most, and involved more complex 
coordination of activities. In addition, the U.S. side per- 
ceived its Chinese counterpart agency as lacking the authority 
to make the varied quick - decisions that would have made the pro- 
ject go more smoothly. 
Although the Chinese side did not report any serious com- 
munications problems, there were indications that improvements 
could be made in some areas. For instance, there was a lack 
of understanding about changes in DOE regulations affecting 
Chinese scientists in U.S. labs. Neither the Chinese nor the 
U.S. SCIATT had been informed of these changes. More generally, 
there were indirect suggestions that the Chinese side would have 
appreciated knowing more about how U.S. counterparts were approach- 
ing questions of where the program might go in the future. 
As the various bilaterals progress from the annex signing 
stages to more substantive and often more complex cooperative 
activities, communications requirements will increase. U.S. 
agencies who have not found communications to be a problem may 
discover that they have become one. However, counterbalancing 
the increased requirements presumably will be a greater mutual 
knowledge and familiarity that should facilitate communications, 
One principle to be considered in expanding programs therefore 
might be that programmatic activities should not exceed the ca- 
pacity of communications. 
Having the proper authority to make decisions and to effect 
inter-agency clearance and coordination are requirements for 
agencies on both sides if communications are to remain effect- 
ive. Not surprisingly, communications also seemed to work best 
when program coordinators had achieved good personal rapport. 
Redundant channels of communication are also operating in some 
of the agreements as a result of greater familiarity, and these 
presumably are consistent with the U.S. policy objective of 
fostering a web of relationships between the two sides. While 
in general these "back channels" are desirable, some monitoring 
of them is necessary to insure that governmental interests and 
objectives are being upheld. 
Another aspect of communications is the problem of lang- 
uage and translation services. Language differences have been 
problematic in two areas. First, complaints were registered 
from some agencies concerning the level of English language 
abilities of some of the Chinese scientists coming to work in 
U. S. facilities. Inadequate Chinese on the part of Americans 
presumably would also be a complaint of the Chinese, although 
this has not yet surfaced as a problem. The problem of English 
language ability will gradually disappear, one suspects, as the 
Chinese educational system becomes more regularized. 
A second area where language differences have caused dif- 
ficulties has been in the supply of interpreters for exchanges 
of delegations. More often than not, interpreters have come 
from the Chinese side, and in a few cases, this has raised ques- 
tions about who should pay for them, or how they should be 
counted i n  a r r i v i n g  a t  numerically equ i t ab le  mutual exchanges. 
A s  budgets g e t  t i g h t  on both s i d e s ,  t h i s  i s s u e  i s  l i a b l e  t o  be- 
come more v i s i b l e  and content ious.  
There i s  no easy answer t o  t h i s  problem. Most U.S. agencies  
have made it a po in t  t o  include Chinese-American s c i e n t i s t s  i n  
exchange a c t i v i t i e s ,  but t h e r e  i s  no consensus on t h e  des i ra -  
b i l i t y  of doing so. Some agencies  a r e  s a t i s f i e d  wi th  t h i s  a r -  
rangement and see it  as an  economy measure i n  which they  ge t  
"double duty" from Chinese American colleagues--as s c i e n t i s t s  
and a s  i n t e r p r e t e r s .  Other agencies ,  however, a re  d i s s a t i s f i e d  
wi th  t h i s  arrangement. I n  some cases ,  agency program s t a f f s  in -  
clude i n d i v i d u a l s  with Chinese language c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  and t h e  
presence of t h e s e  i n d i v i d u a l s  has undoubtedly f a c i l i t a t e d  comrnu- 
n i c a t i o n s .  The t ime has probably come when t h e  i s s u e  of i n t e r -  
p r e t e r s  should rece ive  more c e n t r a l i z e d  a t t e n t i o n  i n  order  t o  work 
out a mutual ly  acceptable  po l i cy .  
3. China e x p e r t i s e  - For a l l  agencies ,  r e l a t i o n s  with China 
have been a novel experience.  China w a s  a l a r g e l y  unknown coun- 
t r y  f o r  most agency personnel .  Yet S & T cooperat ion with China 
had become an important aspect  of U . S .  China p o l i c y  which agen- 
c i e s  were expected t o  help implement. I d e a l l y ,  each of t h e  
agencies  should have had i n  house China e x p e r t i s e  t o  help c a r r y  
out i t s  mission. Approximately one- th i rd  of t h e  agencies  have 
made t h e  e f f o r t  t o  add a staff member wi th  Chinese language and 
a r e a  s t u d i e s  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  I n  some of t h e  o t h e r s ,  Chinese-American 
s c i e n t i s t s  a l r eady  employed by t h e  agencies  have been r e c r u i t e d  
i n t o  r o l e s  a s  "China exper t s .  " 
While t h e  language and a r e a  s k i l l s  of t h e  China expert  a r e  
c l e a r l y  d e s i r a b l e  t o  t h e  agencies ,  m o s t  would f i n d  it d i f f i c u l t  
t o  j u s t i f y  h i r i n g  an ind iv idua l  whose s o l e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  would 
be China--the ind iv idua l  would have t o  have t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  q u a l i -  
t i e s  needed t o  make him/her a  s u i t a b l e  program o f f i c e r  f o r  d i s -  
charging o the r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  as wel l .  It i s  c l e a r l y  poss ib le  
t o  f i n d  such people.  Agencies who f i n d  t h a t  t h e  pace of t h e i r  
a c t i v i t i e s  w i t h  China i s  quickening should be encouraged t o  do so.  
It would probably be a mistake,  however, t o  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  
a d d i t i o n  of an ind iv idua l  wi th  language and a r e a  s t u d i e s  capabi l -  
i t i e s ,  o r  t h e  des ignat ion  of Chinese Americans as Chinese exper t s  
w i l l  meet a l l  of t h e  needs of t h e  agencies  f o r  knowledge and 
a n a l y s i s  of China re l evan t  t o  t h e i r  missions.  This  i s s u e  w i l l  
be discussed f u r t h e r  below. 
5. inter-agency coordinat ion - Inter-agency coordina t ion  
i s  i n  one sense a mat ter  of p o l i c y  management and w i l l  be d i s -  
cussed f u r t h e r  i n  t h a t  connection below. There a r e  a l s o  a few 
coordina t ion  i s s u e s  t h a t  p e r t a i n  t o  t h e  opera t iona l  l e v e l ,  how- 
ever .  F i r s t ,  some on the  U.S. s i d e  be l i eve  t h a t  a l a c k  of i n t e r -  
agency coordina t ion  on t h e  Chinese s i d e  has been a problem f o r  
t h e  implementation of some of t h e  agreements, and is l i k e l y  t o  
be a f a c t o r  l i m i t i n g  t h e  expansion of t h e  program. A s  t h e  U . S .  
s i d e  has come t o  l e a r n  more about t h e  PRC S & T community, it 
is discovering t h a t  t h e  e x p e r t i s e  most compatible w i t h  i t s  in -  
t e r e s t s  i s  not  always i n  t h e  bureaucra t ic  sys temwithwhich  it 
has an  agreement. 
On t h e  U.S. s i d e ,  o the r  than  t h e  problems a t  USGS w i t h  
t h e  e a r t h  sc iences  agreement which a r e  r e a l l y  " in t ra-agency,"  
t h e  only o the r  s e r i o u s  problem of inter-agency coordina t ion  
has  been i n  t h e  a r e a  of export  c o n t r o l s  ( t o  be discussed be- 
low).  The most notable  a c t i v i t i e s  where coordinat ion i s  es- 
s e n t i a l  a r e  i n  t h e  hydropower agreement and i n  t h e  earthquake 
p r e d i c t i o n  agreement. I n  both ,  coordina t ion  seems t o  be working 
reasonably wel l .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e r e  a r e  a number of a r e a s  where 
t h e r e  a r e  overlaps of i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  w i l l  r equ i re  cooperat ion.  
These inc lude  environmental causes of cancer (EPA and HHS), 
p e s t  management (EPA-USDA ) , aquacul ture  (USDA -NOAA ) , and Yang- 
t z e  e s tua ry  s t u d i e s  (NoAA-COE) . 
5. modes of cooperat ion - The DOS's RFP included a ques- 
t i o n  about t h e  s u i t a b i l i t y  of present  modes of cooperat ion.  The 
c e n t r a l  implementation problem r e l a t i n g  t o  modes of cooperat ion 
p e r t a i n s  t o  the  uneven l e v e l s  of s c i e n t i f i c  development i n  t h e  
two c o u n t r i e s ,  and U.S. p o l i c y  regarding t h e  funding of cooper- 
a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s .  Some U . S .  agencies  have expressed t h e  view 
t h a t  t r u e  r e c i p r o c i t y  i n  exchanges i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  achieve s ince  
Chinese counterpar ts  a r e  o f t e n  not a t  t h e  same s c i e n t i f i c  l e v e l .  
Therefore ,  t h e r e  i s  o f t e n  a de f a c t o  t r a i n i n g  component (whether 
c a l l e d  t h a t  or  n o t )  i n  t h e  agreements, which i f  no t  pa id  f o r  by 
t h e  Chinese s i d e ,  i n  e f f e c t  v i o l a t e s  U . S .  p o l i c y  gu ide l ines .  
A second i s s u e  r e l a t i n g  t o  modes of cooperat ion i s  t h a t  
t h e r e  have been more exchanges of de legat ions  and l e s s  coopera- 
t i v e  r e sea rch  than  many on t h e  American and some on t h e  Chinese 
s i d e  would p r e f e r .  This  problem i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of a new 
r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  however, and presumably w i l l  so lve  i t s e l f  as t h e  
two s i d e s  g e t  t o  know each o the r  b e t t e r .  The ques t ion  of mu- 
t u a l l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  modes of cooperation has important implica- 
t i o n s  f o r  t h e  r e c i p r o c i t y  of t h e  o v e r a l l  U.S.-PRC S & T r e l a -  
t i o n s h i p ,  and t h e r e f o r e  warrants  cont inuing monitoring. 
6.  access  - For a number of agencies ,  t h e  g r e a t e s t  appeal  
f o r  cooperat ive a c t i v i t i e s  i n  China i s  i n  t h e  oppor tun i t i e s  it 
o f f e r s  f o r  access  t o  phenomena and d a t a  t h a t  a r e  unique t o  China. 
While problems of access  t h u s  f a r  have not  been numerous, some 
problems have a r i s e n .  One as noted above, pe r t a ined  t o  t h e  
choice of t h e  most s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  a r e a s  of t h e  East  
China Sea f o r  the  marine sedimentation p r o j e c t .  While t h i s  
case generated some misunderstandings i n i t i a l l y  ( r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  which does not  r e s t  e n t i r e l y  wi th  t h e  Chinese), t h e  access  
ques t ion  no longer  seems t o  be an i s s u e .  
Another case has been i n  germplasm exchange, where t h e  
American s i d e  has been denied what i s  regarded as e s s e n t i a l ,  
access  t o  f i e l d  s i t e s .  The Chinese have agreed t o  t r y  t o  solve 
t h i s  problem. I n  o the r  a r e a s  where problems of access  could 
l e a d  t o  misunderstandings ( e . g . ,  i n  pub l i c  h e a l t h )  t h e  Chinese 
have been cooperat ive.  The major except ion,  and one t h a t  i s  
l i k e l y  t o  produce hard f e e l i n g s ,  a s  noted above, i s  t h e  s o c i a l  
sc iences  f i e l d  work problem. 
I n  a few cases  t h e  U.S. has l i m i t e d  t h e  access  of Chinese 
t o  U.S. f a c i l i t i e s .  The most notable  case i s  i n  t h e  metrology 
a r e a  where NBS f a c i l i t i e s  a t  Boulder, Colo., were r u l e d  o f f  
l i m i t s  t o  Chinese on t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  of t h e  DOD. 
7. s o c i a l  hos t ing  - A f i n a l  notable  opera t iona l  problem 
p e r t a i n s  t o  providing s o c i a l  occasions f o r  Chinese de lega t ions  
by American hos t s .  Typica l ly  American de legat ions  t o  China 
a r e  t r e a t e d  t o  e l abora te  banquets by Chinese hos t s .  Americans 
f e e l  obl iged t o  r e c i p r o c a t e ,  but cannot use government funds 
f o r  t h i s  purpose. A s  a r e s u l t ,  t h e  c o s t s  of s o c i a l  hos t ing  a r e  
of ten  borne by Americans out of personal  funds,  and i n  a  few 
cases ,  through t h e  use of con t rac t  funds.  This  problem i s  l i k e l y  
t o  diminish a s  t h e  program moves from t h e  de legat ion  exchange 
phase t o  longer  term mutual v i s i t s  and as both s i d e s  come t o  
know each o t h e r ' s  s o c i a l  mores b e t t e r .  
B .  Problems of Po l i cy  Management 
Problems of p o l i c y  management a r e  understood t o  inc lude  
t h e  problems of insu r ing  t h a t  ope ra t iona l  o r  program a c t i v i t i e s  
a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  t h e  l e t t e r  and s p i r i t  of U.S. p o l i c y  toward 
China, and with t h e  i n t e n t  of t h e  U.S.-PRC J o i n t  Commission. 
Whereas some problems of p o l i c y  management can be i d e n t i f i e d  
a t  t h e  l e v e l  of t h e  ind iv idua l  agencies ,  it i s  a t  t h e  OSTP and 
DOS/OES l e v e l s  t h a t  p o l i c y  management problems a r e  most l i k e l y  
t o  be found. 
U.S.-PRC S & T r e l a t i o n s  had an unusual ly high degree of 
p o l i c y  s a l i e n c e  from mid-1978 t o  t h e  end of 1980. S  & T r e l a -  
t i o n s  conducted by the  CSCPRC and o the r  agents  p r i o r  t o  normal- 
l i z a t i o n  made s i g n i f i c a n t  con t r ibu t ions  t o  t h e  process  of moving 
toward normalizat ion,  and t h e  symbolism of S  & T cooperat ion 
pervaded events  j u s t  p r i o r  t o  and immediately a f t e r  normalizat ion.  
This was particularly true during the visit of Deng Xiaoping 
to the U . S .  in January, 1979. The possibilities for beneficial 
S & T cooperation were also very much in the minds of those re- 
sponsible for China policy during the Carter administration. 
As a result, the S & T agreement with China seemingly had much 
greater political significance than S & T agreements sometimes 
have with other nations. The particular form of the agreement 
(i.e., having a central government-government umbrella agreement 
followed by agency-agency protocols) and the formal structure 
of policy management (centralized in the OSTP with the President's 
Science Adviser actively involved in the program) attests to 
the importance attached to S & T relations by the Carter admin- 
istration. 
The implementation of all such agreements, however, ulti- 
mately rests with operational agencies. In all such agreements, 
there are also the dangers that as the substantive activities 
devolve to the agencies, policy purpose is diluted, and coordi- 
nated action in support of that purpose becomes more difficult. 
In the U.S.-PRC agreement, efforts were made to avoid or mini- 
mize such dangers by requiring fairly strict central clearance 
procedures for all agency actions, by having a full-time member 
of the Department of State with responsibility to oversee the 
agreement, and by organizing the Executive Secretary's Committee 
of China project coordinators from all of the participating 
agencies. Nevertheless, certain problems of policy management 
are evident. 
These problems a r e  i n t e r r e l a t e d  and involve monitoring and 
analysis ,  and b r i e f i n g  and debr ie f ing  a c t i v i t i e s .  While i t  has 
been p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  p o l i c y  management s t a f f  a t  OSTP and OES 
t o  monitor t h e  development of t h e  program up t o  a p o i n t ,  it ap- 
pea r s  t h a t  t h e  monitoring func t ion  has  not  been performed as we l l  
as it might have been. 
The amount of information generated by a c t i v i t i e s  under t h e  
b i l a t e r a l s  would i n  p r i n c i p l e  s t r a i n  t h e  a b i l i t y  of a  s i n g l e  
p o l i c y  manager t o  keep up with.  For tunate ly ,  i n  one sense ,  t h e  
a c t u a l  amount of information t h a t  has  been generated and r e t a i n e d  
i n  t h e  program i s  not  beyond t h e  a b i l i t i e s  of a  hard working and 
consc ient ious  o f f i c i a l .  Unfortunately,  however, t h e  information 
reaching t h e  p o l i c y  manager i s  not always of t h e  q u a l i t y  needed 
f o r  t h e  t a s k .  This  i n v e s t i g a t o r  has been s t r u c k  by the  consider- 
a b l e  information l o s s  i n  t h e  program. Requests t o  agency o f f i -  
c i ans  f o r  t r i p  r e p o r t s ,  f o r  ins t ance ,  were o f t e n  met with r e p l i e s  
t h a t  none had been w r i t t e n .  Documents from agencies  t h a t  would 
o f f e r  pe r spec t ive  on t h e  program by r e l a t i n g  c l e a r  s ta tements  
of agency ob jec t ives  t o  assessments of Chinese c a p a b i l i t i e s  and 
needs,  and t o  U . S .  p o l i c y  g o a l s  a r e  r a r e .  The q u a l i t y  of agency 
r e p o r t s  t o  the  Executive S e c r e t a r y ' s  Committee (which have been 
incorpora ted  i n  t h e  DOS " T i t l e  5'' r e p o r t s  t o  C o n g ~ e s s )  a t t e s t s  
t o  t h i s  def ic iency.  
I n  s h o r t ,  t h e r e  i s  not  a  g r e a t  dea l  of high q u a l i t y  w r i t t e n  
m a t e r i a l  reaching t h e  DOS from t h e  agencies .  Most of what i s  
w r i t t e n  i s  i n  the  form of communications with China t h a t  r e q u i r e  
c learance .  There i s ,  of course,  unwri t ten information i n  t h e  
form of telephone calls and oral debriefing sessions, but these 
do not become part of the written record unless someone writes 
them down. As individuals rotate through positions, these oral 
communications are likely to be lost also. 
The usefulness of monitoring activities is related to how 
the information gained from monitoring fits into ongoing policy 
review, evaluation and analysis activities. The latter gives 
significance to information and provides cues as to its import- 
ance. The fact that DOS felt it necessary to issue an RFP for 
this study is prima facie evidence that in house analytic capa- 
bilities are limited. It is also evident that DOS/OES is under- 
staffed for this function. While some informal analysis does 
occur as a result of OES interactions with other parts of the 
Department, particularly the China desk, the prime concern of 
the latter is not necessarily S & T relations or Chinese S & T 
activities. Indeed, the only place where monitoring and anal- 
ysis are combined within the government is at the CIA, but there 
may be institutional reasons why reliance solely on the CIA for 
analysis may be less than fully desirable. 
Weaknesses in combined monitoring-analysis functions also 
influence the efficacy of the policy manager in briefing and de- 
briefing situations. While some of the agencies may be relatively 
indifferent about China briefings, a number of them felt that 
having a more wholistic view of contemporary China would pro- 
vide a needed sense of context for their activities. The ability 
to provide regular briefings, however, is a function of analytic 
capabilities. Similarly, making the most out of debriefing 
sess ions  f o r  re turned  de legat ions  a l s o  goes back t o  t h e  d iscuss ion  
above about the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between information and a n a l y s i s .  
The i n c l u s i o n  of a  r ep resen ta t ive  of t h e  C I A  i n t o  t h e  b r i e f i n g /  
debr ie f ing  aspec t s  of t h e  p o l i c y  management process  has been a 
u s e f u l  a d d i t i o n ,  but aga in  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  purposes 
of t h e  C I A ,  t h e  DOS and t h e  agencies  should be kept i n  mind i n  
eva lua t ing  p o l i c y  management problems. 
A p o l i c y  management problem of a d i f f e r e n t  s o r t  i s  t h e  cul-  
t i v a t i o n  of cons t i tuenc ies  i n  support  of t h e  S & T cooperat ion 
program. Three i n  p a r t i c u l a r  a r e  notable :  Congress, t h e  univer- 
s i t y  community and t h e  business  community. Rela t ions  w i t h  Con- 
g r e s s  were ou t s ide  t h e  purview of t h i s  s tudy.  I n  one sense ,  r e -  
l a t i o n s  wi th  u n i v e r s i t i e s  do not  seem t o  be a  problem s ince  most 
of t h e  b i l a t e r a l s  involve some u n i v e r s i t y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  and op- 
p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  u n i v e r s i t y  r e l a t i o n s  outs ide  t h e  S & T agreement 
a r e  numerous. On t h e  o ther  hand, t h e  s tudy d id  uncover some un- 
e a s i n e s s  about t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of t h e  program t o  u n i v e r s i t y  a c t i -  
v i t i e s .  This  uneasiness  ranged from concerns t h a t  u n i v e r s i t y  s c i -  
e n t i s t s  were not  as involved i n  t h e  program as they  might be and 
as a  r e s u l t  t h e  Chinese may no t  be i n  contac t  wi th  t h e  b e s t  s c i -  
ence t h e  U.S. has t o  o f f e r ,  t o  concerns t h a t  t h e  b i l a t e r a l s  were 
absorbing funds t h a t  could be used f o r  o the r  more product ive forms 
of cooperat ion wi th  China. While these  concerns may be somewhat 
unfounded, t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  some percept ions  t h a t  t h e  r e -  
l a t i o n s  a r e  not  q u i t e  r i g h t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t .  A t  t h e  l e a s t ,  t h e  
ex i s t ence  of these  percept ions  impl ies  t h e  need f o r  providing more 
information about t h e  program t o  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  community, and per-  
haps more a c t i v e  e f f o r t  t o  c r e a t e  a l i a i s o n  mechanism. One 
segment of the university community--those concerned with studies 
of contemporary China--represents a special case and will be dis- 
cussed separately below. 
Of particular interest here is the business community. It 
was an explicit objective of policy that the bilaterals contri- 
bute to commercial opportunities. PThile expectations of these 
have been deflated largely by changes in Chinese economic policy, 
there are perceptions in the business community that not only 
have the bilaterals not contributed to commerce, in some cases 
(e. g. , the hydropower agreement) they have frustrated it. With- 
out attempting to judge the merits of that opinion here, it is 
necessary to point out that in general, active efforts to cul- 
tivate the support of the private sector are not as numerous 
as they could be. While the business community is represented 
on the Joint Commission, and while some of the bilaterals have 
involved government-industry cooperation, ongoing, systematic 
efforts to involve the private sector are not in evidence. This 
question will be discussed further in the context of recommenda- 
tions. 
C. Problems of Design 
In many ways the U.S.-PRC S & T agreement represented an 
interesting and ambitious new departure in the use of S & T as 
instruments of foreign policy. As we have noted earlier in this 
report, S & T figured prominently in the movement toward normal- 
ization. S & T development was given high priority in PRC mod- 
ernization policies and the U.S. was preeminent in many of the 
f i e l d s  China chose f o r  p r i o r i t y  a t t e n t i o n .  Accordingly t h e  S & T 
agreement enjoyed considerable  p o l i t i c a l  s ign i f i cance  on t h e  U.S. 
s i d e ,  more i n  f a c t  than  had been t h e  case with p r i o r  S & T agree- 
ments wi th  most o t h e r  coun t r i e s .  
I n  s p i t e  of--or perhaps because o f - - t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  promin- 
ence,  c e r t a i n  i n t e r n a l  con t rad ic t ions  i n  t h e  program have become 
evident .  There was genera l  agreement t h a t  t h e  l e v e l  of U.S. S & T 
w a s  considerably above t h a t  of the  PRC i n  most a r e a s .  The imme- 
d i a t e  s c i e n t i f i c  b e n e f i t s  t o  t h e  U.S. s i d e  t h e r e f o r e  were expected 
t o  be few (which has not n e c e s s a r i l y  turned  out t o  be t h e  c a s e ) .  
Yet,  t h e  program w a s  not  intended t o  be a t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  
e f f o r t  (even though one of i t s  ob jec t ives  w a s  t o  a i d  Chinese 
S  & T development). The White House i n s i s t e d  t h a t  funding of 
p r o j e c t s  be done on t h e  b a s i s  of mutual i ty ,  o r  i f  t h a t  were no t  
p o s s i b l e ,  on t h e  b a s i s  of "benef i t ing  s i d e  pays."  This  approach 
t o  funding i s  one of the  major design problems of t h e  program. 
For  most of t h e  agencies ,  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  r e l a t i o n s  with 
China (and indeed a l l  fo re ign  a c t i v i t i e s )  have t o  be funded out 
of t h e  normal opera t iona l  budget. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
most agencies  complained about funding arrangements f o r  t h e  pro- 
gram. A s  i nd ica ted  above, t h i s  approach t o  funding means t h a t  
d i s c r e t i o n a r y  dec i s ions  by agency o f f i c i a l s  a r e  c r i t i c a l l y  i m -  
po r t an t  i n  determining t h e  l e v e l  o r  ex ten t  of a c t i v i t i e s  wi th  
China. During t h e  Car ter  admin i s t r a t ion ,  t h e s e  o f f i c i a l s  i n t e r -  
p r e t e d  White House ob jec t ives  t o  mean t h a t  i n  t h e  exe rc i se  of 
d i s c r e t i o n ,  programs with China should be favored. This  high 
l e v e l  i n t e r e s t  i n  China r e l a t i o n s  predisposed agency o f f i c i a l s  
t o  f i n d  the necessary funds i n  t h e i r  budgets.  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  many 
of t h e s e  o f f i c i a l s  t r a v e l e d  t o  China, were favorably  impressed, 
and began t o  develop sympathy f o r  cooperat ive a c t i v i t i e s  wi th  
t h e  Chinese. With  t h e  change of admin i s t r a t ions ,  i t  i s  n e i t h e r  
c l e a r  what White ~ o u s e / ~ e ~ a r t m e n t  of S t a t e  i n t e n t i o n s  w i l l  be ,  
nor i s  it  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  new incumbents i n  agency dec i s ion  making 
p o s i t i o n s  w i l l  have t h e  same sympathies f o r  China programs a s  
t h e i r  predecessors ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  f ace  of severe budget 
c u t s  . 
Funding arrangements i n  many of t h e  p ro toco l s  and annexes 
a r e  vaguely s t a t e d .  This has l e d  t o  some confusion and misunder- 
s tanding  wi th  t h e  Chinese. The Chinese have not accepted t h e  
concept of "benef i t ing  s i d e  pays" a s  a funding formula,  a l though 
they  have c l e a r l y  been w i l l i n g  t o  pay on a cos t  re imbursible  
b a s i s  f o r  p r o j e c t s  where t h e  b e n e f i t s  accrue only t o  them. The 
concept of b e n e f i t i n g  s i d e  i s  viewed by t h e  Chinese a s  too  a m -  
biguous t o  be of use.  The Chinese assume t h a t  the  U.S. must 
perce ive  some b e n e f i t ;  otherwise it wouldn't want t o  e n t e r  i n t o  
agreements. Furthermore, it i s  not c l e a r  whether t h e  balance of 
b e n e f i t s  should be ca lcu la ted  on an intra-agency o r  cross-agency 
b a s i s .  
Ambiguity over funding formulae has been most notable  i n  
t h e  hydropower agreement. To move t h e  implementation of t h i s  
p ro toco l  forward it w a s  necessary t o  go outs ide  normal agency 
budgets and draw on funds from t h e  Trade and Development Program. 
But even wi th  these  funds,  an impasse developed between t h e  two 
sides over Article 4 of the agreement which has resulted in 
the indefinite delay of a delegation from China to the Bonne- 
ville Power Authority to investigate long distance high voltage 
transmission technology. In this case the amount at issue was 
a mere $6,500-$7,000, but the question of who should pay it 
became a matter of principle for the two sides. 
Although the hydro case has been the most notable example 
of a problem arising from funding ambiguity, less dramatic in- 
stances have arisen in situations where Chinese come to work 
in U.S. facilities. Since the Chinese scientists are often 
not up to the standards of their American counterparts, it is 
difficult to justify covering their costs on a receiving side 
pays bases (which the Chinese prefer), when U.S. policy is for 
the benefiting side to pay in cases where there is not mutual 
benefit. While this is a problem of funding, it is also due 
in part to the fact that the American side doesn't know as much 
as it would like about the individuals in question. In rela- 
tions with other countries, informal scientific networks generate 
the necessary information about the qualifications and backgrounds 
of candidates for placement in American facilities. Presumably 
as Chinese scientific development progresses, and the two scien- 
tific communities learn more about each other, the U.S. can be 
more discriminating in deciding whom to accept, and whether the 
visits should be understood as training exercises or mutually 
beneficial research activities. 
A second area where design problems in the agreement are 
notable is export controls policya especially as it relates to 
t h e  space and high energy phys ics  agreements. Although Chinese 
economic retrenchment i s  making t h e s e  problems l e s s  p ress ing  a t  
t h e  moment, it i s  i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  note them never the less .  
I n  both t h e  space and HEP agreements, f u l l  implementation 
would have requi red  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of very advanced technology t o  
China. I n  t h e  case of t h e  space agreement, t h e r e  a r e  i n d i c a t i o n s  
t h a t  some high U . S .  o f f i c i a l s  d id  not know how advanced t h e  tech-  
nology of LANDSAT D ground s t a t i o n  w a s  when t h e  o f f e r  t o  f a c i l i -  
t a t e  t h e  s a l e  of one w a s  made. Resis tance t o  t h e  o f f e r  from 
w i t h i n  t h e  government suggests  t h a t  t h e r e  had been a f a i l u r e  
of e f f e c t i v e  inter-agency coordina t ion  p r i o r  t o  approaching t h e  
Chinese. 
F a i l u r e s  of inter-agency coordinat ion a r e  a l s o  evident  i n  
t h e  HEP case.  I n  s p i t e  of high l e v e l  p o l i c y  changes on expor ts  
t o  China made i n  1980, r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  po l i cy  w a s  encountered 
a t  lower l e v e l s  i n  t h e  bureaucracy. The HEP agreement r equ i red  
t h a t  a v a r i e t y  of advanced instruments  and devices  f o r  t h e  BPS 
be procured i n  t h e  U . S .  f o r  export  t o  China. Export l i c e n s e s  
on most of what  has been procured t h u s  far  have not  been granted. 
A s  i n d i c a t e d ,  budgetary cutbacks i n  China have made t h e  
export  con t ro l  i s s u e  i n  these  two agreements l e s s  p ress ing .  How- 
ever ,  export  con t ro l  i s s u e s  a r e  bound t o  a r i s e  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  
The U . S .  seems t o  l a c k  a c l e a r  p o l i c y  f o r  dea l ing  w i t h  them. 
The changes i n  p o l i c y  i n  1980 were intended t o  l i b e r a l i z e  t h e  
export  l i c e n s e  procedure t o  China considerably.  However, not  
only were these  new i n i t i a t i v e s  r e s i s t e d ,  t h e r e  s t i l l  seems t o  
be t ~ o  much ambiguity i n  t h e  dec i s iona l  c r i t e r i a  f o r  t h e  p o l i c y  
t o  be implemented, even i f  t h e  r e s i s t a n c e  were overcome. 
The two problems of funding and export  c o n t r o l s  a r e  t r e a t e d  
here a s  t h e  r e s u l t  of f l a w s  i n  t h e  underlying design of t h e  agree- 
ment, Given t h e  high p o l i t i c a l  v i s i b i l i t y  of t h e  agreement and 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  U.S. had as an ob jec t ive  t h e  s t r e n g t h e n i ~  of 
Chinese S & T c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  t h e  approaches taken  on t h e  funding 
and export  con t ro l  ques t ions  seem somewhat inappropr ia te .  I n  
t h e  l a t t e r ,  while t h e r e  w a s  an e f f o r t  t o  l i b e r a l i z e  expor t s ,  t he  
e f f o r t  appears  t o  have been somewhat uncoordinated and i n a t t e n t i v e  
t o  problems of implementation. 
With regard t o  funding, a case could be made t h a t  t h e  ap- 
proach taken followed wel l  e s t a b l i s h e d  p r i n c i p l e s  of in te rna -  
t i o n a l  S  & T co l l abora t ion .  According t o  t h i s  view, t r u e  mutu- 
a l i t y  of b e n e f i t s  should be t h e  o b j e c t i v e ,  and gu ide l ines  on 
funding should be drawn s o  as t o  enforce t h i s  p r i n c i p l e .  Agen- 
c i e s  should not have access  t o  s l ack  resources  o r  s p e c i a l  fund- 
i n g ,  s ince  t h i s  could lead  t o  l e s s  d i sc r imina t ing  judgments about 
what i s  t r u l y  b e n e f i c i a l  t o  them. 
There a r e  two d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i t h  t h i s  view when app l i ed  t o  
China. F i r s t ,  t h e  uneven l e v e l s  of S & T development make t h e  
search  f o r  mutual i ty  more d i f f i c u l t ,  though not  impossible.  
More impor tant ly ,  however, t h e  funding g u i d e l i n e s  l i m i t  t h e  a b i l -  
i t s  of t h e  agencies  t o  be as forthcoming as they  might be i n  
working toward the  s t a t e d  ob jec t ive  of a s s i s t i n g  i n  PRC S & T 
development. 
V.  Summary Assessment 
It i s  no easy t a s k  t o  reach  d e f i n i t i v e  judgments about a 
program which has  become as broad and d ive r se  as t h i s  one. 
C r i t e r i a  such a s  "mutual benef i t ' '  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  opera t ional -  
i z e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s ince  "benef i t J '  must include p o l i t i c a l  as well  
as s c i e n t i f i c  and technologica l  a spec t s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  l i f e  
of t h e  program i s  s t i l l  r a t h e r  s h o r t ,  and by i t s  very n a t u r e ,  
r e a l i s t i c  i n d i c a t i o n s  of b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s  w i l l  only become 
more evident  wi th  t h e  passage of t ime. 
Both t h e  U.S. and China understood a t  t h e  o u t s e t  t h a t  t h e  
program had more than  s c i e n t i f i c  s ign i f i cance .  Both s i d e s  under- 
s tood t h a t  it w a s  one component of a  process  of bu i ld ing  p o l i -  
t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s  between t h e  two c o u n t r i e s ,  and of overcoming 
t h e  e f f e c t s  of 30 years  of mutual i s o l a t i o n  and o f  markedly d i f -  
f e r e n t  s o c i a l  systems. R e a l i s t i c a l l y ,  S & T r e l a t i o n s  a r e  not 
a s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  and t h e  former can only 
be conducted when t h e  l a t t e r  a r e  v i a b l e .  But it seems t h a t  both 
s i d e s  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  former could s t rengthen  the l a t t e r .  
I n  t h e  s h o r t  run ,  it i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  judge whether S & T 
t i e s  have s t rengthened t h e  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  but  a t e n t a -  
t i v e  judgment i s  t h a t  it has.  This  judgment i s  based upon t h r e e  
cons idera t ions .  F i r s t  t h e r e  i s  no doubt t h a t  t h e  program has 
cont r ibuted  t o  b e t t e r  mutual understanding, t h e  development of 
personal  f r i e n d s h i p s ,  and t o  a  c e r t a i n  amount of !'people t o  people" 
con tac t .  A s  one American o f f i c i a l  pointed out  concerning the  l a t -  
t e r ,  t h e  impressions c rea ted  by Chinese de legat ions  on t a x i  dr iv-  
e r s ,  h o t e l  employees and o t h e r s  who s e r v i c e  t h e i r  v i s i t s  i s  no t  
i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  More impor tant ly ,  perhaps,  t h e  program has l e d  
t o  t h e  a c t i v e  i n t e r a c t i o n  of o f f i c i a l s  of t h e  two governments, 
and has forced  those o f f i c i a l s  t o  consider  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  
o the r  government i n  t h e i r  own p o l i c y  processes .  F i n a l l y ,  and 
fol lowing from t h e  above, t h e r e  i s  evidence t h a t  both  s i d e s  have 
made t h e  kinds of conscient ious e f f o r t s  t o  accommodate those  i n -  
t e r e s t s ,  which would i n d i c a t e  progress  toward a p o l i t i c a l  p a r t -  
nersh ip .  
The American s i d e  w i l l  have no d i f f i c u l t y  i n  recognizing 
what it cons iders  t o  be t h e  accommodations it has made, but  it 
i s  important t o  recognize t h a t  t h e  Chinese s i d e  f e e l s  it has 
made them as we l l .  These include such t h i n g s  as access  t o  fac-  
t o r y  management p r a c t i c e s ,  access  t o  r a r e  and va luable  spec ies  
of f l o r a  and fauna, t h e  p rov i s ion  of s p e c i a l  housing and f a c i l i -  
t i e s  f o r  American s c i e n t i s t s ,  t h e  acceptance of U.S. c r u i s e  ob- 
j e c t i v e s  i n  t h e  marine sedimentation s tudy and promised access  
t o  Chinese popula t ions  i n  a r e a s  of hea l th  research .  To Ameri- 
cans ,  t h e s e  may seem l i k e  small  concessions t h a t  would of course 
be expected of a cooperating p a r t n e r .  However, given Chinese 
condi t ions  of extensive bureaucratism, fragmented admin i s t r a t ive  
j u r i s d i c t i o n s  and t h e  mul t ip le  d i s r u p t i v e  l e g a c i e s  of t h e  Cul- 
t u r a l  Revolution y e a r s ,  t h e  genera l ly  favorable  impression of 
cooperat iveness  which most American o f f i c i a l s  have repor ted  came 
as a r e s u l t  of r e a l  e f f o r t s  on t h e  p a r t  of Chinese coun te rpa r t s .  
There have, of c w r s e ,  been problems and i r r i t a t i o n s  on 
both  s i d e s  as wel l .  But i t  i s  perhaps a measure of t h e  progress  
made, t h a t  these  have not  been allowed t o  permanently sour  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p .  They have, i n  genera l ,  been handled i n  a  s p i r i t  
of f r i e n d s h i p  and cooperation i n s t e a d .  
The progress  on t h e  l e v e l  of p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s  would not  
be poss ib le  without some sense of mutual b e n e f i t  on the  l e v e l  
of S & T cooperat ion i t s e l f .  It would be a mistake f o r  t h e  Ameri- 
can s i d e  t o  see t h e  b e n e f i t s  accruing only t o  China, and i t  i s  
r e g r e t t a b l e  t h a t  t h e r e  has developed among some Americans who 
a r e  concerned wi th  U.S.-PRC r e l a t i o n s ,  but who a r e  not i n t i -  
mately familiar wi th  the  d e t a i l s  of t h e  program, a cyn ica l  view 
t h a t  t h i s  i s  i n  f a c t  t h e  case.  While t h e  U . S .  s i d e  has reason 
t o  be disappointed t h a t  t h e  program has not  y ie lded  t h e  comrner- 
c i a 1  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  had been a n t i c i p a t e d ,  a number of s c i e n t i f i c  
b e n e f i t s  have emerged t h a t  perhaps were not a n t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  c a l c u l a t i o n  of "balance of b e n e f i t s . "  These include 
t h e  a r e a s  of a g r i c u l t u r e ,  seismology, meteorology, and oceano- 
graphy, wi th  expected b e n e f i t s  i n  e a r t h  sc iences ,  h e a l t h  and en- 
vironmental  s t u d i e s .  While t h e r e  a r e  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  l e v e l s  
of U.S. i n t e r e s t s  wi th in  and among these  f i e l d s ,  it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  
U . S .  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  high t o  make e f f o r t s  t o  charac- 
t e r i z e  t h e  program a s  a  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  e f f o r t  a  s e r i o u s  d i s -  
t o r t i o n  of what is going on. 
A s tandard approach t o  eva lua t ing  t h e  q u a l i t y  of s c i e n t i f i c  
cooperat ion is ,  of course,  t o  judge t h e  q u a l i t y  of t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  
papers  t h a t  r e s u l t .  Unfortunately,  it i s  s t i l l  too  e a r l y  t o  see  
t h i s  r e s u l t ,  but t h e  expecta t ion  of favorable  reviews from the  
s c i e n t i f i c  community i s  c e r t a i n l y  one of t h e  f a c t o r s  con t r ibu t ing  
t o  t h e  enthusiasm f o r  t h e  p r o j e c t  shown by U.  S .  s c i e n t i s t s  who 
have a c t u a l l y  been engaged i n  subs tant ive  r e sea rch  wi th  t h e  Chinese. 
The ques t ion  of b e n e f i t s  t o  t h e  PRC s i d e ,  and t h e  appropri-  
a t e n e s s  of t h e  program t o  PRC needs i s  discussed above. What 
has  not been addressed so f a r  i s  t h e  ques t ion  of PRC expecta t ions  
and t h e  danger of a "backlash" should those expecta t ions  not be 
r e a l i z e d .  
A t  one l e v e l ,  t h e  ques t ion  of expecta t ions  can be r e a d i l y  
answered. It i s  f a i r l y  s a f e  t o  say t h a t  expecta t ions  of those  
Chinese who a r e  c lose  t o  and f a m i l i a r  wi th  t h e  program a r e  not  
i n f l a t e d  o r  otherwise u n r e a l i s t i c .  Indeed, it has  become q u i t e  
c l e a r  t o  Chinese o f f i c i a l s  c lose  t o  t h e  program t h a t  i n  coopera- 
t i o n  wi th  t h e  U.S. (and i n  comparison w i t h  cooperation wi th  
o ther  OECD coun t r i e s )  one doesn ' t  g e t  something f o r  nothing,  
and t h e r e f o r e  t h e r e  i s  no reason t o  allow expecta t ions  t o  soar .  
The more d i f f i c u l t  ques t ion  i s  whether p o l i t i c a l l y  powerful 
Chinese who a r e  not c lose  t o  t h e  program have i n f l a t e d  expecta- 
t i o n s  which could l e a d  t o  disappointment and resentment i f  t hey  
a r e  not  r e a l i z e d .  One could develop an argument t h a t  such people 
e x i s t  and t h a t  such a danger i s  r e a l .  Such a n  argument need not 
p lay  a major r o l e  i n  a s sess ing  t h e  S & T program, however, f o r  
two reasons.  F i r s t ,  it i s  un l ike ly  t h a t  t h e  S & T program by 
i t s e l f  would r a i s e  u n r e a l i s t i c  expecta t ions .  The S & T program 
a s  p a r t  of t h e  l a r g e r  U.S.-PRC s t r a t e g i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p  could,  how- 
ever .  But i n  t h i s  case t h e  overarching p o l i t i c a l ,  and p a r t i c u -  
l a r l y  mi l i ta ry ,  r e l a t i o n s  w i l l  be determining. Second, i n f l a t e d  
expecta t ions  about U.S.-PRC S & T cooperat ion,  i f  they  e x i s t ,  
a r e  China's  problems, not ours.  I f  such expecta t ions  e x i s t ,  
t hey  a r e  presumably p a r t  of a view which s e e s  cooperat ion wi th  
t h e  U . S .  as an e l i x i r  which w i l l  r a p i d l y  cure t h e  dysfunct ions 
of PRC S & T development. This  would b e ,  i n  i t s  ignorance of 
a c t u a l  Chinese condi t ions ,  a r e g r e t t a b l e  view. I n  t h e  f i n a l  
a n a l y s i s ,  however, t h e  exis tence  of such a view does not  c a r r y  
any s p e c i f i c  impl ica t ions  f o r  U . S .  conduct of t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  
It c e r t a i n l y  would not  imply t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  should be 
reduced o r  terminated,  o r  even t h a t  t h e  U . S .  has a  s p e c i a l  r e -  
s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  disabuse those who might hold i t .  
There i s  a more s e r i o u s  ques t ion  of expec ta t ions ,  how- 
eve r ,  t h a t  r e q u i r e s  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  of t h e  new adminis t ra t ion .  
This  i s  not  a ques t ion  of i n f l a t e d  expec ta t ions ,  but r a t h e r  one 
of d isappoin t ing  those w i t h  r e a l i s t i c  expecta t ions .  A s  suggested 
at  s e v e r a l  p l a c e s  above, while t h e  Chinese who a r e  respons ib le  
f o r  t h e  program c e r t a i n l y  seek t o  ge t  as much b e n e f i t  f o r  China 
from it as p o s s i b l e ,  they  a l s o  give evidence of see ing  it  from 
t h e  pe r spec t ive  of t h e  development of a p o l i t i c a l  and s c i e n t i f i c  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  w i l l  be enduring. The program t h e r e f o r e  has 
symbolic p o l i t i c a l  importance t o  t h e  Chinese s i d e ,  a symbolic 
importance c e r t a i n l y  c u l t i v a t e d  by t h e  U . S .  s i d e  during t h e  
C a r t e r  Administration. 
For t h i s  reason,  unless  t h e  Reagan Administration i n t e n d s  
t o  a l t e r  fundamentally U . S .  China p o l i c y ,  t h e  symbolic import- 
ance of t h e  program should be recognized and subs tan t ive  coopera- 
t i o n  i n  keeping with t h e  l e v e l  of Chinese expecta t ions  should 
be supported.  A t  t h e  l e a s t ,  a s t rong  endorsement of t h e  program 
backed wi th  a  modest budgetary commitment t o  i t ,  would be a u s e f u l  
s i g n a l  t h a t  t h e  new admin i s t r a t ion  t a k e s  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p  with t h e  PRC s e r i o u s l y .  More a c t i v e  e f f o r t s  t o  expand t h e  
program, perhaps wi th  a  c r e a t i v e ,  more concessionary approach t o  
funding,  could be a u s e f u l  way t o  s i g n a l  U . S .  i n t e r e s t s  i n  moving 
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  forward, and would be an a l t e r n a t i v e  
t o  more c o n t r o v e r s i a l  (and probably l e s s  d e s i r a b l e )  " s igna l s"  
such as arms s a l e s .  
I have a l ready mentioned problems of information l o s s  i n  
t h e  conduct of t h e  program. I n  conducting t h e  s tudy,  I could 
not escape t h e  impression t h a t  t h e  w r i t t e n  record support ing 
t h e  program w a s  r a t h e r  weak. Analy t ica l  c a p a b i l i t i e s  a r e  not  
wel l  developed a t  e i t h e r  t h e  opera t iona l  o r  p o l i c y  management 
l e v e l s .  O f  course,  the  most egregious case of squandered oppor- 
t u n i t i e s  t o  generate  information from t h e  program i s  t h e  t o t a l  
l a c k  of i n t e r e s t  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  Commerce Department t o  i n -  
volve s p e c i a l i s t s  on t h e  Chinese economy and Chinese management 
i n  t h e  Dalian program. It would be r a t h e r  inconceivable  i f  a 
country l i k e  Japan undertook a Dalian-type p r o j e c t  and ignored 
t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  resources  and e x p e r t i s e  t h a t  would help produce 
maximum b e n e f i t  t o  t h e  Japanese. I n  t h e  U . S .  , such overs igh t s  
a r e  becoming a n a t i o n a l  t r a i t .  
Information l o s s ,  and l o s s  of oppor tun i t i e s  t o  genera te  
information,  a r e  a l s o  evident  i n  t h e  approach t h e  U . S .  has taken  
t o  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of t h e  science a t t a c h e  i n  t h e  embassy i n  Bei j ing .  
While an experienced s c i e n t i s t  w a s  chosen f o r  t h e  p o s i t i o n ,  t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  of h i s  d u t i e s  and t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  provide support  
staff has meant t h a t  t h e  value of t h e  a t t a c h e ' s  experience and 
e x p e r t i s e  i s  not  being r e a l i z e d .  There i s  no po in t  t o  s e l e c t  
a sen io r  s c i e n t i s t  f o r  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  i f  he i s  only expected t o  
adminis te r  t h e  program. If i n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  sc ience  a t t a c h e ' s  
time i s  spent  on admin i s t r a t ive  d e t a i l s  because of a l a c k  of 
s e c r e t a r i a l  suppor t ,  one c a n ' t  expect him t o  make t h e  kinds of 
extensive con tac t s  among Chinese S & T personnel t h a t  would per-  
m i t  exper t  assessments of Chinese s c i e n t i f i c  r e sea rch  and tech-  
no log ica l  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  It would be a mistake t o  assume t h a t  
g e n e r a l i s t  commercial o f f i c e r s  could make such assessments.  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  a r e  important ques t ions  of how t h e  sc ience  a t t a -  
c h e ' s  r e p o r t s  a r e  received and used i n  Washington, and whether 
he i s  ab le  t o  serve a s  a science adv i se r  t o  t h e  U.S. ambassador. 
However, i t  may be t o o  soon t o  reach judgments on t h e s e  ques t ions .  
It i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  compare t h e  Swedish approach t o  t h e  
sc ience  a t t a c h e ' s  r o l e  with t h a t  of t h e  U.S. The former has a 
p r o f e s s i o n a l  staff of f i v e ,  and i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  a r t i c u l a t e  d i r e c t l y  
wi th  Swedish commercial i n t e r e s t s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  r e p o r t i n g  back 
t o  t h e  Swedish government i n  Stockholm, t h e  science a t t a c h e  a l s o  
sha res  information on a  systematic  b a s i s  with t h e  Research Po l i cy  
Program of t h e  Univers i ty  of Lund. 
A s  a r e s u l t  of these  arrangements, t h e  sc ience  a t t a c h e  has 
t h e  time t o  v i s i t  Chinese research  i n s t i t u t e s  and f a c t o r i e s ,  and 
t h e  information gained from such v i s i t s  i s  f e d  back t o  Lund 
where it i s  sub jec t  t o  sys temat ic  a n a l y s i s  by a  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
s t a f f .  When t h e  Swedish e f f o r t s  a r e  compared wi th  those of t h e  
U.S., it i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  escape t h e  conclusion t h a t  Sweden t a k e s  
i t s  S  & T r e l a t i o n s  wi th  China more s e r i o u s l y  than  does the  U .  S. 
( i n  s p i t e  of t h e  much l a r g e r  s i z e  of t h e  U . S .  program) and more 
genera l ly ,  i s  more a t t e n t i v e  t o  t h e  r o l e  of S & T i n  fo re ign  
p o l i c y  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e .  
A s t r a t e g y  t o  overcome 30 years  of mutual h o s t i l i t y  and 
misunderstandings could be based on assumptions of caut ion ,  gradu- 
a l n e s s  and t h e  maintenance of a low p r o f i l e .  The Car te r  ~ d m i n i -  
s t r a t i o n ,  i n  genera l ,  d id  not fol low t h i s  s t r a t e g y .  I t s  s t r a t e g y  
i n s t e a d  w a s  t o  mobilize a  broad range of American i n t e r e s t s  i n -  
c luding ,  of course,  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  agencies  of the  U.S. govern- 
ment, t o  seek con tac t s  w i t h  t h e  PRC and i n i t i a t e  a v a r i e t y  of 
programmatic a c t i v i t i e s .  I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  behavior on t h e  Chinese 
s i d e  showed c e r t a i n  p a r a l l e l s .  
A s  suggested a t  var ious  p o i n t s  i n  t h i s  r e p o r t ,  it w a s  not 
p o s s i b l e  t o  p l a n  f o r  a l l  of t h e  cont ingencies  once t h e  mobiliza- 
t i o n  took p l a c e ,  and although e f f o r t s  were made t o  modulate t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  through admin i s t r a t ive  means, t h e s e  e f f o r t s  had 
mixed r e s u l t s .  I n  add i t ion ,  while t h e r e  was a conscious e f f o r t  
t o  c r e a t e  a const i tuency f o r  t h e  new China r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  doubts 
p e r s i s t e d  about t h e  conduct of Car te r  Administration China pol-  
i c y  i n  t h e  most important const i tuency of a l l ,  t h e  U . S .  Congress. 
A s  a r e s u l t ,  once t h e  i n i t i a l  mobi l iza t ion  w a s  e f f e c t e d ,  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  grounds f o r  follow-through support a c t i v i t i e s  were 
not a s  f i rm as they  might have been. This  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  
w i t h  regard t o  funding and export  con t ro l s .  
One of t h e  conclusions of t h i s  s tudy i s  t h a t  i n  s p i t e  of 
t h e  very  g r e a t  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  two c o u n t r i e s ,  t o  a re -  
markable extent  t h e  mobi l iza t ion  s t r a t e g y  has been successfu l .  A 
wide v a r i e t y  of mutually b e n e f i c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i n  S & T have 
been es tab l i shed ,and  it i s  u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e y  would have been had 
a  more cau t ious ,  low p r o f i l e  approach been followed. For i n -  
s t a n c e ,  i n  t h e  oceanography a r e a ,  had t h e r e  no t  been t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
entrepreneurship t h a t  cha rac te r i zes  the  mobi l iza t ion  s t r a t e g y ,  
it i s  q u i t e  conceivable t h a t  both s i d e s  would now be i n  a pro- 
t r a c t e d  nego t i a t ion  over d e t a i l s  f o r  poss ib le  p r o j e c t s  i n s t e a d  
of sha r ing  e x c i t i n g  new knowledge from a success fu l ly  completed 
f i r s t  c r u i s e ,  and planning f o r  f u t u r e  a c t i v i t i e s  on t h e  b a s i s  
of mutual understandings t h a t  d id  not  e x i s t  t h r e e  yea r s  ago. 
The Dalian p r o j e c t ,  which has not  escaped c r i t i c i s m  i n  t h i s  r e -  
p o r t ,  i s  another  example of how p o l i t i c a l  en t repreneurs  were a b l e  
t o  ge t  a va luable  and i n t e r e s t i n g  p r o j e c t  s t a r t e d  i n  s p i t e  of t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  numerous reasons could be mustered f o r  a  more caut ious  
approach. Other examples could be c i t e d .  
One d i f fe rence  between p o l i t i c a l  and p r i v a t e  entrepreneur-  
s h i p ,  however, i s  t h a t  t h e  consequences of and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
stemming from t h e  en t repreneur ia l  a c t  f o r  t h e  former a r e  o f t e n  
e a s i e r  t o  evade. With a  change of admin i s t r a t ions ,  t h e  problem 
of confront ing consequences and dea l ing  with r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
becomes f u r t h e r  b lu r red .  Yet a  f a i l u r e  t o  fol low through on 
i n i t i a t i v e s  t h a t  have a l r eady  been taken by t h e  U . S .  government 
would c r e a t e  t h e  impression t h a t  t h e  U.S. i s  a f f l i c t e d  w i t h  t h e  
f i c k l e n e s s  of t h e  immature. 
The Chinese have ind ica ted  t h e i r  o v e r a l l  s a t i s f a c t i o n  with 
t h e  program of S & T cooperat ion,  and i n  most a r e a s ,  f i n d  t h a t  
it i s  cons i s t en t  with t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  i n  S & T development. They 
have a l s o  expressed t h e  view t h a t  they  regard t h e  program as an 
important p a r t  of t h e  o v e r a l l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  A s  a r e s u l t ,  t hey  
be l i eve  they  have made accommodations t o  U . S .  i n t e r e s t s  i n  some 
p r o j e c t s  t h a t  a r e  not  as c lose  t o  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  as t h e y  might 
be, and i n  some s i t u a t i o n s  where e s t ab l i shed  Chinese p r a c t i c e s  
would have prevented cooperation had they  no t  been changed. 
The program has a l s o  produced b e n e f i c i a l  and s c i e n t i f i -  
c a l l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  opportu&ies f o r  t h e  U.S. s i d e ,  which a r e  
perhaps not  as widely known as they  might be.  However, a f t e r  
t a k i n g  many of t h e  i n i t i a t i v e s  i n  t h e  program, most of which 
have been remarkably success fu l ,  t h e  U.S. s i d e  seems a b i t  un- 
su re  of what t h e  o v e r a l l  U.S.-PRC r e l a t i o n s h i p  means t o  t h e  U . S . ,  
where it would l i k e  t o  see  t h e  r e l z t i o n s h i p  going, and what t h e  
r o l e  of S & T cooperat ion i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  should be. 
The purpose of t h i s  s tudy w a s  not t o  evalua te  U . S .  China 
p o l i c y ,  but  w a s  r a t h e r  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  appropr ia teness  of t h e  
S  & T program f o r  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of both c o u n t r i e s ,  and t o  a s s e s s  
t h e  degree t o  which it i s  cons i s t en t  wi th  U.S. China p o l i c y  a s  
def ined by t h e  Car te r  Administration. The conclusion i s  t h a t  
wi th in  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  a f f e c t i n g  both c o u n t r i e s ,  and wi th  due 
regard  t o  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  two p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
systems, t h e  program has been appropr ia t e ,  and has been a s i g n i -  
f i c a n t  instrument of po l i cy  f o r  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  def ined.  But as 
t h e  d i scuss ion  above i n d i c a t e s ,  t h e  program i s  not  without prob- 
lems. The f i n a l  s e c t i o n  of t h e  r e p o r t  o f f e r s  suggest ions f o r  
amel iora t ing  some of them. 
TI. Recommendat i o n s  
Since one of t h e  c e n t r a l  conclusions of t h i s  s tudy i s  t h a t  
t h e  program f o r  S  & T cooperation has served the  i n t e r e s t s  of 
both s i d e s ,  t h e  main recommendation i s  t h a t  t h e  program be 
continued at least at roughly current levels. A significant 
expansion of the program at this time would not be appropriate 
in light of the financial strictures both sides now feel, un- 
less creative new approaches to financing are adopted. This, 
however, would require renewed momentum in the political rela- 
tionship. Should the U.S. clarify its China policy to a greater 
extent than it has done as of this writing, and decide that 
U.S.-PRC S & T cooperation is in the long term interests of the 
two countries (a view which this investigator endorses), one 
approach to providing greater flexibility in funding might be 
the creation of an endowment fund for S & T cooperation with 
contributions from both sides (including perhaps the U.S. pri- 
vate sector). While this approach has not been widely used in 
U.S. foreign relations in S & T, a version of it supports U.S.- 
Israel cooperative programs, and it might have considerable 
political significance (as well as operational usefulness) in 
relations with China, should both sides agree that the relation- 
ship warrants a special approach. 
On the assumption that original approaches to funding are 
unlikely for the foreseeable future, it is nevertheless desir- 
able and financially possible to carry to completion the current 
items in the various work programs. In addition, to maintain 
momentum, as current activities are completed, U.S. agencies 
should be encouraged to initiate some new activities in keeping 
with their interests and resources, and to be receptive to PRC 
initiatives. While it is neither possible nor desirable to 
limit U.S.-PRC S & T relations to the bilaterals, the latter 
have served as an important br idge between t h e  two s c i e n t i f i c  
communities and t h e  t e c h n i c a l  agencies  of t h e  two coun t r i e s .  
It i s  important t o  keep t h e  br idge i n  good r e p a i r  f o r  a few 
more y e a r s  a t  l e a s t ,  while ind iv idua l s  and groups on both  s i d e s  
discover  new and perhaps more v i a b l e  modes of i n t e r a c t i o n .  
Budget c o n s t r a i n t s  on both s i d e s  w i l l  be s i g n i f i c a n t  ob- 
s t a c l e s  t o  expanded cooperation f o r  t h e  foreseeable  f u t u r e .  
There a r e  a number of impl ica t ions  t h a t  stem from t h i s  f a c t .  
F i r s t ,  t he  U.S. government cannot poss ib ly  a n t i c i p a t e  a l l  t h e  
resources  i n  t h e  U.S. t h a t  might be a v a i l a b l e  t o  support  U.S.- 
PRC S & T cooperat ion.  It i s  t h e r e f o r e  d e s i r a b l e  t o  make 
g r e a t e r  e f f o r t s  t o  involve non-governmental p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  b i -  
l a t e r a l s  i n  order  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  matching of oppor tun i t i e s  
with resources .  This  poin t  i s  discussed f u r t h e r  below. 
Second, t i g h t  budgets w i l l  and should f o r c e  g r e a t e r  scru-  
t i n y  of t h e  program with an  idea  toward reassess ing  b e n e f i t s .  
Under condi t ions  of s c a r c i t y ,  t h e  concept of " b e n e f i t "  i s  l i k e l y  
t o  be sub jec t  t o  a more r igorous  d e f i n i t i o n .  It i s  appropr ia t e  
under such circumstances f o r  t h e  U.S. t o  maintain i t s  "benef i t -  
ing  s i d e  pays" p o s i t i o n  i n  s p i t e  of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  China's  o the r  
p a r t n e r s  i n  S  & T cooperat ion a r e  more generous. However, t h e  
U.S. should o f f e r  the  PRC a d e t a i l e d  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h i s  pos i -  
t i o n ,  emphasizing U.S. p r a c t i c e s  i n  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  wi th  o the r  
coun t r i e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  use of " b e n e f i t i n g  s i d e  pays" i n  
communications wi th  t h e  Chinese should be discont inued.  The 
concept has not been acceptable  t o  t h e  PRC and i s  i n h e r e n t l y  
ambiguous. There seems t o  be no reason not  t o  s u b s t i t u t e  in -  
s t ead  such concepts as "reimbursable" and "non-reimbursable" 
forms of cooperation. This terminology is in fact used in some 
of the agreements and is used in agreements with other countries. 
The shift in terminology should, however, be accompanied by a 
change in the practice of writing agreements. Future agree- 
ments, including where feasible, the annual work programs under 
existing protocols, should provide more detailed statements of 
how the projects to be performed are to be financed. 
In addition, the U.S. should make an extra effort to ex- 
plore alternative means for funding projects of interest to the 
PRC but not of direct benefit to the U.S. This might include 
U.S. support for PRC initiatives toward international funding 
agencies. It might also include creative new approaches towards 
limited concessionary financing on a bilateral basis. Creative 
approaches are particularly warranged in the area of PRC hydro- 
power development, where the long term benefits to both sides 
are substantial, but where short term funding problems threaten 
to stymie the relationship. 
Third, in spite of tight budgets and approaches to coopera- 
tion on the basis of the benefiting side formula, the continu- 
ation of the program at present levels will be difficult if 
modest sums are not available for investments in the program. 
The U.S. practice of funding activities out of existing agency 
budgets (with the few exceptions noted) has the advantage of 
enforcing discipline on the agencies in their assessments of 
the value of PRC activities to them, It is also a useful de- 
vice for protecting funds for activities with the PRC from zeal- 
ous budget cutters. It is, however, a poor way to account for 
t h e  t o t a l  b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s  of t h e  S  & T program and tends  t o  
undervalue t h e  importance of investments needed t o  r e a l i z e  f u l l  
b e n e f i t s .  A p a r t i c u l a r  form of investment t h a t  i s  a b s o l u t e l y  
necessary f o r  t h e  program is t r a v e l .  While t h e r e  may have been 
excess s l a c k  i n  t r a v e l  budgets f o r  t h e  government as a whole, 
i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  see  how t h e  cont inuat ion  and growth of t h e  
China program (and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s c i e n t i f i c  a c t i v i t i e s  genera l ly )  
can occur without adequate t r a v e l  funds.  It i s  t h e r e f o r e  d e s i r -  
a b l e  t o  s e t  funds a s i d e  f o r  e s s e n t i a l  FRC program t r a v e l ,  e i t h e r  
w i t h i n  t h e  va r ious  agencies ,  o r  i n  a s p e c i a l  account con t ro l l ed  
by t h e  DOS. 
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  ques t ion  of fundi'ng should be put  on t h e  agenda 
of t h e  next  Zoint  Commission meeting. The approach should be 
l e s s  t o  i ' n i t i a t e  n e g o t i a t i 0 . n ~  than  t o  explore p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  
Since both  s i d e s  a r e  experiencing economic d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  t h e  
time i s  r i g h t  f o r  a f rank  exchange of views on how those d i f f i -  
c u l t i e s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  cons t ra in  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  program, 
and. on how improvements can be made i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  b a s i s  of 
t h e  program. 
Another conclusion of t h e  s tudy i s  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between t h e  U . S .  government and t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i s  not  as 
good as it  should be.  I n  a few a r e a s ,  it i s  bad. I n  most o the r s  
it i s  r e l a t i v e l y  non-exis tent .  The commercial b e n e f i t s  of t h e  
program were probably overestimated a t  t h e  o u t s e t ,  and hopes 
f o r  commerce on some of t h e  "b ig  t i c k e t ' '  i tems have been dashed 
by PRC economic retrenchment. 
The time is  now r i g h t  f o r  a re th ink ing  on t h e  U.  S. s i d e  
of t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between b i l a t e r a l  S & T a c t i v i t i e s  and t r a d e  
promotion. Three recommendations a r e  o f fe red  i n  t h i s  regard.  
F i r s t ,  t r a d e  promotion i n t e r e s t s  should be represented  a t  what 
I have c a l l e d  t h e  po l i cy  management l e v e l .  Concretely t h i s  
would involve inc luding  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  wi th  t r a d e  promotion 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  from t h e  DOC on t h e  Executive S e c r e t a r y ' s  Som- 
m i t t e e ,  and a more a c t i v e  l i a i s o n  between DOC and DOS/OES i n  
t h i s  a r e a .  biithout too  much d i f f i c u l t y ,  one could imagine 
how t h e  t r a d e  promotion resources  of t h e  DOC could be coordi-  
na ted  more with t h e  b i l a t e r a l s .  For i n s t a n c e ,  Chinese p a r t i -  
c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  b i l a t e r a l s  could be presented  s p e c i a l l y  pre-  
pared l i t e r a t u r e  i n  Chinese on p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  a c t i v i t i e s  par-  
a l l e l i n g  those  i n  t h e  government and on the  type of i n s t r u -  
mentation and support  s e r v i c e s  f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  r e sea rch  a v a i l -  
a b l e  from t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r .  Specia l  meetings between Chin- 
ese  s c i e n t i s t s  and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  could 
be hosted by DOC, and appropr ia t e ly  def ined and organized t o u r s  
of p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  f a c i l i t i e s  could be organized. 
Second, ind iv idua l  agencies  wi th  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  pro- 
t o c o l  implementation should attempt t o  formalize t h e i r  r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p s  w i t h  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  such t h a t  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  views on 
a c t i v i t i e s  wi th  the  PRC a r e  r o u t i n e l y  incorporated i n t o  agency 
planning.  It may not be poss ib le  o r  appropr ia te  f o r  a l l  agen- 
c i e s  t o  emulate t h e  USDA model, but  USDA experience should be 
s tudied .  Perhaps t h e  most p ress ing  a r e a  where more formalized 
consu l t a t ions  a r e  needed i s  i n  hydropower. 
F i n a l l y ,  some r e s o l u t i o n  must be brought t o  t h e  export  con- 
t r o l  problem. I n  t h e  course of t h e  s tudy,  t h e r e  w a s  some 
i n d i r e c t  evidence t h a t  the  export  c o n t r o l  process ,  and t h e  un- 
c e r t a i n t i e s  surrounding i t ,  have had an  a n t i c i p a t o r y  impact on 
Chi'nese behavior .  That i s ,  t h e  mere exis tence  of t h e  c o n t r o l s  
de te r red  Chinese p u r s u i t  of commercial r e l a t i o n s  growing out of 
t h e  b i l a t  e r a l s  . 
There i s  c l e a r l y  no easy s o l u t i o n  t o  export  con t ro l  prob- 
lems, but  i n  t h e  context of t h e  S & T b i l a t e r a l s ,  t h e r e  i s  a 
need f o r  g r e a t e r  coordina t ion  between agencies  who a r e  i n i -  
t i a t i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  with t h e  PRC, o f f i c i a l s  respons ib le  f o r  China 
p o l i c y ,  o f f i c i a l s  respons ib le  f o r  making export  l i c e n s e  deci-  
s ions  and t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r .  To t h e  extent  p o s s i b l e ,  export  
c o n t r o l  ques t ions  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  cooperat ive agreements should 
be resolved  before  t h e  agreement i s  s igned,  and once s igned,  the 
agreements should serve t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  l i c e n s i n g  process .  
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  conduct of most of t h e  b i -  
l a t e r a l s  and t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  community i n  genera l  does not  i n  f a c t  
seem t o  be a major problem, although as noted above, t h e r e  a r e  
percept ions  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  not  as good a s  i t  might be. 
I n  a few cases  t h e r e  may be underlying competit ive t e n s i o n s  
between u n i v e r s i t y  and government s c i e n t i s t s  t h a t  could under 
c e r t a i n  condi t ions  become problematic.  The problem of coordin- 
a t i n g  u n i v e r s i t y  ca lendars ,  g ran t  cyc les  and agency a c t i v i t i e s  
may a l s o  i n h i b i t  a more e f f e c t i v e  coordina t ion  of u n i v e r s i t y  
a c t i v i t i e s  and t h e  b i l a t e r a l s .  One way t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  r e -  
sources  held a t  u n i v e r s i t i e s  might be exp lo i t ed  more f u l l y  
would be t o  involve a  body l i k e  t h e  CSCPRC, wi th  extens ive  
u n i v e r s i t y  con tac t s ,  more a c t i v e l y  i n  the  planning and execu- 
t i o n  of a c t i v i t i e s  under t h e  b i l a t e r a l s .  Again, USDA 
experience may a l s o  be of relevance t o  t o  o the r  agencies  and 
deserves a t t e n t i o n .  
Another conclusion of t h e  s tudy i s - t h a t  the  information 
b e n e f i t s  t o  t h e  U. S. from t h e  program a r e  no t  as g r e a t  as 
they  should be.  There i s  c l e a r l y  a  need f o r  more c e n t r a l i z e d  
c o l l e c t i o n  and a n a l y s i s  of information and f o r  a mechanism t o  
insure  t h a t  a n a l y s i s  reaches po l i cy  makers who need i t .  F i r s t ,  
t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  agencies  should enforce a requireme,nt t h a t  
a l l  program r e l a t e d  t r a v e l  must be followed by a t r i p  r e p o r t .  
A s tandard  r e p o r t i n g  form should be a v a i l a b l e  as an op t iona l  
mode of r epor t ing .  Copies of a l l  t r i p  r e p o r t s  should be sent  
t o  t h e  Executive Secre tary  i n  OES. Since it i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  
OES w i l l  have t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  sus ta ined  a n a l y s i s ,  informa- 
t i o n  generated i n  t h e  program should r o u t i n e l y  be made a v a i l -  
a b l e  t o  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  outs ide  t h e  government. Some of 
t h e  information may be c l a s s i f i e d ,  but c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  need not 
be a major problem s ince  usua l ly  t h e  information needing pro- 
t e c t i o n  can be r e a d i l y  excerpted.  
It may be d e s i r a b l e  t o  f o s t e r  t h i s  a n a l y t i c  a c t i v i t y  on 
a con t rac t  b a s i s .  Agaic, t h e  use of CSCPRC comes t o  mind s ince  
they have some re levan t  experience and could develop t h e  needed 
c a p a b i l i t y .  However, low-cost non-contractual p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
a l s o  e x i s t .  There a r e  non-governmental p a r t i e s  with p ro fess iona l  
i n t e r e s t s  i n  China who would be happy t o  r ece ive  t r i p  r e p o r t s  
and r e p o r t s  from t h e  SCIATT, and who would do t h e  a n a l y s i s  as 
p a r t  of ongoing p ro fess iona l  research  a c t i v i t i e s .  
The a n a l y s i s  func t ion  could more f u l l y  serve  t h e  U.S.-PRC 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  i f  t h e r e  were more complete information on Chinese 
p o l i c y  th inking  and processes .  The Chinese s i d e  should recog- 
n ize  t h a t  it i s  i n  i t s  i n t e r e s t  t o  share  information about i t s  
sc ience  and technology p o l i c i e s  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  arrangements 
f o r  R & D.  Given t h e  importance of S & T r e l a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  over- 
a l l  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  it would be use fu l  t o  both s i d e s  i f  a s m a l l  
j o i n t  sc ience  p o l i c y  s t u d i e s  group were e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  would 
produce an annual r e p o r t  t o  be shared wi th  a l l  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  
agenci e s  . 
A f i n a l  a r e a  of f i n d i n g s  involves t h e  a r t i c u l a t i o n  of t h e  
S  & T program with China p o l i c y  more genera l ly .  Four i n t e r r e -  
l a t e d  p o i n t s  can be made. F i r s t ,  t h e r e  appears  t o  be on t h e  
U.S. s i d e  a  l a c k  of long term v i s i o n  i n  both China p o l i c y  gen- 
e r a l l y  and t h e  S  & T program p a r t i c u l a r l y .  While s h o r t  term 
b e n e f i t s  t o  both s i d e s  can be r e a d i l y  demonstrated, by s t a y i n g  
t h e  course,  t h e  f u t u r e  holds even more s u b s t a n t i a l  p o l i t i c a l  
and s c i e n t i f i c  b e n e f i t s .  Yet,  t h e  U.S. seems t o  r e s i s t  t a k i n g  
t h e  longer  term view, and seems unclear  about how t h e  PRC con- 
nec t ion  f i t s  i n t o  i t s  long term i n t e r e s t s .  A s  a r e s u l t ,  t h e  
i n e v i t a b l e  shor t  term i r r i t a t i o n s  and f r u s t r a t i o n s ,  and percep- 
t i o n s  of Chinese domestic problems has produced a cynicism t h a t  
i s  n ~ t  conducive t o  t h e  progress ive  conduct of t h e  S  & T r e l a t i o n -  
ship.  Publ ic f2rendiness"  perhaps has had too  much o f  an impact 
on o f f i c i a l s  whose duty it i s  t o  r i s e  above " t r end iness"  i n  
order  t o  cha r t  a  course which w i l l  s e rve  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  
over t h e  long run. 
A r e l a t e d  problem i s  t h e  uncer t a in  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  PRC 
i n  U . S .  p o l i c y  th ink ing  and p o l i c y  procedures.  The U.S. seems 
unable or unwilling to clarify the status of the PRC for the 
purposes of implementing policy within the context of U.S. laws. 
This is a problem that has concrete consequences for such ques- 
tions as how PRC scientists are to be treated in government sup- 
ported laboratories, how export license applications are treated, 
and how the question of concessionary aid and Exim credits 
should be approached. 
A third problem is that public awareness and understand- 
ing of the S & T programs is low. This is true even for such 
"attentive publics" as commercial firms wishing to trade with 
China (often in S & T related products) and the professional 
"China community." It is neither necessary nor desirable to 
engage in elaborate public relations or make exaggerated claims 
for the program, but more attention to educating the public 
as to the value of the program does seem warranted. 
A final problem uncovered is the tendency on the U.S. side 
to undervalue the role of the S & T program in U.S.-PRC rela- 
tions. This conclusion is somewhat ironic in light of the role 
of S & T in U.S.-PRC normalization, but is an understandable 
reflection of the unfortunately low status accorded S & T as 
an instrument-of U.S. foreign policy generally. The initial 
weak support provided the SCIATT in Beijing and the failure to 
develop in house analytic capabilities on the conduct of the 
program are symptomatic of this orientation. The failure to 
prepare for the linking of S & T and export promotion is also 
indicative of failures to perceive how the comparative advan- 
tage of the U.S. can be used to advance U.S. interests. 
I n  l i g h t  of China's  cu r ren t  s i t u a t i o n ,  inc luding  t h e  em- 
p h a s i s  now being placed on con t rac t  r e sea rch ,  an example of a 
c r e a t i v e  new i n i t i a t i v e  t o  use S  & T t o  support  U.S.-PRC r e l a -  
t i o n s  while a l s o  involving t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  would be t o  work 
with t h e  Chinese s i d e  i n  developing a model con t rac t  r e sea rch  
i n s t i t u t e .  U.S. experience with t h e  establ ishment  of t h e  h ighly  
success fu l  Korean I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Science and Technology (KIST) 
might provide i n s p i r a t i o n ,  but would not  n e c e s s a r i l y  r ep resen t  
a model t o  be emulated. The work of such an  i n s t i t u t e  might 
i n i t i a l l y  be o r i en ted  t o  t h e  improvement of China 's  export  per-  
formance (and thus  serve t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of U.S.-PRC t r a d e  i n  t h e  
long r u n ) ,  and i t s  success fu l  opera t ion  might serve  a s  an e f fec -  
t i v e  c a t a l y s t  f o r  much needed reforms i n  China's  r e sea rch  sys- 
tem. I f  proper ly  approached, t h e  U.S. p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  could be 
expected t o  a c t i v e l y  p a r t i c i p a t e  ( the  Dalian p r o j e c t  i n d i c a t e s  
such wi l l ingness ,  a l b e i t  on a  more modest s c a l e ) .  Such a pro- 
ject,however, would requ i re  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  of U.S. i n t e r e s t s  v& 
a v i s  China, considerable  thought about f i n a n c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i -  - -  
t i e s ,  and considerable  e f f o r t  t o  o r c h e s t r a t e  a l l  of t h e  i n t e r -  
e s t ed  p a r t i e s .  However, i n s t e a d  of sus ta ined  and thought fu l  
exp lo ra t ions  of t h i s  type i n t o  how t h e  S  & T r e l a t i o n s h i p  could 
be c r e a t i v e l y  developed t o  serve  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  and economic i n -  
t e r e s t s  of both  c o u n t r i e s ,  much of U.S. p o l i c y  th inking  has be- 
comedidzacted by t h e  p u r s u i t  of a l a r g e l y  chimerical  m i l i -  
t a r y  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  
The determinat ion of t h e  r o l e  of U.S.-PRC r e l a t i o n s  i n  long 
term c a l c u l a t i o n s  of U.S. i n t e r e s t s  i s  beyond t h e  scope of t h i s  
study. However, an evaluation of the S & T program is not un- 
related to the problems of making such a determination. On 
balance, the conclusions of this study are that the program in 
S & T cooperation with China has been remarkably succesqful 
thus far in spite of inadequate public understanding of the 
program, and in spite of inadequate institutional preparation 
to capitalize on opportunities to advance the national interest 
through S & T cooperation. The Chinese side has found parti- 
cipation in the program to be in its interest, and in general, 
has shown good faith in carrying out its responsibilities. 
The summary recommendations of this report therefore are (1) 
that the U.S. continue its support for the program; (2) that it 
do so with long term mutual benefits in mind; (3) and that it 
prepare itself more adequately to realize those benefits by 
upgrading the status of S & T in foreign policy with the corol- 
lary that scientific, commercial and foreign policy interests 
be more effectively coordinated. 
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